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Abstract 
This thesis examines financial reporting behaviors of private medium-sized 
family companies in the UK, particularly focusing on the effects of ownership 
structure on financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosure among private 
companies. Furthermore, the thesis examines the impact that family ownership 
has on the association between financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency. 
 
Competing predictions derived from agency theory leave an open question on the 
relationship between private family firms and financial reporting quality. It is 
unclear whether private family firms increase agency costs due to their pursuit of 
non-economic goals or decrease agency costs as a result of their incentives to 
maximize family wealth (Carney, Essen, Gedajlovic and Heugens, 2013). These 
questions are answered by employing panel data of medium-sized UK private 
companies for the period 2004-2007, and several measures are used to proxy for 
financial reporting quality and to deal with the multi-dimensional aspects of 
earnings quality.  
 
Panel regression model results reveal that family ownership impacts positively on 
financial reporting quality and family companies report less conservatively 
compared to non-family companies, suggesting that family companies are less 
conservative in their financial reporting as they might have fewer agency and 
litigation concerns. Examination of the proprietary cost hypothesis reveals that 
family companies are significantly and positively associated with the likelihood 
of lodging abbreviated financial reports, suggesting family companies have less 

vi 
incentives to provide voluntary information as they incur more costs in terms of 
loss of proprietary information. In addition, using deviations from expected 
investment to examine investment efficiency, this thesis finds that financial 
reporting quality is consistent with financial reporting quality mitigating both 
under and overinvestment. However, there is no support for the conjecture that 
specificities of family ownership is effective in mitigating investment efficiency. 
 
This thesis contributes to the extant literature on private family companies.  In 
particular it highlights that private companies are not a homogeneous group and 
although private family companies exhibit higher financial reporting quality 
compared to their nonfamily counterparts, they have less incentives for voluntary 
disclosure. Furthermore, it highlights that despite the costs, private companies 
derive an economic benefit in the form of increased investment efficiency by 
having higher quality information to make investment decisions. 

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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Most of what we know regarding family firm behaviour, particularly financial 
reporting behaviours, is based on large, publicly listed companies. In contrast, this 
thesis examines financial reporting behaviours of private medium-sized family 
companies, in particular the effect of ownership structure on measures of accruals 
quality and disclosure1 of private companies in the UK. Theory suggests that 
family firms are more susceptible to Agency Problem Type II between controlling 
family and other stakeholders as well as agency costs engendered by altruism 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz, 2001). However, recent empirical 
research maintains private family firms may also derive agency benefits such as 
increased incentives to monitor firm performance and minimal pressure to meet 
short term objectives.  These benefits are attributed to the fact that compared to 
public family firms, private family firms are relatively insulated from capital 
market pressure and because substantial ownership closely ties firm wealth to 
family wealth, factors which may affect the financial reporting behaviour of 
family firms (Carney, Essen, Gedajlovic and Heugens, 2013). Furthermore, 
research suggests that high quality financial reporting is important for internal 
decision-making (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Hence, this thesis not only 
investigates financial reporting behaviours but also the impact that family 
ownership has on the association between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency. 
 

1 Disclosure refers to the choice to disclose information regarding sales and cost of sales which is 
voluntary for medium-sized private companies in the UK prior to 2008. 


2 
Privately held entities constitute the majority of companies in the world (Chen, 
Hope, Li and Wang, 2011). In the United Kingdom, private companies outnumber 
public companies representing 99.6 per cent of all incorporated entities 
(Companies House, 2009/10). According to the 2010 Forbes list of largest private 
companies, employment and gross domestic product of the top ten privately held 
companies in the US alone employ more than one million people and account for 
$4.9 billion or three per cent of America’s gross domestic product in revenue. 
Furthermore, small and medium-sized companies play a major role in both 
developing and developed economies. SMEs account for 95 per cent of all 
companies in most countries (Chiao, Yang and Yu, 2006) and provide close to 60 
per cent of manufacturing employment in a large proportion of countries 
(Ayyagari, Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt, 2007). In spite of their significant economic 
influence on the economy in terms of both employment and contribution to gross 
domestic product, little is known about financial reporting by private companies 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) and by SMEs in particular (Ayyagari et al., 2007). 
 
Important differences exist between private and public companies (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). Private companies’ shares are not listed and hence decisions 
are less likely to be influenced by capital market considerations. An example is 
the takeover of private companies cannot be accomplished through open market 
share purchases, as shares of private companies are not publicly available. Private 
companies also are more likely to be owner-managed and typically have highly 
concentrated ownership. In addition, in comparison to private companies, public 
companies are more liquid which makes it easier to sell shares. Bhide (1993) 
argues that one of the costs of increased liquidity is that it reduces the cost of exit 


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for shareholders which reduces incentives for internal monitoring by shareholders 
(Bhide, 1993). In contrast, in private companies as it is relatively harder to 
dispose shares, shareholders have incentives to actively monitor management. 
Accordingly, these differences suggest that empirical evidence documented from 
public companies may not necessarily be generalizable to the private company 
setting (Chaney, Jeter and Shivakumar, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, empirical evidence on financial reporting quality differences 
between public and private companies has been mixed and inconclusive. Ball and 
Shivakumar, (2005) documented that compared to public companies, financial 
reports of private companies are of a lower quality. Conversely, Francis, Khurana, 
Martin and Pereira (2008) provide evidence to the contrary and argue that private 
companies that have outside contracting obligations have incentives to provide 
high quality financial reports. Notwithstanding, despite the possibility that private 
companies may exhibit a lower level of agency costs compared to public 
companies, private companies are not a homogeneous group and there is merit in 
examining how differences in ownership affect the financial reporting behavior of 
private companies. 
 
Family ownership is a common form of ownership (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer 
(2003). In the US, one-third of S&P (500) firms can be classified as family 
controlled (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). According to the Institute for Family 
Business Report (2011), family businesses are the backbone of the UK economy. 
Statistics from the report reveal that in 2010 there were almost 3 million family 
businesses in the UK or more than three in five of all private sector enterprises. In 


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terms of employment, statistics from the report state that UK family businesses 
provided 9.2 million jobs in 2010, which is around 50 per cent more than the 
entire UK public sector. In addition, the report highlighted that family businesses 
generated revenue of £1.1 trillion or 35.3 per cent of total private turnover. 
Interestingly, in contrast to Continental Europe, the Family Business Report 
(2011) suggests that family businesses in the UK private sector are made up of 
predominantly Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME).  
 
Family ownership is characterized by large, under-diversified equity stakes; long 
investment horizons and family members often control senior management 
positions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Prior literature has provided evidence that 
while there are benefits to family ownership such as improved performance (Ali, 
Chen and Radhakrishnan, 2007; Wang, 2006) and lower cost of financing (e.g. 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003), family ownership also has been shown to have 
a negative effect on corporate transparency (Anderson, Duru and Reeb, 2009).  
 
A review of the literature suggests that although research on family business in 
the public setting is relatively extensive, there has been limited research on the 
financial reporting quality of private family and non-family firms. Private family 
firms have a unique ownership structure as they are usually characterized by 
founders or descendants who are among the largest shareholders, usually 
managing the firms and who have a seat on the board of directors (Schulze, 
Lubatkin & Dino (2003). Furthermore, private family firms are insulated from 
capital market pressures which provides them with greater latitude in the 
management of their firms. Nonetheless, compared to public family firms, the 


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lack of capital market oversight inadvertently exposes private family firms to 
higher agency costs engendered by altruism and self–control. Given that 
increasingly prior research has documented that different types of family firms 
differ in their strategic choices and relative performance, Carney et al. (2013) 
argue that private family firms are a distinct organizational form. Moreover, due 
to the limited capital market incentives to manage earnings, motivations to 
manage earnings are different in private family firms (Kvaal, Langli and 
Abdolmohammadi, 2012). Consequently, results from public family firms may 
not be generalizable to privately held family firms.  
 
One of the reasons as to why UK was selected as the regulatory environment 
relates to data availability. Unlike in the US where financial data of private 
companies have not been widely accessible, (Hope, Thomas and Vyas, 2013), in 
the UK, private companies are required by law to file financial statements at 
Companies House (a central depository) that enables the financial statements to 
be publicly available (Collis, 2012). Furthermore, as highlighted by Dedman and 
Lennox (2009), within the sample period utilized in this thesis, there is an 
opportunity to examine voluntary disclosure preferences of private companies as 
the companies in the sample have the option to file full or abbreviated profit and 
loss account. Moreover, as outlined above, despite the prevalence of family 
companies and their significant economic influence in the UK, to the extent of the 
author’s knowledge; there has been a limited number of research that has 
examined financial reporting behavior of private family companies in the UK.2 
 

2 A recent exception is Westhead and Howorth (2006) who investigated private family company 
and performance. 


6 
Accordingly, the first objective of this thesis is to examine whether ownership 
structure, specifically family and non-family ownership structures affect financial 
reporting quality of medium-sized private companies in the UK. Using proxies of 
financial reporting quality utilized in prior literature such as discretionary 
accruals, timely loss recognition and incidences of small positive earnings, this 
thesis investigates whether there are differences in financial reporting quality of 
private family and private non-family companies in the UK.  
 
Prior literature argues that family firms face more agency problems that arise 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (Agency Problem Type II) 
as family firms potentially have greater information asymmetry between founding 
families and other shareholders (Wang, 2006). Citing Jensen (1994), Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz (2001, p.43) argue that as a consequence of private 
ownership and owner management, private firms are exposed to “self-control 
problems created by incentives that cause owners to take actions which harm 
themselves as well as those around them”. Schultze et al. (2001) contend that 
agency problems such as altruism may exist in private family firms. Furthermore, 
Schulze et al. (2001) argue agency problems are pertinent issues in private family 
firms as a family’s controlling interest could provide them with greater 
opportunities for private rent extraction for the benefit of family members, which 
could be at the expense of minority shareholders. Nonetheless, as substantial 
ownership ties the family’s wealth closely to the firms’ wealth, this reduces 
incentives for opportunistic earnings management.  
 


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The second objective is to investigate whether family and non-family companies 
have different preferences for voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure choices 
of family firms is an area where more research is warranted (Chen, Chen and 
Cheng, 2008). Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009) posit and find evidence to 
suggest that in less transparent environments, family firms have incentives to 
extract firm resources for their benefit. In their study of private UK companies, 
Dedman and Lennox (2009) provide evidence that managers of private companies 
are more likely to withhold proprietary information if perceived or potential 
competition is strong. This thesis differs from Dedman and Lennox (2009) as its 
objective is to investigate whether family and non-family ownership will have an 
impact on the voluntary disclosure behaviours of private companies in the UK.  
 
A third objective of this thesis is to test whether differences in financial reporting 
behaviors of family and non-family companies affect their resource allocation 
decisions. Extant literature has documented that there is an association between 
financial reporting quality and investment efficiency (Biddle and Hilary, 2006). 
Moreover, the association between earnings quality and investment efficiency 
exist both in the private and public firm environments (McNichols and Stubben, 
2008; Chen et al., 2011). Furthermore, prior literature has provided evidence that 
ownership affects investment efficiency. James (1999) demonstrates that due to 
their long-term investment horizon privately held family firms should provide 
greater returns on capital investments than non-family firms. Given that both 
financial reporting quality and ownership structure has been documented to be 
associated with better investment efficiency, this thesis seeks to test whether 

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family ownership affects the relationship between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency. 
 
1.2 Research Question  
Following the three objectives outlined above, this thesis considers several issues 
regarding the preparation and economic consequence of financial statements by 
private medium-sized companies in the UK. Specifically, this thesis seeks to 
examine the following three research questions:  
 
Research Question 1: Does family ownership explain variation in earnings quality 
of private companies in the UK? 
Research Question 2: Is voluntary disclosure different between family and non-
family medium-sized private companies? 
Research Question 3: Does family ownership affect the relationship between 
financial reporting quality and investment efficiency? 
 
1.3 Motivation  
There are several factors that provide impetus to examining financial reporting of 
medium-sized private companies in the UK. Firstly, in spite the prevalence of 
private firms around the word, prior research has focused primarily on public 
firms (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Private firms are a large and informationally 
opaque sector of the economy (Minnis, 2011). Beyond the positive impact that 
sophisticated (accruals versus cash) and audited financial reports have on 
obtaining credit and lower cost of credit (Allee and Yohn, 2009), not much is 
actually known regarding the role of financial reporting for private companies. 
Furthermore prior research has provided conflicting evidence on the role and 


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incentives to produce financial reports in the private company setting. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) suggest private companies do not have the same incentives to 
produce high quality financial reports as listed companies. Conversely, Kim and 
Yi (2006) provide evidence that publicly traded companies have a greater 
magnitude of discretionary accruals when compared to private companies, which 
is consistent with the view that capital markets provide greater incentives for 
earnings management in order to meet the expectations of market participants. In 
addition, Chen et al. (2011) argue that despite the assertion that private companies 
exhibit lower financial reporting quality, accounting information is still important 
due to fewer competing sources of information. Furthermore, Chaney, Jeter and 
Shivakumar (2004) maintain that accounting information may play a more 
important role in the evaluation of managerial performance in private companies 
due to the fact that private companies do not have market measures of firm value. 
Given the economic importance of private companies worldwide, more research 
in this area is warranted. 
 
Secondly, theory and empirical studies provide competing arguments on the 
impact of family relationships on a firm’s ownership structure. Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000) provide empirical evidence that owner-managed firms are one of the most 
efficient forms of organizations due to the alignment of shareholders and owners 
(Agency Problem Type 1). Nonetheless, the literature suggests that Agency 
Problem Type II is more severe in family firms (Setia-Atmaja, Haman and 
Tanewski, 2011). In addition, in spite of family firms receiving increasing 
attention, there is still limited knowledge on the quality and overall 
informativeness of their financial reporting practices (Hutton, 2007), specifically 

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private family firms. Furthermore, increasingly research has documented that 
different types of family firms vary in their strategic choices and relative 
performance. (Carney et al, 2013). Hence, within the private company setting, it is 
an empirical question as to whether different types of companies (i.e., companies 
with different types of ownership structure) vary with respect to their financial 
reporting behaviour.  
 
Thirdly, financial reporting in the private company setting is an issue that has 
been receiving increasing attention by regulators (International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2010).  In comparison to public companies, there is limited 
understanding on the role of accounting in the private sector which is an 
important issue as currently there is considerable debate by regulators (e.g., 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2012) as to whether the costs of 
producing full GAAP financial reports outweigh the benefits for private 
companies.  
 
Fourthly, due to limitations to empirically testing the proprietary cost hypothesis, 
there is limited empirical evidence on the effect of proprietary cost on voluntary 
disclosure behaviors in the private company setting. In the public company 
setting, enhanced disclosure has often been promoted as a monitoring tool via its 
effect on increased transparency. Notwithstanding, the paucity of research on 
voluntary disclosure in the private company environment needs to be addressed if 
conclusions are to be drawn on the role of voluntary disclosure in the private 
company setting. 
 

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Fifthly, despite small and medium-sized businesses being recognized as a vital 
part of the UK economy and contributing significantly to economic growth (BIS 
Economics Paper, 2012), little is known regarding the investment behaviours of 
private companies (Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013). Research in this 
area is important economically given that investment is a determinant of 
economic growth (Biddle, Hilary and Verdi, 2009). In addition, this thesis looks 
at the impact of both ownership and financial reporting quality on investment 
efficiency. To the extent of the author’s knowledge, the impact of these two 
constructs together on investment efficiency has not been examined in private 
medium-sized companies. 
 
In summary, given the differences between private and public companies, results 
on financial reporting quality of public companies may not necessarily extend to 
private companies (Chaney et al., 2004), which suggests that there may be 
important insights that can be obtained in examining financial reporting 
behaviours of private companies. Given that increasingly research on different 
types of family companies show variation in their strategic choices and relative 
performance, this thesis adds to the theory on agency costs in private family 
companies. Regulators increased interest is another important reason to 
investigate financial reporting behaviours of private companies. Moreover, given 
the importance of SMEs to the economy and the importance of investment for 
economic growth, research examining determinants of investment efficiency is 
warranted. Thus, this thesis examines whether family ownership affects the 
financial reporting quality, voluntary disclosure lodgement behaviours and 
investment efficiency in the private medium-sized company setting in the UK. 

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1.4 Data and Methodology 
This thesis utilizes panel data of medium-sized UK private companies for the 
period 2004-2011. This time period was chosen because it provides a natural 
setting to test proprietary costs among private medium-sized companies in the 
UK. As explained in Chapter 4, in 2004 changes were made to the size thresholds 
of private medium-sized companies, which enabled some companies who were 
previously filing full accounts to be eligible to file abbreviated financial reports 
which do not disclose turnover and cost of sales. As data were collected in 
December 2012, 2011 was chosen as the final year-end of the sample.  
 
Financial and ownership data were obtained from Bureau Van Dijk (BVD) 
through their FAME database. This database has been used consistent with other 
studies, which have utilized private company financial reports such as Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) and Dedman and Lennox (2009). While financial data are 
collected from 2004, ownership data only becomes available in the FAME 
database from 2005 as the bulk of companies in the sample were missing annual 
returns for the year 2004. Consequently, ownership information was collected 
from 2005-2011. Accordingly, eight years of financial data and seven years of 
ownership data were collected from FAME in December 2012. Lagged financial 
data are needed to calculate the earnings quality models that are utilized in this 
study. 
 
This study utilized both pooled and panel data methodology to test the hypotheses 
in this thesis. Random effects panel methodology is utilized to test Hypothesis 1 
and 4.  Hypothesis 2 and 3 were tested using logit regression models, as the 
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dependent variable in the regression is a binary variable. In addition, univariate, 
bivariate and correlations are used to provide preliminary evidence on the data. 
Stata software is utilized to estimate all descriptive, pooled and panel data 
regressions. 
1.5 Findings 
1.5.1 Family ownership and financial reporting quality 
Results of the multiple regressions reveal that family ownership is associated with 
higher financial reporting quality. This is evident using the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) measure of accrual quality and the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals 
model.  Results also demonstrate that family companies are negatively associated 
with incidences of reporting small positive earnings. Furthermore, using, an 
alternative measure of family ownership, evidence suggest that family ownership 
has only a positive effect on earnings quality when ownership is more than 50 per 
cent. Although theory suggests that family companies face severe Agency 
Problem II, consistent with predictions, the evidence suggests that overall private 
medium-sized family companies have lower agency costs than non-family private 
companies. The rationale is that, less severe agency problems results in less 
opportunistic earnings managements and higher financial reporting quality (Ali et 
al., 2007). This provides support for the argument that due to the close links 
between family and firm wealth in private family companies, private family 
companies will have fewer incentives to manage earnings opportunistically as 
consequently it reduces family wealth (Stockmans, Lybaert and Voordeckers , 
2010). Moreover, empirical results suggest that even in the private firm setting 
where there is arguably less capital market pressure to produce high quality 
financial reports, compared to private non-family companies, family companies 
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are associated with higher quality financial reports (Wang, 2006; Ali et al. 2007). 
Evidence from this thesis corroborates the findings of research in the public 
setting that family companies exhibit higher financial reporting quality. 
 
Notwithstanding, the results also indicate that family companies are reporting less 
conservatively compared to non-family companies.  A possible explanation for 
this is that due to lower agency costs and litigation concerns, private family 
companies have fewer incentives to implement conservative financial reporting 
which the literature highlights as two key drivers of conservatism (Chen, Chen 
and Cheng, 2013). This result corroborates evidence on family companies in the 
public company setting such as Chen et al., (2013).  
As part of robustness checks, a GMM specification was utilized to take into 
account potential endogeneity issues in the modelling of family ownership. 
Overall, results are the same in this alternative specification and family ownership 
remains associated with higher financial reporting quality. 
 
1.5.2 Family ownership and voluntary disclosure 
Using the likelihood of lodging abbreviated financial reports to measure voluntary 
disclosure, the logit regressions suggest that family companies are significantly 
and positively associated with the likelihood of lodging abbreviated financial 
reports. Consistent with predictions, the results suggest that family and non-
family companies have different preferences for voluntary disclosure. The result 
is consistent with the notion that family companies have less incentives to provide 
voluntary disclosure as they incur more costs in terms of loss of proprietary 
information, but due to their substantial ownership and involvement in 
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management they derive less benefit from voluntary disclosure. The results 
corroborates evidence from Chen et al. (2008) who document evidence to suggest 
that on average, family owners in the public company setting prefer less voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
Furthermore, the results show that regardless of the firm’s financial reporting 
quality, there is no significant difference as to whether family companies submit 
an abbreviated or full financial report. This is similar to the effect of family 
ownership observed by Ali et al. (2007), which suggests that financial reporting 
quality and the decision to voluntarily disclose information are two separate 
decisions. In particular, whilst voluntary disclosure is linked to proprietary cost 
issues, financial reporting quality is important for stewardship as private 
companies do not have market measures of firm value (Chaney et al. (2004). 
Moreover, it suggests that not disclosing potentially sensitive information is not 
indicative of lower financial reporting quality.  
 
1.5.3 Family ownership and investment efficiency 
Results of the multiple regressions reveal that although financial reporting quality 
is associated with investment efficiency, family ownership does not seem to have 
an effect on the relationship between financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency. In particular, multiple regression results are consistent with financial 
reporting quality mitigating both under and overinvestment. However, there is no 
support for the conjecture that specificities of family ownership are effective in 
mitigating investment efficiency. Specifically, the interaction between the family 
dummy and the financial reporting dummy variables is not significant in the 
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regression model. The results are robust to alternative investment efficiency 
specifications and controls for pre- and post-Global Financial Periods. However, 
after taking endogeneity into consideration, financial reporting quality is only 
effective in mitigating overinvestment. 
 
The results suggest that although prior literature provides evidence that financial 
reporting quality is lower in private companies, evidence suggests that the quality 
of financial reporting affects subsequent capital investment efficiency and 
highlights the importance of financial reporting information in the private 
company setting. The intuition behind this association is that higher quality 
financial reporting mitigates information asymmetries which results in increased 
investment efficiency through the reduction of both moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Biddle and Hilary, 2006). Furthermore, it provides support for the 
argument by Bushman and Smith (2001) that even in the absence of information 
asymmetry, financial accounting data will increase capital allocation efficiency as 
it enables managers and investors to identify value creation opportunities with 
less error. In addition, evidence from this thesis complements results from 
McNichols and Stubbens (2008) which demonstrates the importance of 
accounting information in internal decision-making.  
 
1.6 Significance and contributions 
1.6.1 Contributions to the literature 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several significant ways. Firstly, it 
extends the limited but growing body of research on privately held businesses. 
Despite the prevalence and economic importance of private companies there is 
limited evidence on the financial reporting behavior of private companies. 

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Financial reporting of private companies is an important and timely topic (Cassar, 
2011) given the increasing emphasis being placed by regulators on accounting 
practices of small businesses worldwide (IASB, 2010). As highlighted by Chi, 
Dhaliwal, Li and Lin (2013), although there has been increasing research on 
financial reporting quality of public versus private firms, these studies have 
implicitly assumed that private firms’ stakeholders have a homogeneous demand 
for financial information. Our research complements studies such as Chi et al. 
(2013) who examined determinants of financial reporting quality in the private 
setting. In particular, by examining the impact of family ownership, an important 
contribution of this thesis is it adds to the increasing literature on the 
heterogeneity of private companies. 
 
Secondly, it contributes to an understanding of private family firms. Specifically, 
it responds to calls for research on private family firms which are an ubiquitous 
and economically important organizational form (Carney et al., 2013). As 
outlined previously, with few exceptions, empirical studies on family business 
have focused primarily on publicly owned family firms. Increasingly, the 
literature on family firms suggests that family firms are heterogeneous and 
different types of family firms (i.e. firms with founder CEO versus firms with 
non-founder CEO, private versus public family firms) will have different 
performance and strategic choices (Carney et al., 2013). Hence, empirical studies 
using public firms as samples are arguably not generalizable to the broad 
population of family firms that are generally privately owned (Gomej-Mejia, 
Cruz, Berrone and Castro, 2011).  
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Thirdly, this thesis adds to specifically to the limited literature on earnings 
management behavior of private family companies. In particular it adds to 
working papers such as Kvaal et al. (2012), who examined earnings management 
behavior of private family and non-family companies in Norway. In contrast to 
Kvaal et al. (2012) this thesis utilizes the absolute value of accruals as a proxy 
earnings management as the focus is on examining the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals. Furthermore, given that within the family firm literature, there is 
academic debate on whether private family companies incur higher or lower 
agency costs compared to non-family private companies (i.e., Schulze et al. 2001; 
Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009) the results that private family companies exhibit 
higher financial reporting quality is not obvious and contributes to theory on 
private family firms.  
 
Fourthly, this thesis takes advantage of an ideal setting to test the proprietary cost 
hypothesis and contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosure. Specifically, 
it complements Dedman and Lennox (2009), who investigated the effect of 
perceived competition and profitability on proprietary costs in the same setting. 
Unlike Dedman and Lennox (2009), the focus of this thesis is the impact of 
family ownership on voluntary disclosure behaviors of private companies. 
Moreover, the sampling method allowed this thesis to examine the behavior of the 
same firm using panel data. Evidence from this thesis suggests that financial 
reporting and voluntary disclosure may have different economic roles, as family 
companies are associated with both better financial reporting quality but a lower 
likelihood to disclose potentially commercially sensitive information such as sales 
and cost of sales. In particular, evidence from this thesis suggests that not 
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revealing potentially commercially sensitive information is not indicative of 
earnings manipulation, which is in contrast to studies that suggest that in less 
transparent environments, families have incentives for private rent extraction 
(Anderson et al., 2009).  
 
1.6.2 Practical contributions 
For corporate managers and owners, it highlights that despite the costs, there is 
merit in producing financial reports. In particular, evidence from this study 
suggests that private companies indeed derive an economic benefit in the form of 
increased investment efficiency by having higher quality information to make 
investment decisions.  
 
For policy makers, evidence from this thesis provides useful insight to the 
knowledge base on family firms as well as to regulation on family companies’ 
reporting practices in the UK. In the EU, the European Commission has 
highlighted the importance of family companies and provides evidence that 60 per 
cent of all European Companies are family companies (European Commission, 
2009). Evidence of this is that the European Commission itself had undertaken a 
project to obtain a more comprehensive view of the characteristics and needs of 
family businesses in the EU. Thus, evidence from this thesis would inform policy 
on the needs of family businesses.  
 
1.7 Organization of thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
background and legislation, which is applicable to financial reporting in the UK. 
In addition, it outlines the theoretical framework, which explains competing 
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arguments in the relationship between family firms and financial reporting 
quality. Chapter 2 also provides a literature review of research on family firms, 
disclosure and investment efficiency. 
 
Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses that posit the relationship between family 
firms, financial reporting quality, and disclosure and investment efficiency while 
Chapter 4 provides details of sample data and research design utilized in this 
thesis. It also provides a rationale for the empirical model and variables utilized in 
this thesis 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss empirical results and robustness tests, while Chapter 7 
provides a summary and conclusions of the thesis. In addition, it also outlines 
limitations and suggests avenues for future research. 
 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The focus of this thesis is to empirically examine the impact of family ownership 
on financial reporting behavior and voluntary disclosure of private medium-sized 
companies in the UK. In addition, this thesis also examines the impact of 
ownership on the relationship between financial reporting quality and subsequent 
investment efficiency.  
 
This chapter presents the background, which includes legislation applicable to 
corporations, in particular medium-sized private companies in the UK. In 
addition, it outlines competing theoretical arguments derived from agency theory, 
which provides a framework to examine the relationship between family company 
ownership and financial reporting quality. Furthermore, the chapter includes a 
review of research on family firms, which includes definitions, differences 
between public and private family firms, family firm and performance and prior 
literature on financial reporting quality behavior of family firms. 
 
In addition, this chapter outlines the proprietary cost hypothesis and discusses its 
relation to voluntary disclosure in the private company setting. In particular, this 
thesis examines the literature surrounding family firms and voluntary disclosure 
in order to identify whether private family firms have different preferences 
towards voluntary disclosure. 
 
This is followed by a review of the literature on investment efficiency. Prior 
literature suggests that there is a link between financial reporting and investment 
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efficiency. The main aim of the literature review is to examine the relationship 
between family ownership, financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. 
 
2.2 Background 
In the United Kingdom, all limited companies are incorporated at Companies 
House which is an executive agency of the Department of Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS). Companies House is a registry of corporate information and its 
main functions include incorporating and dissolving limited companies, 
examining and storing company information delivered under Companies Act and 
related legislation and enabling the public to have access to this information 
(Companies House, 2014). All limited companies can be classified as either 
public or private companies. In 1967, as a response to an increase in the number 
of private companies being liquidated, the Companies Act of 1967 was introduced 
whereby all companies public or private were required to lodge their financial 
reports with the Registrar of Companies House (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). The 
rationale behind it is that anyone dealing with a limited liability company should 
have access to their financial reports (Collis, 2012). 
 
In 1981, differential reporting based on size was first introduced in the UK via the 
Companies Act 1981, which enabled small and medium-sized companies to 
protect their financial affairs from public scrutiny by reporting only abridged 
financial reports. The requirement to lodge financial reports at a registry is also 
part of the European Union Fourth Company Law Directive. However, as 
highlighted by Collis (2012), member states are allowed to provide options for 
qualifying small and medium-sized firms to register less–detailed abbreviated 
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accounts. Although options to file abbreviated financial reports were first 
introduced in the UK, the size thresholds for small and medium-sized firms were 
set at a lower level than the EU maxima. Accordingly, additional changes were 
made in the UK to the size thresholds for small and medium companies in 2004 
and 2008 in order to bring them in line with the EU size maxima. As the focus of 
this thesis is only on examining medium-sized companies, changes in the 
thresholds for medium-size entities are outlined below. 

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Criteria 1992 2004 2008 
Turnover £11.2m £22.8m £25.9m 
Balance Sheet Total £5.6m £11.4m £12.9m 
Average employees 250 250 250 
 
In the United Kingdom, all financial statements must be prepared in accordance 
with the UK accounting standards. In addition, UK tax laws are the same for both 
private and public companies. Furthermore, tax incentives are unlikely to affect 
private company financial reporting as UK financial reporting choices are not 
binding for tax purposes (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). 
 
2.2.1 Regulatory context 
Currently the only source of legislation for companies in the UK are contained 
within the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) which received Royal Assent on 8 
November 2006 and replaced the company law provisions of the Companies Act 
1985 and 1989. It is kept up to date through statutory instruments which are 
issued as required. Before CA 2006, regulations for small and medium company 
were included as exemptions from regulations aimed at larger corporations. In 
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particular, Schedule 8 of Companies Act 1985 outlined guidelines for modified 
accounts of companies qualifying as small or medium-sized. As outlined in 
Schedule 8, a small private company is only required to disclose an abbreviated 
balance sheet. Medium-sized companies, on the other hand, are given the option 
to file full or abbreviated profit and loss statements. Specifically, Schedule 8, 
paragraph 7 outlines that particulars of gross profit need not be given. Aside from 
the exemption to provide details of gross profit, medium-sized companies are 
required to publicly disclose full statutory accounts, which includes notes to the 
financial statements. Notwithstanding, abbreviated accounts are drawn from full 
financial reports and companies are nonetheless required to deliver full financial 
reports to their shareholders (Dedman and Lennox, 2005). 
 
In order to modernize company legislation, CA 2006 was drawn up in line with 
four key objectives (Companies House, 2014): 
• To enhance shareholder engagement and provide a long term investment 
culture; 
• To ensure better regulation and a “Think Small First’ approach;  
• To make it easier to set up and run a company; 
• To provide flexibility for the future. 
Think Small First is an initiative by the European Union to reduce the regulatory 
burden for small companies. The Think Small First principle requires that 
legislation takes into account SMEs at the very early stages of policy making in 
order to make legislation more SME friendly. An example of the ‘Think Small 
First’ approach is that CA 2006 now provides specific requirements relating to 
small companies or private companies with additional requirements for public 
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quoted and traded companies. This is a reversal on previous regulatory 
approaches, which excluded smaller companies from regulations aimed primarily 
at large corporations. The CA 2006 introduced a number of significant changes in 
order to simplify and improve company law in the UK. This is consistent with one 
of its objective, which is to reduce the burden of regulation, especially for small 
companies (Collis, 2012). This is mainly due to the fact that compliance to 
accounting standards imposes additional work and can impose a significant outlay 
in producing accounts, which would result in a disproportionate burden on small 
companies as it costs more for small companies to comply with regulatory 
requirements than it does for large companies due to economies of scale (Collis, 
2012). 
 
The Companies Act 2006 (Accounts and Reports) Regulation 2008 defines a 
medium-sized company as one which meets two of the following three criteria 
(and does not fall into one of the excluded categories): 
• Annual turnover must be no more than £25.9 million; 
• The balance sheet total must be no more than £12.9 million 
• The average number of employees must be no more than 250 
 
To qualify as a medium-sized company, a company must qualify for that year and 
the preceding year. In other words, once a company has qualified as being 
medium-sized, it loses its status only if the qualifying conditions are breached for 
two consecutive years. A company is excluded from being treated as medium-
sized at any time in the financial year if: 
• It is a public company; 
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• It is a company that has permission under Part 4 of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 to carry on a regulated activity or it carried 
on insurance market activity. 
It is a member of an ineligible group if any of its members are:  
• A Public company; 
• A body corporate (other than a company) whose shares are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market; 
• A person (other than a small company) who has permission under Part 4 
FSMA 2000 to carry on a regulated activity; 
• A small company that is an authorised insurance company, a banking 
company, an e-money issuer, a Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) investment firm or a Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS) management company; 
• A person who carries on insurance market activity. 
 
The CA 2006 outlines financial reporting requirements for medium-sized 
companies. In particular, financial reports must include: 
• Profit and loss account; 
• Balance Sheet showing the printed name and signature of a director; 
• Notes to the accounts; 
• Group accounts (if appropriate); 
And should be accompanied by: 
• Director’s report including a business review showing the printed name of 
the approving secretary or director; 
• An auditor’s report that includes the name of the registered auditor unless 
the company is exempt from audit. 
Aside from the changes to size thresholds, CA 2006 (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulation 2008 reduces the exemptions available to medium-sized companies 
and groups. In particular: 
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1. Medium-sized parents are required to produce consolidated accounts 
(unless exemptions apply); 
2. Medium-sized companies are required to disclose turnover in the 
abbreviated profit and loss accounts filed with the Registrar, although 
there is still exemption from disclosing details of turnover in the notes. 
In summary, in a reversal of previous regulatory approaches that were primarily 
aimed at large corporations, the CA 2006 provides specific requirements relating 
to small companies or private companies with additional requirements for public 
quoted and traded companies. This is in line with one of the aims of CA 2006 to 
improve company law in order to reduce the regulatory burden for small 
companies and to make it more SME friendly. Of particular importance to this 
study is that changes were made in the UK to the size thresholds for small and 
medium companies in 2004 and 2008 in order to bring them in line with the EU 
size maxima. These changes in the thresholds were taken into consideration in the 
data collection process outlined in Chapter 4, Section 4.4. Furthermore, post-April 
2008, medium-sized companies that qualify for the option to file abbreviated 
Companies Act accounts are now required to disclose turnover in the profit and 
loss account. In effect, the period prior to April 2008 provides a natural 
experiment setting to test the voluntary disclosure behavior of private companies 
(Dedman and Lennox, 2009). 
 
A conceptual framework drawing upon agency theory and other theoretical 
explanations is now presented in relation to family firm ownership and constructs 
utilized in this thesis. 
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2.3 Conceptual framework 
This section provides a discussion on agency theory and two competing 
arguments utilized to explain the impact that family relationships would have on 
agency costs. 
 
2.3.1 Agency theory and family firms 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.5) define an agency relationship as “a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent”. According to agency theory, the 
separation of ownership and control can lead to divergence of interest between the 
owners and the managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed out that whereas 
shareholders seek to maximize the value of the firm and consequently to 
maximize their wealth, self-motivated managers may have other interests to 
maximize their utility such as overconsumption of perquisites, shirking and 
empire building. The conflicts that arise through this divergence of interests are 
referred to as agency problems. 
 
Agency theory has two competing predictions on the impact that family 
relationships would have on agency costs. To solve agency conflicts caused by 
the separation of ownership and control (Agency Problem Type I), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that the first best solution is ownership by corporate 
managers. The rationale behind this argument is that dispersed ownership 
increases agency cost between ownership and management. Thus, ownership by 
corporate managers would align the incentives of both managers and owners and 
reduce incentives to act opportunistically.  

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Schleifer and Vishny (1997) put forward the argument that large shareholders 
might contribute to solving the free-rider problem of small shareholders. This is 
based on the premise that the benefits of monitoring are proportional to the 
percentage of shares owned. In particular, large shareholders benefit from 
economies of scale in gathering information. Furthermore, compared to atomistic 
shareholders, it is much easier for large shareholders to coordinate their actions as 
voting power is not split among a highly segmented group of investors. In 
addition, the exit option becomes more expensive for large shareholders as large 
block sales generally entail large discounts, thus large shareholders stand to lose 
more if they choose to be less informed about their portfolio firms. Thus, large 
shareholders have incentives and power to monitor their investee companies and 
hence reduce agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control.  
 
Family firms are often characterized as having both an undiversified equity 
position and often firm owners as being involved in senior management, which 
enables family firms to both influence and monitor the firms (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). Andres (2008) highlights that the incentive to monitor managers may be 
particularly strong in the case of founding family ownership, due to the fact that a 
large portion of their wealth has been invested in their firm and in general they are 
not well diversified, providing them with incentives to monitor managers. 
Moreover, due to their long term and sustainable presence in the firm and their 
intention to preserve the family name, founding families have greater stake in the 
firm in comparison to non-family professional executives (Wang, 2006). 

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Accordingly, the alignment hypothesis argues that family ownership would 
reduce Agency Problem Type I. 
 
Notwithstanding, there are also substantial costs associated with large 
shareholders. Demsetz (1983) argues that combining ownership and control 
enables the owner to choose non-pecuniary consumption, which could result in 
resources not being invested in profitable projects. Agency costs between 
controlling and minority shareholders (Agency Problem Type II), which is where 
dominant shareholders extract rent at the expense of other shareholders, is 
suggested to be more prevalent in family firms. In addition, Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino and Buchholtz (2001) contend that owner management does not necessarily 
eliminate the agency cost of ownership. They argue that private ownership and 
owner management expose firms to agency threats engendered by altruism and 
self-control which were not included in Jensen’s and Meckling’s (1976) agency 
model. In addition, the authors also assert that private firms face a threat of 
adverse selection with respect to the labour markets, as they are not able to offer 
prospective employees the same terms of employment as public firms. 
Accordingly, the entrenchment hypothesis argues that family ownership creates 
incentives for family firms to manipulate earnings in order to hide rent extraction 
from minority shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, prior research has also highlighted that family firms may have 
different preferences than other types of owners. Using behavioural theory, 
Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson and Moyano-Fuentes (2007), 
argue that family firm behaviour is concerned with both financial returns and 
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socio-emotional wealth. The authors define socio-emotional wealth as “non-
financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s effective affective needs such 
as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the 
family dynasty” (pg.106). Kvaal et al. (2012) argue that these different family 
preferences may also have an impact on financial reporting behaviour of family 
firms.  
 
Notwithstanding, Carney et al. (2013) highlight that increasingly research has 
documented that different types of family firms vary in their strategic choices and 
relative performance. Carney et al. (2013) argue that compared to public family 
firms, private family firms have several specific characteristics which results in 
differences in agency cost. Private family firms are usually characterised by 
substantial or exclusive ownership. Public family firms are more likely to be 
characterised by mixed ownership, in particular ownership is divided between 
block-holding family and other types of non-family block-holders or minority 
investors. Carney et al., (2013) argue that mixed ownership in public family firms 
creates incentives for public family firms to expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders which is attenuated in private family firms as substantial ownership 
ties the family’s wealth closely to the firms’ wealth. However, in comparison to 
public family firms, private family firms are arguably more opaque as generally 
private firms need to disclose less information than public firms. Furthermore, 
private family firms benefit less from capital market oversight, which suggests 
that private family firms are more exposed to altruism, loss aversion and pursuit 
of non-economic goals. These differences suggest that public family firms and 
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private family firms are distinct organization forms that have differing levels of 
agency problems. 
 
Furthermore, agency costs and benefits are also different between private family 
and non-family firms (Carney et al., 2013). Private non-family firms are a 
similarly heterogeneous form of ownership as this category would include 
companies that are managed by lone founders and limited liability companies. In 
the case of lone founder firms, Miller, Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) 
posit and found evidence that although lone founder and family ownership are 
both characterised by concentrated ownership, lone founder firms experience 
higher market valuations even after controlling for first generation of family 
ownership. In later research, Miller Breton-Miller and Lester (2011) argue that 
differences between family firms and lone founder firms could be due to the fact 
that family ownership is constrained by familial attitudes and strategies to 
conserve the family. In contrast Miller et al. (2011) argue that lone founders are 
more emotionally detached. Moreover, private non-family firms also include 
limited liability companies which are often managed by professional managers, 
making these firms more prone to classic principal agency problems of separation 
of ownership and control (Carney et al., 2013). This heterogeneity in non-family 
firms suggests that private family and non-family firms are different and have 
differing levels of agency problems. 
 
In this thesis, the focus of interest is on conflicts of interests between controlling 
and minority shareholders (Agency Problem Type II) as the literature suggests 
that Agency Problem II is more severe in family firms (Ali et al, 2007, Setia-
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Atmaja et al., 2011). Moreover, given that the primary focus of prior research on 
family companies has been on public companies, the focus of this thesis is on 
private companies, specifically differences between family and non-family private 
companies.  More research in this area is warranted given that private companies 
are argued to be a distinct organizational form (Carney et al, 2013) and make up a 
significant portion of the economy in all countries and as outlined below, there 
are important differences that exist between private and public companies. 
2.4 Private firms 
In recent years, there has been increased interest in the financial statements of 
private companies both by regulators and academia. Proprietary firms are a large 
and informationally opaque sector of the economy (Minnis, 2011). Prior literature 
has provided evidence that important differences exist between private and public 
companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). The most important difference is that 
private companies do not have access to public capital markets. Accordingly, 
compared to public companies, private companies’ financial statements are less 
likely to be influenced by capital market considerations.  
 
Another important difference between public and private firms is that private 
firms have on average a much higher concentration of both ownership and 
managerial ownership. Despite the possibility that private firms may exhibit a 
lower level of agency costs compared to public firms, private firms are not a 
homogeneous group and there is merit in examining how differences in ownership 
affect the financial reporting behavior of private firms. Hope, Langli and Thomas 
(2012) notes that private firms are more likely to be family owned, and have 
relationships between owners and managers, which gives rise to greater variation 
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in agency conflicts in comparison to public companies. These differences suggest 
that empirical evidence documented from public firms may not necessarily hold 
in the private firm setting (Chaney et al., 2004). 
 
2.4.1 Costs and benefits of financial reporting 
One of the issues debated in the private firm environment is whether financial 
reports produced in the public company setting is beneficial to private companies. 
Compliance to full standards has been argued to be excessive and too complex for 
small entities IFRSs (IASB, 2012). Aside from the actual costs of producing 
financial statements (i.e.; accounting and auditing costs), another issue often 
highlighted is loss of proprietary information due to making such confidential 
information publicly available. This is a pertinent issue for private companies in 
the UK because of the potential to reveal proprietary information to competitors 
which is not the case in other countries such as US and Japan where private firms 
are not required to publicly disclose financial statements (Dedman and Lennox, 
2009). 
 
Nonetheless, prior literature has provided evidence that private firms benefit from 
producing financial reports. In particular, high quality financial reporting appear 
to be associated with lower cost of capital and higher credit ratings. Using audited 
and accrual-based financial statements as proxies for financial reporting quality, 
exploratory studies such as Allee and Yohn (2009) have shown that small private 
firms in the US derive benefit in the form of greater access to credit and a lower 
cost of credit, respectively. In addition, they found evidence that the production, 
use and sophistication of financial statements by firms in their sample is 
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positively correlated with loans, total assets, number of employees and negatively 
correlated with owner-management. In related research, Minnis (2011) provides 
evidence that there is value in audited financial statements for proprietary firms as 
private firms with audited financial statements have a significantly lower cost of 
debt compared to firms that do not produce audited financial statements.  
 
Notwithstanding, the two main objectives of financial reporting are the provision 
of decision-useful information and stewardship (Gjesdal, 1981). Prior research 
has argued that financial reports play a governance role for owner managers. For 
example, recent research such as Michiels, Voordeckers, Lybaert and Steijver 
(2012) provide evidence that objective performance-based measures play a 
significant role in CEO compensation in privately held US firms. In addition, 
Chaney et al. (2004) argue that accounting information may play a more 
important role in the evaluation of managerial performance in private firms due to 
the fact that private firms do not have market measures of firm value. Moreover, 
despite the assertion that private firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality, 
accounting information is still important due to fewer competing sources of 
information (Chen et al., 2011). 
 
Furthermore, prior studies have suggested that higher quality financial reporting 
should result in an increase in investment efficiency (Bushman and Smith, 2001). 
Moreover, as will be outlined further in section 2.82, increasingly research has 
provided evidence that an important benefit of financial reporting, in particular 
higher financial reporting quality, is its association with higher investment 
efficiency. 
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2.5 Definition of family firms 
Most firms around the world are family firms (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 
2003). Whilst family firms appear to be more prevalent in countries with weak 
minority shareholder protection, Anderson and Reeb (2003) highlight that even in 
the US where investor protection is high, one-third of S&P (500) firms could be 
classified as family controlled. 
 
While highlighting the uniqueness of family firms compared to non-family firms, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003, p.1304) explain, “founding-families represent a 
unique class of shareholders that hold poorly diversified portfolios, are long term 
investors (multiple generations), and often control senior management position”. 
Thus, Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that due to their characteristics, founding 
families are in a position to have both influence and control of their firms, which 
potentially leads to performance differences compared to non-family firms.  In 
addition, due to their long-term presence in the firms, family firms may have 
competitive advantage, which stems from their ability to monitor management 
closely as well as firm specific or market specific technology (Andres, 2008). 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, most of what we know regarding family company 
behaviour, particularly financial reporting behaviours, is based on large, publicly 
listed companies. One possible explanation for the lack of research on private 
family companies compared to public family companies is financial data of 
private companies have not been widely accessible (Hope et al., 2013). Similar to 
other studies examining private family company behaviour (i.e., Westhead and 
Howorth, 2006; Stockmans et al, 2010) due to the limited research on private 
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family companies, the literature review has included research on both public and 
private family companies in order to gain insight on family company financial 
reporting behaviour and investment efficiency. 
 
As pointed out by Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone and Castro (2011), there is broad 
agreement in the family firm literature that family firms are firms where a family 
exercises influence over the firm’s affair. Nonetheless, the authors highlight that 
this is not the case with operational definitions as the literature has utilized a wide 
assortment of proxies to capture the family firm construct. Table 2.2 below 
provides definitions3 of family firms that have been obtained from prior literature. 
As can be seen, a typical definition is an organization controlled and usually 
managed by multiple family members.  
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Author Time 
Frame 
of 
Study 
Data Source 
and 
Location 
Definition of Family Firms 
Public Firms 
Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) 
1992-
1999 
1992 and 
S&P 500 
(US) 
Family firm definitions: 
1.Fractional equity ownership of 
the founding family and/or the 
presence of family members on 
board of directors to identify 
family firms 
2.Alternative measure: Ratio of 
family board control to family 
ownership 
 
Wang (2006) 1994-
2002 
1994 or 2002 
and S&P 500 
Family firm definitions: 
1.Founding Family members are 

See Miller, Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) for a comprehensive review of definitions 
of family firms
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(US) either on the board of directors 
or in the top management 
(irrespective of level of family 
common stock ownership) 
2.Percentage common stock 
ownership of family members 
Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan 
(2007) 
1998-
2002 
S&P 500 
(US) 
Business Week classification of 
family firms in 2002. A firm is 
considered a family firm if the 
founder and/or their descendants 
hold positions in the top 
management or on the board or 
are among the companies’ 
largest shareholders. 
Andres (2008) 1998-
2004 
1998 and 
Frankfurt 
Stock 
Exchange 
(Germany) 
Meet one of the following two 
criteria: 
1.The founder and/or family 
members hold more than 25% of 
the voting shares 
2.If the founding family owns 
less than 25% of the voting 
rights they have to be 
represented on either the 
executive or the supervisory 
board 
Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and 
Lang 
(2002) 
1996 Worldscope 
(8 East Asian 
Countries) 
Family firm is the total 
ownership of a group of people 
related by blood or marriage with 
large ownership stakes. 
Faccio and Lang 
(2002) 
1996-
1999 
Worldscope 
plus various 
country 
specific 
reference 
databases(13 
Western 
European 
Countries) 
Family firm if a family or an 
individual or unlisted firm on 
any stock exchange is considered 
as the ultimate owner 
Maury (2006) 1996-
2003 
Faccio and 
Lang(2002) 
data plus 
Worldscope 
2003 (13 
Western 
European 
countries) 
1. Family firm if the largest 
controlling shareholder who 
holds at least 10% of the voting 
rights is a family, an individual 
or an unlisted firm. 
2. Alternative measure: The 
controlling shareholder is from 
an unlisted firm/ The largest 
controlling shareholder is an 
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identified family or individual/ 
The controlling shareholder is a 
family or an individual holding 
the title CEO, Honorary 
Chairman, Chairman or Vice 
Chairman 
Private Firms 
Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000) 
1992 Federal 
Reserve 
Board’s 
National 
Survey of 
Family Firms 
(US) 
Family firm when a single family 
controls more than 50% of the 
firm’s shares 
Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino and 
Buchholtz (2001) 
1995 Survey of 
American 
Family 
Business 
conducted by 
the Arthur 
Anderson 
Center for 
Family 
Business 
(US) 
Family firm if privately held, 
greater than $5 million annual 
sales and listed by Arthur 
Anderson as a family business 
Steijvers and 
Voordeckers 
(2009) 
1993 National 
Survey of 
Small 
Business 
Finance 
(NSSBF) 
(US) 
Family firm if not quoted on 
stock exchange and more than 
50% owned by a single family. 
Kvaal et. al. (2012) 2000-
2007 
Centre for 
Corporate 
Governance 
Research 
(CCGR) 
database 
(Norway) 
Family firm if 50% or more is 
ultimately owned by a single 
family 
 
Notwithstanding, Miller, Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella (2007) examined 
both Fortune 1000 firms and a random sample of 100 smaller public companies in 
order to investigate why family companies in the US perform better than their 
non-family counterparts. Their study found evidence that superiority of family 
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company performance is sensitive to the definition of family and the source of 
data. In particular, evidence from their study suggest that differentiating between 
lone founder companies and companies with founders and other family members 
is particularly important in investigating the relationship between family 
companies and performance, as it is only companies with a lone founder that 
outperform in their market evaluations. Thus, the authors assert that out-
performance of family business in the US is due to how these businesses are 
defined.  
 
In order to overcome measurement errors related to definitions of family firms, 
this thesis uses several definitions of family ownership. Similar to prior studies 
(Claessen et al., 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999), this study 
focuses on ultimate ownership. An ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder 
who is not controlled by anyone else and is identified by looking at the detailed 
ownership structure in the FAME database. Although a company can have more 
than one ultimate owner, consistent with Fan and Wong (2002), this thesis 
focuses on the largest ultimate owner. In particular, the definition of family 
companies utilized in this study is an indicator variable, coded one when family 
members are either on the board of directors or in the top management and is the 
largest percentage ultimate shareholder(s) and, 0 otherwise (Chapter 4, Section 
4.3.1.2.1). In addition, in robustness test carried out in Chapter 5, an alternative 
definition of family companies is utilised. Specifically, family companies are 
subdivided into family firms with shareholdings of 50 per cent and over and 
shareholdings of less than 50 per cent of total shares. This measure of family 
company captures both family ownership and family control, which is consistent 
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with other operational definitions utilized in the literature to capture the family 
firm construct. 
  
2.5.1 Family firms and performance 
Within the research on family firms, one of the most widely discussed topics is 
the direct impact of family ownership on firm performance. The intuition behind 
this line of research is that family firms have different characteristics that enable 
them to perform better than their non-family counterparts. For example, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) investigated the relationship between founding family ownership 
and firm performance on a sample of S&P 500 firms. Their study found evidence 
that family firms perform better than non-family firms. Furthermore investigation 
found that the relationship between family ownership and firm performance is 
non-linear. In addition, they found evidence that performance in family firms is 
better when family members serve as CEO. 
 
Prior research has also examined characteristics of family firms that enable them 
to perform better than non-family firms. Miller et al. (2007) investigated the 
difference in performance of family firms among the Fortune 1000 firms. 
Evidence from their study suggests that only businesses with a lone founder (with 
no family of the founder in the business) outperform other firms.  
 
In similar research, Andres (2008) examined 275 German exchange-listed 
companies to address whether it was family ownership or the existence of a 
block-holder, which leads to superior performance of family firms. His study 
separated the family effect and general block-holder effect in order to identify 


42 
whether differences exist. His study found evidence that family firms outperform 
both widely held firms and other types of block-holders. However, this result is 
conditional on family firms having board representation, which he interprets as 
suggesting that family firms without board representation face similar agency 
problems as other firms.  
 
In more recent research, Sacristan-Navarro, Gomez-Anson and Cabeza-Garcia 
(2011) provide evidence to suggest that after taking endogeneity issues into 
account, family ownership does not influence profitability. However, results from 
their study suggest that family CEO’s and/or chairmen negatively influence 
performance. 
 
Beyond the public firm setting, Westhead and Howorth (2006) utilized survey 
data to examine a range of performance measures and objectives of private family 
companies in the UK. Evidence from their study suggests that it is the 
management team rather than ownership structure of private family companies 
that are associated with firm performance indicators. In particular, private family 
companies with larger teams of directors and managers were significantly 
associated with higher levels of absolute sales.  
 
Overall, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) argue that the main conclusion that can be 
obtained from the literature on family firms and performance is that family 
ownership has either no effect or only has a small performance advantage in 
comparison to other types of ownership. Nonetheless, in examining financial 
reporting quality, it is important to discuss firm performance as Badertscher, 
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Collins and Lys (2012) highlights that a possible explanation as to why managers 
make discretionary accounting choices is in order to hide the true underlying 
performance of the firm. In particular, when earnings are poor, the literature has 
provided evidence that firms engage in earnings management in order to hide 
their true economic performance. Furthermore, citing Miller (2002) regarding 
family firms’ superior performance, Hutton (2007) asserts that if families only 
retain ownership and control of successful firms, then the relationship between 
disclosure and family firms is spurious. Accordingly, performance is included as a 
control variable in this study to take into account any impact that performance 
may have on earnings quality. 
 
2.6 Earnings quality 
The extant literature has used earnings quality measures to capture accounting 
quality. Earnings quality is a broad concept with multiple dimensions 
(Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 2006). This thesis utilizes two dimensions of 
earnings quality, which are accruals quality and timely loss recognition. These 
two constructs are especially relevant to the research questions as they rely on 
managerial discretion and hence are likely to be influenced by incentives facing 
the preparers of financial statements (Christensen, Lee and Walker, 2008). 
 
DeFond (2010) raises the point that as earnings management is mainly concerned 
with within GAAP violations, this raises the question whether earnings 
management is a valid proxy for gauging financial reporting quality? However, a 
benefit of better earnings quality, which is applicable to the private firm setting, is 
that higher earnings quality has been shown to be associated with investment 
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efficiency (Chen et al, 2011). Moreover, given that a major source of finance for 
private firms is from banks (Vander Bauhede and Willekens, 2004), an additional 
benefit of better financial reporting quality as documented by Bharath, Sunder 
and Sunder (2008), is that firms with poorer accounting quality have higher 
interest costs, lower maturity and higher likelihood of posting collateral. 
 
2.6.1 Earnings quality of public and private firms 
The quality of accounting information is influenced by an array of factors which 
stem from differing incentives to provide users with information useful in making 
economic decisions. Aside from the issuance of equity to outside shareholders, 
there are other factors that affect demand for financial statements such as 
managers’ decision-making needs, the needs of outside parties who contract with 
the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and to provide information to mitigate 
agency problems In addition, the quality of accounting information is also 
affected by the incentives and opportunities of management to manage the 
reported numbers (Givoly, Hayn and Katz, 2010). 
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) contend that notwithstanding equal regulation, the 
market demands lower quality financial reporting for private companies than 
public companies, which results in the lack of incentives to produce high quality 
financial reports. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that private companies are 
more likely to resolve information asymmetry through private channels of 
communication with their stakeholders than through public disclosures, which 
reduces demand for accounting quality.Using timely loss recognition as a proxy 
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for financial reporting quality, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) documented that 
financial reports of private firms are of a lower quality compared to public firms. 
 
In a study of 13 European countries across the European Union, Burgstahler et al. 
(2006) document that in comparison to public firms, private firms exhibit higher 
levels of earnings management. Conversely, Givoly et al. (2010) found evidence 
that firms with privately held equity have a lower propensity to manage income 
than firms with publicly traded equity. 
 
Kim and Yi (2006) investigated a large sample of publicly traded and privately 
held firms in Korea over the nine year period from 1992 to 2000. They found 
evidence that as the control–ownership disparity becomes larger, controlling 
shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings management. 
Interestingly, in contrast to research in Europe (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2005), 
Kim and Yi (2006) also found evidence that publicly traded firms engage in more 
earnings management than private firms. They assert that their finding is 
consistent with the view that stock markets create incentives for public firms to 
manage earnings.  
 
From the discussion above, it appears that the literature suggests that there may be 
differences in the public reporting behavior of public and private firms. 
Furthermore, financial reporting practices of public firms may not be 
generalizable to the public firm setting. Accordingly, this thesis focuses on the 
earnings management behavior of private firms, specifically examining whether 
differences in ownership results in differences in financial reporting quality. 

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2.6.2 Ownership structure and earnings management 
Depending on the type of agency problem that exists in family firms, agency 
theory postulates competing predictions on the relationship between family firms 
and financial reporting quality. In particular as family firms are less susceptible to 
Agency Problem Type I, they will have less incentives to manage earnings and 
hence the alignment theory suggests that family firms will be associated with 
higher financial reporting quality. On the other hand, as family firms are more 
susceptible to Agency Problem II, it increases the risk of wealth expropriation by 
controlling owners at the expense of minority shareholders. Accordingly, the 
entrenchment hypothesis suggests that family firms are associated with lower 
financial reporting quality. Notwithstanding, Wang (2006) maintains that 
although the entrenchment effect may motivate family firms to manage earnings 
opportunistically, if users of financial statements perceive that family firms 
supply lower quality financial reports, they may protect themselves by setting 
contracts that are more sensitive to accounting numbers. Wang (2006) suggests 
that this in turn will provide incentives for family firms to produce financial 
reports with better earnings quality to take advantage of better contracting terms. 
Alternatively, Wang (2006) argues that whilst the alignment effect provides 
family firms incentives to provide higher quality financial reports, it may reduce 
the demand for higher quality financial reports if stakeholders believe that family 
firms are better able to monitor managers.  
 
Although empirical evidence is consistent with both theoretical views positing 
higher and lower quality earnings reported by family firms, the evidence is mixed 
and inconclusive (Salvato and Moores, 2010). Wang (2006) examined family 
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firms among the S&P 500 and found evidence that founding family ownership is 
associated with lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness and 
less persistence of transitory loss components, which is consistent with family 
firms exhibiting higher financial reporting quality. Similarly, Ali et al. (2007) 
examined family firms among the S&P 500 firms and found evidence that family 
firms have higher financial reporting quality. The authors argue that their finding 
is consistent with the reasoning that although family firms suffer less severe 
Agency Problem Type I and more severe Agency Problem Type II compared to 
non-family firms, overall, they face less severe agency cost problems than non-
family firms. Accordingly, Ali et al. (2007) argue that this leads to higher 
financial reporting quality, as there is less manipulation of earnings for 
opportunistic reasons. 
 
In a European context, Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino and Sansone (2010) found 
evidence that earnings quality of family firms is higher relative to their non-
family counterparts. In addition, they found that the determinants of accounting 
quality are different when compared between family and non-family firms. 
Specifically, evidence from their study suggests that accounting quality in family 
firms is positively associated with leverage, board independence and audit 
quality, while institutional ownership has a negative association. In non-family 
firms, institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings quality. In 
addition, the authors argue that as they explored a setting where ownership 
concentration is high across all firms, their evidence suggests that it is the 
presence of family and not ownership concentration that produces beneficial 
effects on accounting quality. 

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In related research, using income smoothing as a measure of financial reporting 
quality, Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, Mazzola and Pozza (2011) investigated income-
smoothing behavior of listed family and non-family firms in Italy. Evidence from 
their study suggests that family firms are less likely to smooth income, which they 
argue is consistent with family firms producing higher quality financial reports. 
Among family firms, their findings also reveal that income smoothing is less 
likely in firms where both CEO and Chairman are members of the dominant 
shareholding family. 
 
Evidence from countries with weak investor protection seems to suggest that 
family firms produce financial reports with lower financial reporting quality. Fan 
and Wong (2002) focused on the way in which ownership structure affects the 
supply of earnings quality in eight East Asian countries. They contend that aside 
from the entrenchment effect, the information effect is also relevant in the 
relationship between concentrated ownership and reporting outcomes. Fan and 
Wong (2002) argue that the concentration of ownership allows rent-seekers to 
conceal specific knowledge about their activities from outsiders and hence they 
predict that high ownership concentration is associated with low earnings 
informativeness. In particular, Fan and Wong (2002) find lower earnings 
informativeness (measured by weaker earnings return relation) in firms with 
concentrated ownership structures, which they assert is both consistent with the 
entrenchment and information effect. Similarly, Yang (2010) found evidence that 
earnings management is greater with increased level of insider ownership in 
family firms. 
 


49 
Beyond the listed family firm setting, there is limited evidence on the earnings 
management behavior of private firms. Using survey evidence, Stockmans et al. 
(2010) examined earnings management behavior of private firms in Norway to 
identify motives for earnings management in the private setting. Evidence from 
their study suggests that when private family firms have poor performance, they 
engage in upward earnings management. Stockmans et al. (2010) argue that this is 
consistent with family using earnings management in order to avoid protective 
measures taken by non-family stakeholders such as the requirement of 
independent directors or losing personal collateral which would result in a loss of 
family control. Thus Stockmans et al. (2010) maintain that this is consistent with 
family firms managing earnings upwards to preserve socioemotional wealth4 . 
 
Furthermore, Kvaal et al. (2012) investigated earnings management behavior of 
private family and non-family firms in Norway. In particular, they find that, 
compared to non-family private firms, private family firms are more likely to 
manage earnings downwards.  Nonetheless, under conditions of high leverage, 
Kvaal et al. (2012) document that private family firms exhibit stronger tendencies 
for income-increasing earnings management than their non-family counterparts. 
In addition, they also found evidence that family firms with family CEOs 
reinforce the earnings management tendencies that were documented. 
 
Overall, the empirical family firm literature provides mixed and inconclusive 
evidence regarding the relationship between family ownership and financial 
reporting quality. Although, empirical research suggests that family firms are 

4 Socio-emotional wealth is defined by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007, p. 106) as “non-financial 
aspects of the firm that meet the family’s effective affective needs such as identity, the ability to 
exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty”. 
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associated with higher financial reporting quality, this research has mainly 
focused on public family firms. Given that research suggests that empirical 
research in public firms may not be generalizable to private firms, research in this 
area is warranted. Furthermore, increasingly research suggests that different types 
of family firms have different incentives and strategies. Accordingly, this thesis 
seeks to add to the limited literature on private family firm and examines the 
relationship between family ownership and financial reporting quality. 
 
2.7 Proprietary cost, agency and voluntary disclosure. 
This thesis also examines whether differences in family ownership will affect 
differences in voluntary disclosure of private firms. Voluntary disclosure i.e., 
information in excess of mandatory disclosure and in this context refers to the 
decision to file abbreviated (financial reports with the option not to disclose 
turnover and cost of sales) or full financial reports, which is a proxy for 
proprietary cost in this environment.  
 
Proprietary cost is Grossman’s (1981) seminal work in which he provides an 
adverse selection argument for the complete disclosure of information. Grossman 
(1981) asserts that non-disclosure would signal the worst possible outcome as 
market participants would interpret non-disclosure as unfavorable news and thus 
discount the value of the firm’s assets. Proprietary cost theory argues that when 
there are no disclosure related costs, firms voluntarily disclose information in 
order to reduce information asymmetry (Verrecchia, 1983). Notwithstanding, 
disclosure is not costless and an argument often used to explain non-disclosure, 
despite substantial capital-market benefits for it, is that disclosure reveals 
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proprietary information. Using an analytical model, Verrecchia (1983) 
demonstrates that the existence of proprietary costs is why full disclosure does not 
occur even when firms have incentives to do so. In particular, proprietary cost 
theory suggests that disclosure levels decrease with higher proprietary costs 
(Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). Prencipe (2004) highlights that the main 
contribution of proprietary cost theory is that it explicitly considers the cost of 
disclosure and argues that the costs of disclosure may provide firms with  
incentives to withhold information as the cost may offset any benefit gained from 
disclosure. 
 
An alternative theoretical framework often used to explain voluntary disclosure is 
agency theory.  The rationale is that as the agency costs associated with the 
separation of ownership and control increases, investors will perceive a greater 
need for more information. Consequently, investors will demand more 
information in order to monitor managers more efficiently (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). However, in the context of private medium-sized firms in the UK, the 
agency framework is unlikely to be a plausible explanation for voluntary 
disclosure as companies in the UK are required by law to provide shareholders 
with full financial reports irrespective of what they publicly choose to disclose 
(Dedman and Lennox, 2009). Thus, private firms derive a lower benefit from 
voluntary disclosures via the reduction of information asymmetries with their 
shareholders in this setting. Moreover, in the private setting, as argued by Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) private companies are more likely to communicate with 
lending banks through private channels.  
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2.7.1 Benefits and costs of disclosure 
Both analytical and empirical researchers in accounting have investigated 
incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose information. Regulation 
notwithstanding, prior research has highlighted the benefits of disclosure such as 
reducing the cost of capital and improving liquidity (Francis, Khurana, Martin and 
Pereira, 2005). In addition, another potential factor that motivates a company to 
provide enhanced disclosures is that disclosures would reduce information 
opacity, as additional disclosures would improve the information environment 
specifically on the firms’ financial position and its ability to repay its debt 
(Sengupta, 1998). This in theory might lead to a reduction in its external financing 
costs. Sengupta (1998) provides evidence that high disclosure ratings are 
inversely associated with the cost of debt.  
 
Empirical research has provided evidence consistent with the argument that 
voluntary disclosure reduces cost of capital. Botosan (1997) found a negative 
association between her self-constructed disclosure index and the cost of equity 
capital for firms with low analyst following. In addition, Sengupta (1998) found a 
negative association between the Association for Investment and Management 
Research (AIMR) disclosure score and the cost of debt proxied by yield to 
maturity on new debt issues and the total interest cost of new debt issues. 
 
Nonetheless, empirical evidence has also documented that the loss of proprietary 
information is a cost of voluntary disclosure. Scott (1994) examined voluntary 
disclosures of benefit pension plan information by Canadian firms, which he 
asserts are proprietary as they are an important part of labor contracts and have 
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significant implications for a firm’s competitiveness. Evidence from Scott (1994) 
suggests that determinants of proprietary costs are associated with a reduction in 
voluntary disclosures. 
 
Prencipe (2004) investigated all non-financial Italian firms listed on the Milan 
Stock Exchange in 1997 in order to identify determinants of the extent of 
voluntary segment disclosure. Using a proprietary cost framework, Prencipe 
(2004) argues that companies limit voluntary disclosure of information due to 
disclosure related costs such as preparation and competitive costs. Her study 
provides evidence that determinants of the extent of voluntary segment reporting 
include correspondence between segments and legally identifiable sub-groups of 
companies and listing status age. She contends that both these determinants are 
proxies for proprietary costs, which are derived from disclosing segment 
information, which is consistent with the argument that proprietary cost will limit 
the disclosure of segment information. 
 
Furthermore, in order to test proprietary cost theory, Leuz (2004) examined the 
voluntary disclosure of segment information by German public firms for the fiscal 
years ending between 1st April 1996 and 31st March 1997.5 Prior to fiscal year 
ending 31st December 1999, Leuz (2004) outlines that large or publicly traded 
companies in Germany were required to disclose sales information by activities 
and geographical markets if they differed significantly from each other, but there 
was no regulation to provide segment information other than components of total 
sales. Leuz (2004) documented that when segment information was voluntary, 

Leuz (2004) outlined that in April 1998, new disclosure regulation was enacted and all listed 
corporations with fiscal years ending on or after 31st December 1999 were now required to provide 
segment reports in their consolidated financial statements.
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German firms only provided segment information when proprietary costs were 
low such as when entry barriers are relatively high or firm profitability is low. 
Further analysis (carried out after the change in regulation) reveals that German 
firms are less likely to provide segment reporting when they have more 
heterogeneous segment profits and when the average profitability reported in the 
income statement is less informative about segment profitability. Hence, Leuz 
(2004) argues that for these firms segment reports are more informative and 
commercially sensitive. Thus, he contends that evidence from his study is 
consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. Leuz (2004) argues that the 
rationale is if firms are only motivated by the desire to inform capital markets, 
firms with more heterogeneous segment profitability would be more likely to 
provide voluntary segment disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry. 
 
Related research in the area of discretionary disclosure includes studies which 
have investigated incentives for managers to conceal information in the financial 
reports. Berger and Hann (2007) investigated what motivates managers to conceal 
line-of-business information via segment aggregation. The authors argue that 
motives for discretionary non-disclosure would include proprietary costs as well 
as agency costs. Berger and Hann (2007) hypothesize that the proprietary cost 
hypothesis would result in managers withholding segment information when the 
segment has relatively high abnormal profits in order to protect their abnormal 
profits. Conversely, the authors hypothesize that agency cost conflicts between 
managers and shareholders would result in managers withholding segment 
information when the segment has relatively low abnormal profit in order to avoid 
heightened external monitoring. Evidence from Berger and Hann (2007) is 
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consistent with the agency cost motive. Furthermoremore, they did not find 
evidence to support their arguments for the proprietary cost motives. 
 
Tang (2008) found evidence that private firms with higher proprietary costs are 
more likely to choose private placement of debt. Tang (2008) suggests that 
differences in disclosure requirements are likely to influence the decision between 
public and private debt placements. In particular, private placements allow firms 
to disclose information to potential investors but conceal it from competitors. 
Furthermore, private firms who choose placements of debt are not subject to SEC 
mandatory disclosure and reporting requirements. Tang (2008) document that 
firms operating in more competitive industries are more likely to choose private 
placement. Furthermore, she documents that more profitable firms and firms 
operating in multiple lines of business are also more likely to choose private 
placements. Tang (2008) argues that her evidence is consistent with the 
conjecture that firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to choose 
private placements in order to conceal information from competitors. 
 
In related research, Birt, Wilson, Smith and Whaley (2006) found evidence to 
suggest that both ownership and competition are important in explaining a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure behavior. Specifically, evidence from their study suggests 
that an interaction variable that captures the impact of both ownership and 
competition provided a better explanation of voluntary segment disclosure among 
Australian firms than did either the competition and ownership variables on their 
own in the regression models. Their results suggest that the association between 
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ownership and voluntary segment disclosure is dependent on the level of 
competition. 
 
2.7.2 Ownership and disclosure 
The structure of ownership will have an influence on both the level of monitoring 
and level of disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Lee (2007) found evidence that 
corporate voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with the separation of cash 
flow and control rights. Lee argues that this is consistent with the argument that as 
separation of cash flow and control rights increases, low corporate disclosure acts 
as a mechanism for controlling owners to mask their private benefits of control. 
 
Anderson et al (2009) maintain that family firms who are able to provide effective 
oversight can substitute the need for corporate transparency. In addition, 
Anderson et al. (2009) assert that if controlling shareholders are able to act as 
effective monitors, corporate opacity can provide a competitive advantage to 
family firms. Thus, the authors contend that this “monitor-in-place” perspective 
implies that there could be a positive relation between family firms and corporate 
opacity. Evidence from their study of large, publicly traded firms found that 
family firms are more opaque than diffuse shareholder firms. 
 
Chen et al. (2008) argue that although the voluntary disclosure literature generally 
assumes that all shareholders prefer more voluntary disclosure, recent evidence 
seems to suggest that not all shareholders are alike. The authors assert that due to 
their long-term investment horizon, family firms may have different preferences 
for voluntary accounting practices. Chen et al. (2008) contend that an explanation 
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is that family owners tend to bear the proprietary cost of disclosure. In addition, 
due to the fact that families are more likely to monitor managers, there is less 
demand for public disclosures by non-family owners. Evidence from Chen et al. 
(2008) suggest that on average, family owners prefer less voluntary disclosure. 
Furthermore, Ali et al. (2007) document that although in comparison to non-
family firm, family firms exhibit higher financial reporting quality, family firms 
in the S&P 500 are less likely to make voluntary disclosures about their corporate 
governance practices.  
 
2.7.3 Disclosure and earnings management 
Analytical research has provided mixed and inconclusive results as to whether 
disclosure substitutes or complements earnings quality (Francis, Nanda and 
Olsson, 2008; Mousseli, Jaafar and Hussainey, 2012). In their analytical model, 
Grossman and Hart (1980) maintain that information asymmetry between firm 
insiders and shareholders create a demand for disclosure and provide an incentive 
for firms to disclose because the value of additional information is greater in these 
settings. In contrast, in his theoretical model Verrechia (1990) argues that there is 
a complementary relationship between accruals quality and disclosure quality. In 
particular, Verrecchia (1990) argues that if information quality increases, 
managers will have more incentives to disclose information. The intuition behind 
his argument is that if managers withhold information of a higher quality, the 
market will discount a firms’ value further than it would otherwise. Accordingly, 
using this argument, firms with better financial reporting quality will have more 
voluntary disclosure (Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008). 
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Similarly, empirical research has provided mixed and inconclusive evidence on 
the relationship between disclosure quality and earnings management. Using 
AIMR disclosure rankings as a measure of disclosure quality and earnings 
management as a measure of earnings quality, Lobo and Zhou (2001) found that 
firms with lower disclosure ratings tend to engage more in earnings management. 
In related research, Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008) investigated the relation 
between voluntary disclosure, earnings quality and cost of capital. Using both a 
self-constructed index of coded items found in annual reports and 10-K filings, 
they found evidence that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive 
voluntary disclosure. Thus, they argue that their findings are consistent with 
earnings quality being a determinant of voluntary disclosure.  
 
In more recent research, Latridis (2011) investigated the relationship between 
high quality accounting disclosures and financial reporting quality of 500 UK 
listed firms after IFRS adoption between 2005 and 2009. Evidence from his study 
suggests firms that have higher levels of disclosures engage in less earnings 
management and greater levels of conditional conservatism. Similarly, Mouselli 
et al. (2012) document a positive association between accruals quality and 
disclosure quality, which they suggest provides evidence that firms engaging in 
less earnings management disclose more information.  
 
In contrast, Shaw (2003) found evidence that firms with higher quality disclosures 
use discretionary accruals to smooth earnings more aggressively than firms with 
lower quality disclosures. In particular, he finds evidence that firms with higher 
quality disclosure substitute enhanced disclosure for delayed recognition of value 
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relevant events in earnings. Shaw (2003) argues that firms with higher disclosure 
utilize enhanced disclosure to revise market expectations downwards before 
recognizing bad news. In effect, he maintains that this suggests higher disclosure 
does not always imply lower earnings managements. 
 
Overall, it appears that family firms may have different preferences towards 
voluntary disclosure. Given that private firms are required by law to provide 
shareholders with full financial reports irrespective of what they publicly choose 
to disclose (Dedman and Lennox, 2009), private firms derive a lower benefit from 
voluntary disclosures via the reduction of information asymmetries with their 
shareholders in this setting. Moreover, in the private setting, as argued by Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) private firms are more likely to communicate with 
lending banks through private channels. Accordingly, this thesis focuses on the 
proprietary cost related to voluntary disclosure in the context of private medium-
sized firms and examines the relationship between private family ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, this thesis also examines the affect that 
financial reporting quality has on the relationship between family firm ownership 
and financial reporting quality. 
 
2.8 Determinants of capital investment efficiency 
Research has provided evidence that an important benefit of financial reporting, 
in particular higher financial reporting quality, is its association with higher 
investment efficiency. Notwithstanding, in perfect capital markets, capital 
investment decisions are solely determined by the availability of investment 
opportunities with a positive net present value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). In 
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the neo-classical framework of investment, firms have unlimited access to finance 
and invest until marginal benefits of capital investment equals the marginal cost 
(Tobin, 1969). Consequently, the firm’s investments are not dependent on the 
amount of internal funds. However, empirical literature supports the view that due 
to market imperfections, firms may depart from the optimal level of investment 
(Biddle, Hilary and Verdi, 2009). As outlined by Biddle et al. (2009), prior 
literature identifies moral hazard and adverse selection caused by the information 
asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital as two primary 
market imperfections, which affect the efficiency of capital investments. 
 
Biddle et al. (2009) highlight that moral hazard can lead to either underinvestment 
or overinvestment depending on the availability of capital. Jensen (1986) put 
forward the free cash flow argument to explain investment efficiencies due to 
excess cash flows. According to the free cash flow argument, when managers are 
not the owners of the firm, they have incentives to pursue perquisite consumption 
and empire building, which may lead to suboptimal investments.  In addition, 
Biddle et al. (2009) argue that suppliers of capital are aware that managers may 
have incentives to invest in projects that have negative net present value and thus 
ration capital ex-ante. Subsequently, Biddle et al. (2009) argue that this may lead 
to underinvestment ex-post. 
 
In addition, prior literature has utilized adverse selection models to explain 
suboptimal investments. The rationale behind adverse selection models is that 
raising external equity will be problematic due to adverse selection problems such 
as Akerlof (1970)’s lemons problem. For example, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
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demonstrate that when managers have inside information and are acting on behalf 
of existing shareholders, there would be instances when they would not issue 
shares at discounted prices in order finance projects with positive net present 
value. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that this would lead to capital investment 
misallocation and a fall in firm value. 
 
2.8.1 Private and public firm investment policy 
Increasingly, research has examined whether public and private firm exhibit 
different investment behaviors. Prior literature suggests that differential 
investment behavior between public and private firms is a trade-off between the 
benefits of being part of public equity markets and the cost of ownership 
dispersion (Mortal and Reisel, 2013).  Private and public firms have different 
agency conflicts and this may have an effect on capital allocation. Specifically, 
due to the nature of public firms, in order to gain capital, ownership and 
management are at least partially separated as shares are sold to outside investors 
who do not manage firms. Hence, public firms are more prone to agency 
problems which may cause public firms to allocate capital less efficiently (Mortal 
and Reisel, 2013). However, private firms are more opaque which results in 
greater information asymmetry between shareholders and future investors, which 
results in a higher cost of capital for private firms (Gilje and Taillard, 2013). In 
addition, benefits associated with public equity markets such as increased 
liquidity may enable public firms to invest capital more efficiently. 
 
Gilje and Taillard (2013) compared public and private firms in the natural gas 
industry in the US and found evidence that private firms are significantly less 
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likely to pursue investment opportunities that require large capital outlays. In 
contrast, using hand collected investment data for public and private firms in the 
chemical industry in the US, Sheen (2011) found evidence that private firms 
invest differently and more efficiently than public firms. Specifically, he found 
that private firm increase in capacity are timed better than public firms, hence 
they appear to realize a higher marginal return on their investments. 
 
Using public and private firm data from 15 European countries, Mortal and Reisel 
(2013) examined investment policy differences between public and private firms. 
Evidence from their study suggests that public firms are better positioned to take 
advantage of growth opportunities than private firms. However, the differential 
between public and private firms is only evidenced in countries with well-
developed stock markets, which they argue suggests that benefits associated with 
increased liquidity, outweigh the costs associated with ownership dispersion. 
 
In related research, Asker, Farre-Mense and Ljungqvist (2013) examined the 
investment behavior of public and private firms in the US. Asker et al. (2013) 
found evidence that public firms invest substantially less than private firms. 
Furthermore evidence from their study suggests that public firms are less 
responsive to changes in investment opportunities compared to matched private 
firms. The authors argue that evidence from their study is robust to economic 
differences such as firms being at different stages in lifecycle. Asker et al (2013) 
argue that the differences in investment efficiencies are due to greater agency 
costs of public firms as evidenced by greater differences in investment behavior 
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of private and public firms in industries where stock prices are particularly 
sensitive to current earnings. 
 
2.8.2 Financial reporting quality and investment efficiency 
One role of accounting information is to facilitate efficient allocation of capital 
(Chen et al., 2011).  Biddle and Hilary (2006) highlight that although there is a 
large number of studies reported in the literature that examines the association of 
financial reporting quality and financial market characteristics, there is limited 
research examining the effects of financial reporting quality on investments.  
 
Biddle and Hilary (2006) argue that both moral hazard and adverse selection 
models are predicated on information asymmetry between managers and outside 
suppliers of capital. Accordingly, they posit and provide evidence that high 
quality financial reporting quality would mitigate these problems. The rationale 
for their argument is that higher quality financial reporting would enable better 
monitoring and hence curb managerial incentives to engage in value destroying 
activities such as empire building. In addition, Biddle and Hilary (2006) argue 
that higher quality financial reporting would provide outside suppliers of capital 
with more information, which would alleviate capital rationing due to adverse 
selection. 
 
In particular, empirical research provides evidence that higher financial reporting 
quality alleviates moral hazard problems associated with overinvestment. Hope 
and Thomas (2008) document that better financial disclosure reduces empire 
building, which is a form of overinvestment. In addition, using timely loss 
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recognition as a proxy for financial reporting quality, Francis and Martin (2010) 
provide evidence that financial reporting quality improves investment efficiency 
with respect to acquisitions. 
 
Increasingly, empirical research has also provided evidence on the effect of 
financial reporting quality on underinvestment. Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009), 
found evidence that financial reporting quality mitigates both overinvestment and 
underinvestment. In more recent research, using changes in the value of a firm’s 
real estate as a proxy for exogenous change in financing capability, Balakrishnan, 
Core and Verdi (2014) posit that firms with better financial reporting quality will 
be less reliant on collateral as they will have less information asymmetry with 
external capital providers. Evidence from their study suggests that financial 
reporting quality substitutes for collateral in mitigating information asymmetry 
associated with under-investment.  
 
Beyond the listed company setting, Chen et al. (2011) highlight that there are 
several reasons to expect an association between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency. Chen et al. (2011) maintain that even in the private 
company setting, disclosed financial information still provides information for 
external providers of capital to mitigate expropriation activities of managers as 
well as in aiding internal stewardship functions. Moreover, due to fewer 
competing sources of information, particularly for small firms that are unlikely to 
have separate management accounting systems, Chen et al. (2011) argue that 
accounting information could be an important source of information for both 
insiders and outsiders. Notwithstanding, Bushman and Smith (2001) argue that 
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even in the absence of agency conflicts between managers and investors, financial 
accounting data will increase capital allocation efficiency as it enables managers 
and investors to identify value creation opportunities with less error. This is 
particularly significant in light of the importance of accounting information in 
internal decision-making as demonstrated by McNichols and Stubbens (2008). 
 
2.8.3 Family and investment policy 
Overall, prior empirical evidence seems to suggest that ownership influences 
corporate investment policy. Bjuggren and Palmberg (2010, p.327) contend that 
family firms are interesting as “it is possible to identify individuals who have the 
ability to influence the use of resources in a more direct way than is possible with 
firms with dispersed ownership”.  
 
Furthermore, Fahlenbrach (2009) suggests that ownership is an important 
determinant of investment behavior and found evidence that founder CEO firms 
make different investment decisions compared to firms with successor CEOs. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2001) found evidence to suggest that large institutional 
investors reduce suboptimal investment spending.  Furthermore, Bjuggren and 
Palmberg (2010) in their study of listed family firms found evidence that family 
controlled firms with aligned ownership and control have a significant and 
positive impact on firm investment performance.  
 
In more recent research, Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2012) note two opposing 
effects i.e., risk aversion or investment horizon can influence the relationship 
between family shareholders and investment decisions. They argue that as family 
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firms are typically undiversified and have concentrated shareholders, they may 
have preferences for mitigating firm risks which impact on investment decisions 
(i.e., research and development and capital expenditures). Notwithstanding, the 
long-term investment horizons perspective suggests that family firms have long 
term incentives to commit more resources to investing activities. Evidence from 
their study suggests that risk aversion seems to dominate family firms behavior 
and family firms devote less financial resources to long term investing. 
 
2.8.4 Family and investment efficiency 
A related stream of literature examines the impact that ownership structure has on 
investment efficiency. James (1999) posits that families have longer investment 
horizons leading to greater investment efficiency. He argues that characteristics of 
family firms such as loyalty and stability are expected to be effective in 
lengthening the horizons of managers and to provide incentives for managers to 
invest according to the market rule6. His analysis suggests that on average 
privately held family firms should provide greater returns on capital investments 
than non-family firms.  
 
In related research, Hadlock (1998) provides evidence to suggest that insider 
ownership can mitigate investment efficiency. Specifically, he suggests that 
insider ownership can alleviate investment efficiency by aligning the interest of 
managers and investors. Using financial and ownership data from 8 East Asian 
countries, Wei and Zhang (2008) found evidence that insider ownership affects 
investment efficiency. Specifically, using investment cash flow sensitivity as a 

	Efficient capital allocation dictates that capital be invested in projects with positive net present 
value and withdrawn from projects with negative net present value
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proxy for investment efficiency (i.e., lower sensitivity is an indication of better 
investment efficiency), they found that investment efficiency increases with an 
increase in cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. However, Wei and Zhang 
(2008) also found that investment efficiency decreases when there is an increase 
in the divergence of cash flow and control rights of the largest shareholders. Wei 
and Zhang (2008) argue that evidence from their study is consistent with the 
explanation that overinvestment is caused by agency cost of free cash flow. 
 
Extending Wei and Zhang (2008), Pindado, Requejo and Torre (2011) examined 
family ownership and investment efficiency in publicly listed companies of nine 
Euro zone countries. Pindado et al. (2011) maintain that ownership structure, 
specifically family ownership, acts as a corporate governance mechanism to 
moderate investment efficiencies. In particular, they argue that specificities of 
family ownership such as the long term investment horizon provides incentives 
for controlling shareholder to maximize firm value over a longer time period, thus 
attenuating deviation from the optimal level of investment. Furthermore, Pindado 
et al. (2011) maintain that longer investment horizon of family firms reduce 
incentives for investment with fast payback that arguably could be at the expense 
of value creation in the long run. Evidence, from Pindado et al (2011) suggest that 
even after controlling for endogeneity, family control is effective in mitigating 
investment efficiencies. Specifically, evidence from their study suggests that this 
result is mainly attributable to family firms, particularly where family members 
hold managerial positions and where there are no deviations between cash flow 
and control rights in the family firm. 
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Thus, it seems that prior research recognizes that both financial reporting quality 
and ownership is a determinant of investment efficiency. Nonetheless, there is 
still limited research on the effect of both these constructs particularly in the 
context of medium-sized private firms. Given the paucity of research in this area, 
particularly within the private firm setting, this thesis seeks to examine the effects 
of both ownership and financial reporting quality on investment behavior of 
private medium-size firms in the UK  
 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the institutional environment of companies in the UK. In 
addition, it describes the conceptual framework utilized in the thesis by outlining 
competing arguments derived from agency theory, which explain associations 
between family ownership and financial reporting quality of medium-sized 
private family companies in the UK. While the prior literature suggests that 
private family companies are more exposed to altruism, loss aversion and pursuit 
of non-economic goals, the chapter notes that private family companies have less 
incentives to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders as substantial or 
exclusive ownership in private family companies ties the family’s wealth closely 
to the firms’ wealth. Furthermore, it outlines different definitions of family 
companies as well as the relationship between family companies, performance 
and financial reporting quality. 
Furthermore, it also discusses the theory related to the family firms’ preferences 
for voluntary disclosure. A review of the relevant literature outlining the benefits 
and costs of disclosure as well as the link between voluntary disclosure, 
ownership and financial reporting quality are also provided in this chapter. 
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Finally, this chapter reviews relevant research on investment efficiency. 
Specifically, the thesis focuses on the impact that financial reporting quality and 
types of ownership have on investment efficiency, which is ascertained from prior 
literature as a benefit of producing higher quality financial reports. 
 
The next chapter presents the hypotheses that have been developed for testing 
predictions between family ownership and financial reporting quality and family 
ownership and voluntary disclosure. In addition, it presents the hypothesis on the 
impact of family on the association between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency. 
 
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CHAPTER 3  
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the hypotheses in this thesis. Drawing from agency theory, 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that private family companies will be associated with 
higher financial reporting quality. In addition, using predictions based on 
proprietary cost theory, Hypothesis 2 and 3 predicts that family and non-family 
companies will have different preferences for voluntary disclosure7 as proxied by 
the filing of full versus abbreviated financial reports.  
 
Prior literature posits that private companies are more likely to communicate 
privately with their stakeholders than through public disclosure, which reduces 
the incentives to provide high quality financial reporting, providing evidence that 
private companies have lower financial reporting quality in comparison to public 
companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Notwithstanding, credible financial 
reporting quality is important, as prior literature has shown that financial 
reporting is associated with investment efficiency (Biddle and Hilary, 2006) as 
well as with the companies’ internal investment decision making (McNichols and 
Stubbens (2008). Moreover, research has provided evidence that ownership is a 
determinant of investment efficiency (Wei and Zhang (2008). This chapter 
extends studies such as Chen et al. (2011) and Pindado, Requejo and Torre (2011) 
and hypothesizes that ownership structure variables such as family ownership will 
have an affect on the relationship between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency (Hypothesis 4). 
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Voluntary disclosure refers to the choice to disclose information regarding sales and cost of sales 
which is voluntary for medium-sized private companies in the UK prior to 2008.
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The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the predictions on the 
associations between family ownership and financial reporting quality. Section 
3.3 explains the predictions on the associations between family ownership and 
voluntary disclosure, while Section 3.4 outlines the predictions on the impact that 
family ownership has on the relationship between earnings quality and investment 
efficiency. 
 
3.2 Family firms and financial reporting quality  
Research Question 1 examines whether differences in the type of ownership, 
specifically family and non-family ownership, explain variations in the earnings 
quality of private companies in the UK. Hypothesis 1, which uses proxies of 
financial reporting quality utilized in prior literature such as discretionary 
accruals, timely loss recognition and incidences of small positive earnings, is thus 
directly related to this this question. . 
 
Two competing views are often used to predict the relationship between family 
ownership and financial reporting quality. The classic agency problem of 
separation of ownership and control (Agency Problem Type I) is argued to be less 
severe in family firms than non-family firms (Ali et al., 2007; Setia-Atmaja, 
Haman and Tanewski, 2011). There are several attributes of family firms that 
align incentives of managers to act in the best interest of shareholders (Ali et al., 
2007). As noted by Andersen and Reeb (2003), family firms tend to be have both 
concentrated and undiversified shareholdings in their firms, which links their 
wealth to firm performance and subsequently heightens their incentives to 
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monitor managers. In addition, due to their long term and sustainable presence in 
the firm and intention to preserve the family name, founding families have a 
greater stake in the firm in comparison to non-family professional executives 
(Wang, 2006). Accordingly, the alignment hypothesis argues that family 
ownership aligns the incentives of ownership and management thus reducing the 
motivation to opportunistically manage earnings.  
 
In the private firm setting, incentive alignment is even more likely as owners are 
also more likely to be managers, which is consistent with the notion of zero 
agency cost base used by Ang et al. (2000). Consequently, families have both the 
ability and monetary incentives necessary to monitor management, which 
suggests that Agency Problem Type I is less severe in family firms. Moreover, 
Carney et al. (2013) Furthermore argues that private family firms also enjoy 
agency benefits. In particular, Carney et al. (2013) argues that the private status 
enables private family firms to be free of short-term pressures from minority 
investors that can provide incentives to manage earnings.  
 
In contrast, prior literature argues that family firms face more severe agency 
problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders 
(Agency Problem Type II) due to expropriation and/or entrenchment. The 
rationale is that family ownership exacerbates agency problems between 
controlling and minority shareholders as family firms potentially have greater 
information asymmetry between founding families and other shareholders (Wang, 
2006). Consistent with this reasoning, the entrenchment hypothesis argues that 
family firms are less efficient because concentrated ownership creates incentives 
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for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth at the expense of other 
shareholders.  
 
Furthermore, due to the absence of capital market oversight, Schulze et al. (2001) 
highlight the potential agency costs that family altruism may bring such as free 
riding by family members and nepotism. Schulze et al. (2001) argue that this is a 
pertinent issue in private family firms as a family’s controlling interest could 
provide them with greater opportunities for private rent extraction for the benefit 
of family members, which could be at the expense of minority shareholders. For 
example, the families’ reluctance to fire incompetent family members are likely to 
lead to higher agency costs (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2011).  
 
Type 1 and Type II agency problems will both create incentives to manage 
earnings (Ali et al, 2007). In non-family firms, where arguably Type I agency 
problems are more severe, Ali et al. (2007) argue that non-family firms are more 
likely to tie compensation contracts of managers to accounting numbers, creating 
incentives for earnings manipulation. In contrast, due to the fact that family 
owners are often more knowledgeable about the firm’s business activities 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003), they are better able to mitigate managerial 
expropriation more effectively through direct monitoring. Indeed, in the private 
setting where managers are also owners, the manager is more likely to be 
committed to seek the interests of the family and in turn will have less incentives 
to manipulate earnings in order to meet short term performance goals (Yang, 
2010).  
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In family firms, Agency Problem Type II is arguably more severe than Agency 
Problem Type I (Setia-Atmaja et al, 2011). As highlighted above, incentives 
derived from altruism and the family’s controlling interest could provide family 
owners with greater opportunities for private rent extraction for the benefit of 
family members, which could be at the expense of minority shareholders. This 
argument suggests that financial reporting quality could be higher in non-family 
firms as family firms manipulate earnings in order to hide expropriation of wealth 
from outside shareholders. However, factors such as preserving socio-emotive 
wealth mitigate incentives to manage earnings. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011), 
maintain that higher quality financial reporting by family firms is consistent with 
families preserving socio-emotive wealth. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) argue that in 
family firms, a good reputation and a positive family image outweigh any boost in 
earnings that may be obtained via earnings management. Furthermore, Stockmans 
et al. (2010) argue that due to the close link between family and firm wealth, 
Agency Problem II is less dominant in private family firms. The authors maintain 
that as expropriation of minority shareholders reduces family wealth, private 
family firms will have fewer incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviour.  
 
Prior empirical research has provided mixed and inconclusive evidence on the 
impact that family firms and concentrated ownership have on financial reporting 
quality. Using S&P 500 firms, Ali et al. (2007) document that family firms 
exhibit higher financial reporting quality compared to non-family firms. The 
authors maintain that their finding is consistent with the reasoning that although 
family firms have arguably more severe Agency Problem Type II than non-family 
firms, overall, they face less severe agency cost problems than non-family firms. 
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Accordingly, Ali et al. (2007) argue that this leads to higher financial reporting 
quality, as there is less manipulation of earnings for opportunistic reasons. 
 
In similar research, Wang (2006) studied family firms among S&P 500 
companies. Evidence from his study suggests that financial reporting quality is 
better in family firms, albeit among listed companies. Specifically, Wang (2006) 
found evidence that founding family ownership is associated with lower abnormal 
accruals, greater earnings informativeness and less persistence of transitory loss 
components.  
 
Outside the US, Cascino et al. (2010) examined earnings quality of Italian listed 
firms and found evidence that earnings quality of family firms is higher relative to 
non-family counterparts. Furthermore, using income smoothing as a measure of 
financial reporting quality, Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, Mazzola and Pozza (2011) 
investigated the income-smoothing behavior of listed family and non-family firms 
in Italy and document that family firms are less likely to smooth income, which is 
consistent with family firms producing higher quality financial reports. Moreover, 
their findings also reveal that income smoothing is less likely in firms where both 
CEO and Chairman are members of the dominant shareholding family. 
 
Prior literature also suggests that institutional factors such as the level of investor 
protection may have an effect on the relationship between family ownership and 
financial reporting quality. In particular, evidence from countries with weak 
investor protection seems to suggest that family firms produce financial reports 
with lower financial reporting quality. Fan and Wong (2002) examined the 
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relationship between ownership structure and the supply of earnings quality in 
eight East Asian countries. In particular, Fan and Wong (2002) find lower 
earnings informativeness (measured by weaker earnings return relation) in firms 
with concentrated ownership structures.  
 
In more recent research, using expense classification shifting as a proxy for 
earnings management, Haw, Ho and Li (2011) examined earnings management in 
eight East Asian economies over the period 2001-2004. Haw et al. (2011) define 
expenses classification shifting as the deliberate misclassification of core 
expenses as non-core special items within the income statement, which increases 
core earnings but does not change the bottom-line income. Evidence from their 
study suggests that controlling shareholders, particularly family controlling 
shareholders, are associated with a greater degree of expense misclassification.  
 
Beyond the listed family firm setting, Stockmans et al. (2010) used survey data of 
Belgian private family firms that engage in upward earnings management and 
found that founder family firms seem to have greater incentives to manage 
earnings upwards in order to preserve socio-emotional wealth.8 In addition, Kvaal 
et al. (2012) investigated earnings management behavior of private family and 
non-family firms in Norway. Evidence from their study suggests that private 
family firms are more likely to manage earnings downwards than non-family 
firms. Conversely, among highly leveraged firms, private family firms manage 
their earnings upwards. Kvaal et al. (2012) argue that their results are consistent 

As per Stockmans et al. (2010, p.280), socio-emotional wealth “ refers to the non-financial 
aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs such as identity, the ability to exercise 
family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty”.
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with the notion that earnings management is used as a tool to preserve family 
control among private family firms. 
 
Notwithstanding, with the exception of Stockmans et al. (2010) and Kvaal et al. 
(2012), the research above has mainly focused on differences between public 
family companies and public non-family companies. Given that increasingly, 
different types of family companies have been shown to vary with respect to 
strategic choices and performance, this thesis examines the relationship between 
private family companies and earnings quality in medium-sized private family 
companies in the UK. Although family ownership enables better monitoring of 
managerial expropriation, it also provides incentives and opportunities for private 
rent extraction. Notwithstanding, due to their frequent substantial and if not 
exclusive ownership, private family companies have high incentives to maximize 
profitability (Carney et al., 2013). Similar to Stockmans et al. (2010), this thesis 
argues that due to the close connection between family and firm wealth in private 
companies, private companies have fewer incentives to manage earnings 
opportunistically as it also reduces family wealth. 
 
Thus, drawing on the aforementioned theory and empirical evidence, this thesis 
predicts that in private family companies, incentives to produce high quality 
financial reports will outweigh incentives to manage earnings and family 
companies will be associated with higher financial reporting quality. As such, the 
following hypothesis is tested to address Research Question 1: 
H1: Private family companies will be associated with higher financial reporting 
quality compared to non-family private companies. 

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3.3 Family firms, earnings quality and disclosure 
Hypothesis 2 addresses research question 2, which examines whether differences 
in family ownership will affect differences in voluntary disclosure of private 
companies. Voluntary disclosure, i.e., information in excess of mandatory 
disclosure, refers to the decision to file abbreviated (financial reports with the 
option not to disclose turnover and cost of sales) or full financial reports which is 
a proxy for proprietary cost in this environment. Proprietary costs are incurred 
when competitors are able to use private information obtained through voluntary 
disclosure to their advantage. The hypotheses regarding voluntary disclosure are 
derived from proprietary cost theory and are based on the literature that suggests 
proprietary costs limit incentives to provide voluntary disclosure (Verrechia, 
1983). 
 
Dedman and Lennox (2009) argue that information regarding sales and cost of 
sales is relevant to competitors and that there are proprietary costs incurred in its 
disclosure. Specifically, Dedman and Lennox (2009) argue that information on 
sales and cost of sales is commercially sensitive, particularly for profitable 
companies, as it would enable competitors to copy the strategies of more 
successful companies. For example, Dedman and Lennox (2009) maintain that a 
firm with low costs will not want their competitors to be aware of the possibility 
of achieving a much lower cost of production.  
 
Notwithstanding, disclosure decisions are based on costs and benefits borne by 
the firm. Benefits of disclosure often highlighted in the public firm setting would 
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include reducing the cost of capital and improving liquidity (Francis, Khurana and 
Pereira, 2005). However, disclosure can also be costly as increased disclosure 
could result in a loss of proprietary information (Scott, 1994; Prencipe, 2004). 
Thus, in deciding whether to reveal voluntary information, firms face a trade-off 
between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry to capital providers and 
the costs of aiding competitors through revealing proprietary information. 
Proprietary cost theory argues that when there are no disclosure related costs, 
firms voluntarily disclose information in order to reduce information asymmetry 
(Verrechia, 1983). In particular, proprietary cost theory suggests that disclosure 
level decrease with higher proprietary costs (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990).  
 
An alternative theoretical framework often used to explain voluntary disclosure is 
agency theory. According to agency theory, as the number of shareholders 
increases and ownership becomes more dispersed (i.e., agency cost associated 
with the separation of ownership and control increases), this will lead to increased 
monitoring costs and demands for additional information (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Given that the UK legislation requires that shareholders (i.e., of both 
public and private firms) are furnished with full financial reports irrespective of 
what firms publicly choose to disclose, the agency framework is unlikely to be a 
plausible explanation for the voluntary disclosure for private firms in the UK 
(Dedman and Lennox, 2009). Thus, private firms derive a lower benefit from 
voluntary disclosures via the reduction of information asymmetries with their 
shareholders in this setting. Furthermore, private firms are more likely to 
communicate with lending banks through private channels (Ball and Shivakumar, 
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2005), which reduces incentives for voluntary disclosure to reduce information 
asymmetry between shareholders and outside stakeholders. 
 
Notwithstanding, the agency framework and limitations to empirically testing the 
proprietary cost hypothesis (Leuz, 2004), empirical studies have provided some 
evidence of proprietary costs on voluntary disclosure. Scott (1994) examined the 
voluntary disclosures of benefit pension plan information by Canadian firms and 
found evidence that is consistent with the conjecture that proprietary costs are 
associated with a reduction in voluntary disclosures. Similarly, Tang (2008) found 
that in the industry cross-section, more competitive product markets have a higher 
proportion of private placement of debt, which suggests that in a competitive 
market, firms do not want to reveal proprietary information. 
 
In related research, Gelb (2000) examined the effect of ownership structure on 
levels of disclosure and found evidence that a firm’s ownership structure is 
associated with differing levels of disclosure. Gelb (2000) argues that evidence 
from his study suggests that optimal disclosure levels differ across firms and 
differing agency costs may provide some explanation for cross-sectional 
differences in the firms’ disclosure policy. 
 
Leuz (2004) investigated voluntary segment disclosure of German public firms in 
order to identify motives for voluntary disclosure. He found evidence to suggest 
that German firms only provide segment information when proprietary cost is 
low, such as when entry barriers are relatively high. In related research, Birt et al. 
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(2006) found evidence to suggest that both ownership and competition are 
important in explaining the firm’s voluntary disclosure behavior. 
 
Chen et al. (2008) argue that due to the family firm’s long-term investment 
horizon, these firms may have different preferences for voluntary disclosure 
practises. In particular, Chen et al. (2008) found that compared to non-family 
firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conferences calls but 
provide more earnings warnings. Chen et al. (2008) contend that an explanation is 
that family owners tend to bear the proprietary cost of disclosure. Moreover, due 
to the fact that families are more likely to monitor managers, there is less demand 
for public disclosures by non-family owners. Consistent with this conjecture, 
Chen et al. (2008) found evidence that on average, family owners prefer less 
voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, Ali et al. (2007) document that despite having 
higher financial quality, family firms in the S&P 500 are less likely to make 
voluntary disclosures about their corporate governance practices compared to 
non-family firms.  
 
Ho and Wong (2001) found that listed companies with a controlling family 
member on the firm’s board tend to have less transparent disclosures. The 
argument here is that given the family member is both a substantial shareholder 
and a member of the board, there is less incentive for voluntary disclosure as 
family members will have direct access to both financial and non-financial 
information. 
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Overall, almost all prior research on voluntary disclosure is on public and not on 
private companies. In particular, research on voluntary disclosure behavior in 
public companies suggests that public family companies have lower incentives to 
provide voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, research also documents that 
proprietary costs are associated with a reduction in voluntary disclosures. Given 
that private family companies are usually characterized by substantial or 
exclusive ownership, compared to non-family companies, they are more likely to 
incur more costs in terms of loss of potential proprietary information. Consistent 
with the reasoning by Dedman and Lennox (2009) that the disclosure of sales and 
cost of sales is a proprietary cost issue as private companies in the UK are 
required by law to provide shareholders with full financial reports irrespective of 
what they publicly choose to disclose, this study extends the literature by 
examining the relationship between proprietary cost theory and ownership, 
specifically family ownership, on the companies’ choice to disclose information 
on sales and cost of sales. Specifically, using disclosure of sales and cost of sales 
as a proxy for voluntary disclosure, Hypothesis 2 predicts that family companies 
will less likely be associated with voluntary disclosure. 
 
H2: Family companies will less likely be associated with the voluntary 
disclosures of sales and cost of sales compared to other types of private company 
ownership structures.  
 
Analytical research provides conflicting predictions on how earnings quality 
influences firms’ disclosure decisions (Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008). Studies 
such as Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that information asymmetry between 
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firm insiders and shareholders create a demand for disclosure and provide an 
incentive for firms to disclose because the value of additional information is 
greater in these settings. In contrast, in his model of how the quality of 
information available to managers explains subsequent voluntary disclosure, 
Verrecchia (1990) argues that if information quality increases, managers will have 
more incentives to disclose information. Accordingly, using this argument, firms 
with better financial reporting quality will have more voluntary disclosure 
(Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, empirical research has provided mixed and inconclusive evidence 
regarding the relationship between voluntary disclosure and earnings quality. 
Lobo and Zhou (2001) provide evidence that increased disclosure is associated 
with reduced earnings management. Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008) document 
a complementary association between earnings quality and voluntary disclosure. 
Similarly, Latridis (2011) investigated the relationship between high quality 
accounting disclosures and financial reporting quality of 500 UK listed companies 
after IFRS adoption between 2005-2009. Evidence from his study suggests that 
firms that have higher levels of disclosures engage in less earnings management 
and greater levels of conditional conservatism. In more recent research, Mouselli 
et al. (2012) found evidence that companies with higher quality financial 
reporting also have higher disclosure quality. 
 
In contrast, Shaw (2003) found evidence that firms with higher quality disclosures 
use discretionary accruals to smooth earnings more aggressively than firms with 
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lower quality disclosures. Shaw (2003) maintains that his results suggest that 
higher quality disclosure does not always indicate lower earnings management. 
 
Overall, prior literature provides mixed and inconclusive evidence on the 
relationship between earnings quality and disclosure decisions. Furthermore, this 
relationship has not been examined in the context of private family companies. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3 addresses the effect of family relationships on disclosure, 
conditional on earnings quality and predicts that: 

H3: Family companies that are associated with voluntary disclosures of sales and 
cost of sales are more likely to exhibit higher financial reporting quality 
compared to other private company types not associated with voluntary 
disclosures of sales and cost of sales. 
 
3.4 Family companies and investment efficiency 
Prior studies have suggested that higher quality financial reporting should result 
in an increase in investment efficiency (Bushman and Smith, 2001). This is a 
particularly pertinent issue in private companies as prior research has 
demonstrated that financial reporting quality of private companies is lower than 
among public companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Notwithstanding, 
alternative forms of information may limit the role of private company financial 
statements (Cassar, 2011). Thus, an issue is whether private medium-sized 
companies derive an economic benefit in the form of increased investment 
efficiency by producing higher quality financial reports? 
 


85 
In the public company setting, empirical research has found evidence that 
financial reporting quality is associated with investment efficiency (Biddle and 
Hilary, 2006). The intuition behind this association is that improved transparency 
via higher quality financial reporting mitigates information asymmetries which 
results in increased investment efficiency through the reduction of both moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Biddle and Hilary, 2006).  
 
A number of studies have documented the relation between financial reporting 
studies and investment efficiency. Biddle and Hilary (2006) posit and find 
evidence that higher quality accounting enhances investment efficiency by 
reducing information asymmetries between managers and outside suppliers of 
capital. Nonetheless, they found that this relationship is stronger in economies 
where financing is largely provided through equity. Results from Biddle and 
Hilary (2006) suggest that where banks play a more important role in financing, 
the relationship between higher quality accounting and investment efficiency is 
smaller as banks are able to mitigate moral hazard through private channels.  
 
Similarly, McNichols and Stubbens (2008) examined whether earnings 
management affect investing decisions. However, unlike other studies, McNichols 
and Stubbens (2008) focus on how earnings management affects investment 
decisions of internal decision-makers. Evidence from their study indicates that 
firms that were being investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities over-
invest in the misreporting period. In addition, McNichols and Stubbens (2008) 
document that after the misreporting period, these firms were no longer 
overinvesting, which they argue is consistent with the argument that corrected 
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information leads to more efficient investment. Accordingly, the authors argue 
that despite the fact that earnings management is being targeted at external 
parties, an unintended consequence is it leads to suboptimal investment decisions. 
 
Beyond the public firm setting, Chen et al. (2011) investigated the relationship 
between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency in emerging 
markets, which is characterized by low investor protection, and more 
concentrated ownership structures. Using data from the World Bank, evidence 
from their study suggests that financial reporting quality alleviates both under and 
overinvestment. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2011) found that the relationship 
between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency increases in the 
presence of bank financing, which the authors argue demonstrates that banks 
utilize financial reports in granting credit to customers. 
 
A related stream of literature examines the impact of ownership structure on 
investment decision-making. James (1999) maintains that characteristics of family 
firms such as loyalty and stability are expected to be effective in lengthening the 
horizons of managers and to provide incentives for managers to invest according 
to the market rule9. His analysis suggests that, on average, privately held family 
firms should provide greater returns on capital investments than non-family firms.  
 
In addition, prior empirical research has also provided evidence to suggest that 
insider ownership has an effect on investment efficiency. Hadlock (1998) 
provides evidence to suggest that insider ownership can mitigate investment 

Efficient capital allocation dictates that capital be invested in projects with positive net present 
value and withdrawn from projects with negative net present value
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efficiency. Similarly, Wei and Zhang (2008) found evidence that insider 
ownership affects investment efficiency. In particular, they found evidence that 
investment efficiency increases with an increase in cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholder. Nonetheless, Wei and Zhang (2008) also found that investment 
efficiency decreases when there is an increase in the divergence of cash flow and 
control rights of the largest shareholders.  
 
Support for the conjecture that family ownership mitigates investment efficiency 
is implied by Pindado, Requejo and Torre’s (2011) research findings. 
Specifically, Pindado et al. (2011) found evidence that that even after controlling 
for endogeneity, family control is effective in mitigating investment efficiencies. 
Specifically, evidence from their study suggests that this result is mainly 
attributable to family firms, particularly where family members hold managerial 
positions and where there are no deviations between cash flow and control rights 
in the family firm. 
 
Overall, prior empirical research suggests that financial reporting quality will 
mitigate both underinvestment and overinvestment. In addition, empirical 
research provides evidence that ownership structure has an effect on investment 
efficiency. Given the evidence in Chapter 5 that family and non-family firms 
exhibit different levels of financial reporting quality, it is predicted that ownership 
will affect the association between financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency. The preceding argument leads to the following hypothesis. 
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H4: The relationship between financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency will be moderated by the ownership structure of the company. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the hypotheses to be tested. Using arguments derived from 
the agency framework this thesis argues that compared to non-family companies, 
private family companies will have fewer incentives to manage earnings. 
Accordingly, Hypothesis 1 predicts that private family companies will be 
associated with higher financial reporting quality 
 
In addition, using voluntary disclosure as a proxy for proprietary costs, this 
chapter also presents the hypotheses on the effect that family ownership has on 
voluntary disclosure. On the basis that family companies will have different 
preferences for disclosure in comparison to non-family companies, it is predicted 
that family companies are less likely to be associated with voluntary disclosure of 
sales and cost of sales (H2). Moreover, given that financial reporting quality is 
expected to affect the relationship between family ownership and voluntary 
disclosure, it is predicted that the likelihood that family companies will be 
associated with voluntary disclosure of sales and cost of sales is stronger for 
companies with higher financial reporting quality (H3). 
 
This chapter also presents the hypothesis on the association between financial 
reporting quality and investment efficiency. Given that prior literature has shown 
that financial reporting quality enhances transparency and mitigates both under 
and overinvestment and corporate governance variables specifically ownership 


89 
affects a company’s’ investment decisions. Accordingly, it is predicted that 
family ownership will moderate the relationship between financial reporting 
quality and investment efficiency (H4). 
Details on sample data, research design, model specifications and variables 
measurement are presented in the next chapter. 
 

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CHAPTER 4  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data and methodology for testing the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3. Hypothesis 1 predicts the association between family 
ownership and earnings quality. Hypotheses 2 and 3 examine the associations 
between family ownership and voluntary disclosure. Hypothesis 4 investigates the 
impact that family ownership has on the relationship between earnings quality and 
investment efficiency. Section 4.2 explains the research design on panel data 
analysis, while Section 4.3 presents model specifications used for testing the 
hypotheses. In addition, this section provides an explanation for the choice of 
variables used in the analyses as well as the measurement of the dependent, 
explanatory and control variables used in the analyses. Section 4.4 provides 
details on data sources, sample selection and sample distributions. Financial and 
ownership data were obtained from Bureau Van Dijk (BVD) through their FAME 
database. In order to take into account any changes in ownership for the seven 
year period from 2005-2011, data were manually extracted from Annual Returns 
in the FAME database. Specifically, the annual returns were examined to 
ascertain if there were changes in share ownership within the seven year period. 
Section 4.5 presents further analyses undertaken and 4.6 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.2 Research Design 
This study utilized an empirical design. Earnings quality is a broad concept with 
multiple dimensions and the extant literature has utilised numerous earnings 
quality measures to proxy for accounting quality. Given that the research question 
needs a large number of samples in order to generalise the results and the need to 
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use secondary data in order to utilize the earnings quality models, consistent with 
prior literature in this area, an empirical design is deemed most suitable 
 
Furthermore, this study utilized both pooled and panel data methodology to test 
the hypotheses. Random effects panel methodology is utilized to test Hypotheses 
1 and 4.  Hypotheses 2 and 3 were tested using logit regressions, as the dependent 
variable in the regression is a binary variable. In addition, univariate, bivariate 
and correlations are used for data screening purposes and to provide preliminary 
evidence on the data. Stata software is utilized to estimate all descriptive, pooled 
and panel data regressions. 
 
4.2.1 Panel data techniques 
 Panel data is a data set which follows a group of individual firms over time. One 
of the main advantages of using panel data is its ability to control for individual 
heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2008). Kennedy (2008) explains that heterogeneity refers 
to the fact that each micro unit (i.e., individual firms) is different from one 
another in fundamentally unmeasured ways. Baltagi (2008) points out that not 
controlling for unobserved individual specific effects leads to bias in the resulting 
estimates.  Panel data enables correction of this problem. Moreover, panel data 
creates more sample variability by combining variation across micro units (cross-
sectional variation) with variation over time (time series variation), which 
alleviates multi-collinearity problems. Baltagi (2008) outlines that more 
informative data enables researchers to obtain more efficient estimates of 
parameters. 
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The panel data method also addresses the unobserved omitted variable bias by 
modeling a different intercept for each cross-sectional unit. Kennedy (2008) 
outlines two techniques which can be used to incorporate different intercepts in 
the model, that is the fixed effects least square dummy variable model (LSDV) or 
the random effects model. The LSDV model involves including a dummy 
variable for each individual firm, which means that although each individual firm 
will have the same slope, they will each have a different intercept. In addition, in 
the LSDV model although each firm has a different intercept, each firm’s 
intercept does not vary over time. The fixed effects method has two major 
drawbacks. The first is as outlined by Kennedy (2008), the loss of degrees of 
freedom commensurate with an increase in the number of dummy variables. The 
second is that the fixed effects model does not take into effect any explanatory 
variable that does not vary within a micro unit (firm). Kennedy (2008) illustrates 
this point by stating that any explanatory variable that does not change with time, 
such as ownership, its effects will disappear in the model. 
 
The second method used in panel data analysis is the random effects method, 
which is designed to overcome the drawbacks of the fixed effects method. 
Kennedy (2008) outlines that although similar to the fixed effects, the random 
effects also postulates different intercepts for each individual firm. However, the 
random effects model views the different intercepts as having been drawn from a 
pool of possible intercepts. Hence, the intercepts can be interpreted as random and 
are included as a component of the error term. In the random effects model, the 
specification consists of an overall intercept, a set of explanatory variables and a 
composite error term. As noted by Kennedy (2008), the composite error term 
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consists of the traditional error term which measures random deviations for a firm 
in a given time period for each individual firm, and a random intercept that 
measures the extent to which each individual intercept differs from the overall 
intercept. 
 
In principle, the random effects model is more attractive because observed 
differences that remain constant for each individual firm is retained in the 
regression model. In addition, as the random effects do not introduce a dummy 
variable for each individual firm, it saves on degrees of freedom, which leads to a 
more efficient estimator of the slope coefficient.  
 
 More importantly, in order to test whether a fixed or random effects is more 
appropriate, both a Hausman and a Breusch-Pagan (BP) Lagrange Multiplier Test 
were conducted. In order to determine whether the fixed or random effects model 
would be more suitable, a Hausman test was carried out. While results from both 
the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan (BP) Lagrange Multiplier test10 suggest that the 
fixed effect method would be more appropriate, this thesis nonetheless utilized 
the random effects specification in the analysis. The primary justification for this 
is that the family dummy is highly persistent in that although it is different across 
firms, it does not substantially change over the seven year period for the bulk of 
the firms in the sample. Due to the nature of the family dummy variable, using the 

The Hausman test was carried out to determine whether the estimates between the fixed and 
random effects model differ substantially. The results show significant differences for both the 
Dechow-Dichev and Jones model, that is χ2=(13,N=7,191)=22.43, p=0.0491, 
χ2=(15,N=8,156)=84.23, p<0.0000, respectively which suggests that random effects is 
inappropriate as the test results suggests that individual effects are correlated with the regressors in 
the model (Setia-Atmaja et al, 2011). In addition, the Breusch-Pagan (BP) Lagrange Multiplier 
was conducted on the same models to examine whether there are no random effects. The χ2 values 
of both models do not reject the null hypothesis that there are no random effects. Nonetheless, 
random effects are utilised as the family dummy is stable and does not change over the seven year 
period for the bulk of the firms in the sample. 
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fixed effects estimator would remove any effect that family ownership has on 
financial reporting quality (Zhou, 2001). Accordingly, for the reason outlined 
above the random effects specification is utilized in the analysis. 
 
Notwithstanding, Baum (2006) argues that using a fixed effects model is 
problematic in the context of a dynamic panel data which is a model containing a 
lagged dependent variable. Citing Nickell (1981), Baum argues that within the 
fixed effect model, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error 
term, which results in a large-sample bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable. In addition, Baum (2006) highlights that this is a 
pertinent issue in a short panel with a large number of observations, as the large 
number of observations do not mitigate this problem. Thus, this study also utilizes 
a dynamic panel data using the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
originally developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
 
Specifically, the two-step system GMM estimation was utilized, that is the 
xtabond2 routine written by Roodman (2009).11The advantage of using GMM is 
that it is a procedure that deals with endogeneity in panel data settings without 
having to rely on exogenous external instrumental variables. In addition, it 
enables estimates obtained from dynamic panel data regression to be consistent 
and unbiased under the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity exists but it is 
fixed or time-invariant (Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012).  
 

11 The two-step estimation by Roodman (2009) estimates the regression with heterokedasticity 
robust standard errors
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Notwithstanding, the consistency of GMM estimates is dependent on the absence 
of second-order serial autocorrelation and on the validity of instruments used. To 
check for the absence of second-order serial autocorrelation, the AR (2) test in 
Stata tests the null hypothesis that the errors are serially independent up to the 
second order. In addition, to check for potential model specification, the Hansen 
statistic of overidentification in the model is utilized. Results for both these 
statistics showed that the instruments utilized in the GMM specification and 
reported in Chapter 5-6 are valid and are shown in the tables respectively. 
 
4.3 Empirical Models to test the hypotheses 
4.3.1 Model for testing Hypothesis 1 -Family ownership and financial 
reporting quality 
4.3.1.1 Financial reporting quality 

 This section presents the analytical models utilized to test Hypothesis 1 presented 
in Chapter 3. Specifically, the model tests whether financial reporting quality as 
proxied by the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model and the modified 
Dechow-Dichev (2002) measure is a function of type of ownership and firm 
characteristics. The coefficient of interest is Famdum, which examines the 
association between family ownership and financial reporting quality. Hypothesis 
1 is accepted if there is a positive association between the family dummy and the 
proxies of financial reporting quality. 
 
The basic form of the model is presented in equation (1) below.  
FRQ it= α0 + α1Famdumit + α2Ownershipit + α3Leverage it + α4Size it + α 5ROA it + 
α 6 AbsROA it α 7GROWTH it +α 8Audit it +  α9Loss it + α10Age it + α11Industryit + 
β12Yearit + εit  (1)  
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Where, 
FRQ it = proxies for financial reporting quality, specifically computation of 
residuals based on the Dechow-Dichev (2002) and Jones (1991) model; which are 
outlined in Section 4.3.1.2 below; 
Famdum it = an indicator variable, where 1 is when family members is the largest 
percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the 
top management and, 0 otherwise;  
Ownership it = Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate 
shareholder; 
Famdum*Ownership = Interaction term capturing the relationship between family 
and ownership concentration; 
Leverage it = total debt divided by total assets; 
Size it = natural log of total asset; 
ROA it =net income divided by total assets; 
AbsROA it=absolute value of ROA; 
GROWTH it = growth rate in assets ; 
Age it = date of incorporation of the company; 
Loss it = Indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 
otherwise; 
Industry it =industry dummies based on industry sectors using SIC 2003, 12 
altogether; 
AUDIT it = a dummy variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 if the firm has 
non-Big 4 auditor; 
it = company i year t; 
εit = error term. 
 
The extant literature on accounting quality has used numerous earnings quality 
measures to proxy for accounting quality in order to capture the extent to which 
firms use their discretion to make financial statements more or less informative. 
Earnings quality is a broad concept with multiple dimensions (Burgstahler et. al., 
2006).  In addition, prior literature argues that there is no single measure for 
earnings quality, but there are several attributes such as accruals quality, 
persistence, and timely loss recognition that have been associated with earnings 
quality (Givoly et al., 2010). Thus, as outlined by Chen et al. (2011), the use of 
one proxy would be insufficient to cover all facets of financial reporting quality. 
Furthermore, as highlighted by Hutton (2007), providing alternative specifications 
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of discretionary accruals is pertinent as inferences drawn from an earnings quality 
model are highly dependent on proper specification of these models. Accordingly, 
the use of several proxies such as the performance adjusted Jones (1991) model, 
the modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model, incidences of small positive 
earnings, and conditional conservatism are warranted as it reduces the risk that 
one proxy is capturing some other factor other than financial reporting quality.  
 
As outlined by Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Shipper (2004), there are two groups 
of earnings attributes that are commonly identified to measure earnings quality, 
namely, accounting based and market based attributes. Accounting based 
attributes include measures such as accruals quality, persistence, predictability, 
and smoothness and are based on only accounting information. On the other hand, 
market based attributes include value relevance and timeliness and features of 
these measures are based on the estimated relation between accounting earnings 
and market prices. Francis et al. (2004) distinguish these attributes of earnings by 
their implicit assumptions on the function of accounting. They argue, 
“accounting-based earnings attributes derive from an implicit assumption that the 
function of earnings is the effective allocation of cash flows to reporting periods 
via the accrual process, while the market-based attributes derive from an implicit 
assumption that the function of earnings is to reflect economic income as 
represented by stock return”(Francis et al., 2004, p. 969). Given that only private 
firms are examined, these two accounting based attributes of earnings and a 
model of conservatism developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) are used in this 
study. These constructs are especially relevant to the research questions as they 
rely on managerial discretion and are likely to be influenced by incentives facing 
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the preparers of financial statements (Christensen, Lee and Walker, 2008). In 
addition, incidences of small positive earnings is also utilised in order to measure 
financial reporting quality (an explanation of this measure is discussed in Section 
4.3.1.4). 
 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Earnings Quality 

The first measure of earnings quality (i.e., first proxy for financial reporting 
quality utilised as the dependant variable in equation 1) is the performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals measure developed by Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
(2005), which is widely utilized in the extant literature (Chen et al., 2011). As 
highlighted by Ronen and Yaari (2008), the aim of the Kothari et al. (2005) model 
is to address the non-linear relationship between normal accruals and 
performance. Kothari et al. (2005) offer two different approaches in their paper. 
The first is to match similar firms and compare their accruals in order to detect 
earnings management. The second method is to modify the Jones (1991) model 
by adding an intercept and an additional control for ROA. In this study the second 
method is utilized in line with studies such as Chen et al. (2011) and arguments 
by Dechow, Hutton, Kim and Sloan (2012) and Keung and Shih (Forthcoming) 
that performance matching increases noise in the discretional accruals estimate. 
 In addition, absolute values of accruals are used as a proxy for the focus is on 
examining the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Hutton (2007) highlights that 
positive (negative) accruals do not necessarily imply higher (lower) earnings 
management. In addition, there may be variations in the directions of the 
incentives to manage earnings. Furthermore,  she highlights that  due to the  
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fact that family firms may have incentives to pay lower taxes, more negative 
discretionary accruals could actually be suggestive of higher and not lower 
earnings management. Moreover, Fan, Wong and Zhang (2012) argue that using 
signed discretionary accruals assumes that firms manage earnings in an expected 
direction. The authors argue that firms using an insider based accounting system 
(i.e., where owners are prone to communicate with stakeholders via private 
communication) rarely use their financial statements to communicate with outside 
investors. Hence, Fan et al (2012) argue they are more likely to use discretionary 
accruals to increase opacity. Thus, consistent with other studies (e.g., Hope, 
Thomas and Vyas, 2013; Chen et al., 2011) this thesis utilizes absolute accruals, 
as it is a good proxy for the combined effect of income-increasing and income-
decreasing earnings management.  
 
In order to derive discretionary accruals, the first step is to calculate total accruals. 
This is achieved by following Kothari et al. (2005) and calculating the change in 
non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding the 
current portion of long-term debt, depreciation that is scaled by lagged total 
assets. Thereafter, Kothari et al. (2005) discretionary accruals is estimated cross-
sectionally using all firm-year observations for each industrial sector as per 
equation (2) below (see Hope et al., 2013). The cross-sectional estimates control 
for changes in accruals due to the business cycle effects (Bharath et al., 2008). 
 
TACCit /TA it-1= α0+ α1(1/TA it-1) + α2∆REVit/TA it-1 + α3PPEit/TA it-1+ α4ROAit  
+   εit   (2) 
Where,  
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TACCit = total accruals of medium-sized company i in year t,(measured as the 
change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current non-interest 
bearing liabilities, minus depreciation); 
TAit = total assets; 
∆REVit = annual change in revenue; 
PPEit = property, plant and equipment; 
ROAit = net income divided by total assets at the end of balance sheet date; 
it = company i year t; 
it-1 = company i year t-1; 
εit             = error term. 
 
In line with Kothari et al. (2005) the inclusion of a constant in the model and the 
use of lagged assets as the deflator are intended to mitigate heteroskedacity in the 
residuals. Changes in revenues are included to control for the economic 
circumstances of the firm (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Gross plant, 
property and equipment are included to control for the portion of total accruals 
related to non-discretionary depreciation expenses (Jones, 1991). Following 
Kothari et al. (2005), return on assets (ROA) is included in the model to control 
movements in accruals related to normal performance. Meanwhile, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) argue that performance adjustment is potentially important, as there 
may be differences in performance among family firms due to differences in 
agency costs and willingness to invest in new projects.  In addition, Hutton (2007) 
highlights the need to control for the performance of family firms. Citing Miller 
(2002) regarding family firms’ superior performance, Hutton (2007) asserts that if 
families only retain ownership and control of successful firms, then the 
relationship between disclosure and family firms is spurious.  
 
Next, the residuals in the industry specific regression equation are used to proxy 
for the discretionary accrual component, that is, this component is not motivated 
by either sales or depreciation of assets which would arise mainly due to the 
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discretionary decision of managers. Also, this thesis utilizes the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality and the absolute 
value of the residual is multiplied by -1 as a proxy for accrual quality (Hope et al. 
2013). Multiplying by -1 enables the construction of a metric that is increasing in 
accounting quality, that is, higher values represent higher accrual quality. 
 
The second measure of accruals quality (i.e., second proxy for financial reporting 
quality included as the dependant variable in equation 1) utilized to test 
Hypothesis 1 is the modified version of the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model. The Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure focuses on the strength of 
the relationship between current accruals and past, present and future cash flows. 
Given that accruals provide information about future cash flows, the intuition 
behind this model is that accruals and earnings will be more representative of 
future cash flows based on the extent that the accrual process is free from 
estimation error (Givoly et al, 2010). That is, a poor match between accruals and 
cash flows signifies low accruals quality or large estimation errors in the accruals. 
In effect, the residuals from the model provide an inverse measure of accounting 
quality based on the portion of current accruals that does not map into near term 
cash flows. 
 
 Similar to Hope et al. (2013), working capital accruals is used to detect earnings 
management in this model as working capital accruals are more susceptible to 
manipulation than non-working capital accruals. Notwithstanding, even though 
accruals models are widely used in the literature, one criticism of these models is 
they ignore asymmetry in the gain and loss recognition of accruals by assuming 
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that the relationship between cash flows and accruals are linear.  Thus similar to 
Givoly et al. (2010), Hope et al. (2013), this thesis incorporates Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2006) improvement to the accruals model by incorporating timely 
gains and losses via adjusting for negative cash flows. Evidence from Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) demonstrate that incorporation of non-linearity, can explain 
up to three times more variation in accruals compared to equivalent linear 
specifications.  
 
Specifically, the indicator variable DOCF (where DOCF receives the value 1 
when CFO<0, and O otherwise) and an interactive variable DOCF*OCF is added 
to equation (3) as per below. Consistent with Chen et al. (2011), equation (3) is 
estimated cross-sectionally, that is, in each industry measured by a two digit SIC 
code using all firm-year observations for each industrial sector as per equation (3) 
below. The residuals in the industry specific regression equation represents 
estimation errors in the current accruals, which are not associated with operating 
cash flows. Also, this thesis utilizes the absolute value of this residual as a proxy 
for financial reporting quality and the absolute value of the residual is multiplied 
by -1 as a proxy for accrual quality (Hope et al. 2013). Multiplying by -1 enables 
the construction of a metric that is increasing in accounting quality, that is, higher 
values represent higher accrual quality. 
 
WCAit = α0 + α 1OCF it -1+ α 2OCFi,t + α 3OCFit+1 + α 4DOCF it + α 5DOCF it * OCF 
it+ εt  (3) 
where:  
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WCAit = working capital accruals of medium-sized firms i at year t, measured as 
the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities other 
than short term debt, scaled by lagged total assets; 
OCFit = cash flows from operations at year t, measured as the sum of net income 
and depreciation minus WCA, scaled by lagged total assets at year t;  
OCFit-1 = operating cash flows at t-1, scaled by lagged total assets at year t; 
OCFit+1 = operating cash flows at t+1, scaled by lagged total assets at year t; 
DOCFit= an indicator variable, where one if the changes in cash flow at t is less 
than zero (CFt - CFOt-1 < 0), and zero otherwise; 
DOCFit * OCFit = Proxy for economic losses 
it = company i year t; 
it-1 = company i year t-1; 
it+1 = company i year t+1; 
ε it        = error term. 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Explanatory variables 

(i) Family ownership 
The variables of interest to test all the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 relate to 
family firms. Similar to prior studies (Claessen et al. 2002; La Porta et al.1999, 
Kvaal et al., 2012), this study focuses on ultimate ownership. An ultimate owner 
is defined as the shareholder who is not controlled by anyone else and is 
identified by looking at the detailed ownership structure in the FAME database. 
Although a company can have more than one ultimate owner, following Fan and 
Wong (2002), this thesis focuses on the largest ultimate owner. Consistent with 
prior research, family companies are defined as those in which family members 
are key executives, directors and are the largest shareholder (e.g.,Villalonga and 
Amit , 2006). This measure is updated every year by examining the annual returns 
to detect whether there have been any changes in shareholdings or management. 
Specifically, first the largest shareholder is identified from the annual returns. As 
outlined previously, the annual returns contain the name and number of shares 
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held by all shareholders in the firm. The annual returns also contain information 
as to who the directors are. Thus, the name of the ultimate shareholder is 
compared to the list of directors to identify whether the shareholders is a director. 
If so, the firm is coded as a family company. Participation in top management is 
consistent with the fact that controlling families are always involved in their 
companys’ management (La Porta et al., 1999; Setia-Atmaja et al, 2011). Thus 
family ownership captures both family ownership and family management and is 
measured as follows: 
Family company = Family company is a binary variable, 1 if the company has 
family members either on the board of directors or top management, and is the 
largest ultimate shareholder, 0 otherwise. 
 
 (ii) Ownership concentration 
Ownership concentration is included in the regression models to gauge whether 
concentrated ownership has an effect on earnings quality in order to differentiate 
between the effect of family control and ownership concentration on earnings 
quality. Wang (2006) argues that U.S. family firms suffer less from agency 
conflicts through stronger incentive alignment from more concentrated 
ownership, and thus are less opportunistic in financial reporting than firms with 
diffuse ownership. In contrast, Fan and Wong (2002) find that concentrated 
family ownership of East Asian firms is associated with lower earnings 
informativeness. Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate 
shareholder (Fan and Wong, 2002). Ownership is predicted to be positively 
associated with financial reporting quality. 
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4.3.1.2.2 Control variables 

The quality of accruals may be influenced by other factors than the explanatory 
variables outlined above. These explanatory factors are controlled for by 
incorporating them in the research models so that potential biases in coefficient 
estimates due to omitted variables are reduced. In other words, this ensures that 
any association between family firms and the earnings quality proxies are due to 
incentives for earnings quality. Control variables utilized are outlined below. 
 
(i) Audit 
Audit is the first control variable. In line with prior studies such as Cano-
Rodriguez (2010), a binary variable is used to measure big N auditors. It is coded 
1 if the firm has been audited by a Big 4 Auditor and 0 otherwise. Prior literature 
has found evidence that Big 4 auditors are more effective at mitigating firms’ 
ability to manage earnings (Chung, Firth and Kim, 2003).The intuition behind this 
argument from prior literature is that Big N auditors have more resources and 
expertise to mitigate earnings management. In addition, the literature also argues 
that due to its size, no single client is important to a large auditor and it is more 
costly for a big auditor to lose its independence than to lose a single client. Prior 
studies have provided evidence that audit quality as proxied by auditor size 
constrains earnings management (Francis, Maydew and Sparks, 1999). In the 
private firm setting, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) found evidence that in 
high tax alignment countries such as Belgium, Finland, France and Spain, 
privately held corporations engage in less earnings management when they 
employ a Big 4 auditor compared to a non-Big 4 auditor. A positive association is 
expected between audit and financial reporting quality. 
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(ii) Size 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Wang, 2006). Larger 
firms are more visible and thus face more demand for higher quality financial 
reporting. Dechow and Dichev (2002) show that larger firms tend to have more 
stable and predictable operations. Evidence from their study suggests that larger 
firms report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals. In addition, Givoly, Hayn 
and Natarajan (2007) provide evidence that firm size is negatively related to 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Similarly, Hribar and Nichols (2007) find that 
firm size is highly correlated with unsigned earnings management measures. In 
addition, Wang (2006) found evidence that larger firms have lower abnormal 
accruals. Thus, a positive association is expected between size and financial 
reporting quality. 
 
(iii) Performance 
Performance is measured by net income divided by total assets at the end of 
balance sheet date (Jaggi, Leung and Gul, 2009). Prior research shows that it is 
important to control for performance as firms with low (high) earnings tend to 
have negative (positive) discretionary accruals (Kim and Yi, 2006). In addition, 
Dechow et al. (1995) show that the Jones (1991) model of discretionary accruals 
is positively correlated with earnings performance. Moreover, Kothari et al. 
(2005) argue tests related to financial reporting discretion that do not control for 
performance are often misspecified. In addition, in her discussion paper, Hutton 
(2007) argues that if family firms only retain control of better performing firms, 
then the relationship between family firms and better quality disclosures could be 
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spurious, given that Miller (2002) provided evidence that better performance is 
associated with better disclosure quality. Moreover, Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
document that compared to non-family firms, family firms have better 
performance in terms of return on assets. To alleviate concerns that the measures 
of discretionary accruals are correlated with performance, an additional control 
variable for performance AbsROA is also included similar to Kim and Yi (2006). 
A positive association is expected between performance and financial reporting 
quality.12 
 
(iv) Leverage 
Leverage is measured by total liabilities divided by total assets and is included to 
control for debt contracting motivations for earnings management (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994). Furthermore, leverage is included as a control variable as 
family firms have been documented to have lower leverage (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). Kim and Yi (2006) argue that firms with high leverage may have 
incentives to manage total earnings in order to avoid debt covenant or private 
lending agreement violations. Cascino et al. (2010) highlights that the relationship 
between leverage and financial reporting quality is ambiguous. Specifically, if 
accounting information is regarded as complementary to other sources of 
information used by creditors, Cascino et al. (2010) argues that the relationship 
between leverage and financial reporting quality is positive. Notwithstanding, if 

12 As outlined in Section 4.3.1.2, in order to obtain residuals from industry-specific regression 
models which is utilised as a proxy for discretionary accruals, following Kothari et al. (2005), 
return on assets (ROA) is included in the industry-specific regression models (equation 2) to 
control movements in accruals related to normal performance. Notwithstanding, consistent with 
studies such as Hope et al. (2013), who utilised the industry-specific regression model to obtain 
discretionary accruals, ROA is included in the main regression (equation 1) as prior literature 
argues that there is a need to control for a spurious relationship between performance and family 
ownership in the main regression. 
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financial statements are considered a substitute for monitoring by creditors, 
Cascino et al. (2010) argue that the positive relationship between financial 
reporting quality and leverage is less likely to hold. Given that there is conflicting 
evidence on the association between leverage and financial reporting quality, no 
specific association is predicted. 
 
(v) Growth 
Growth is measured by growth in total assets in the current year compared with 
the previous year (Hope et al., 2013). Growth is controlled for in the model 
because Ali et al. (2007) document that family firms have higher growth than 
non-family firms. In addition, firms that have greater growth are usually 
associated with greater abnormal accruals (Wang, 2006). A negative association 
is expected between growth and financial reporting quality. 
 
(vi) Loss 
Loss is measured by an indicator variable (Biddle et al. 2009).  Loss is coded 1 if 
the firm reports a negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. 
Consistent with prior literature, loss is controlled for in the model because firms 
that have negative income are usually associated with lower accounting quality 
(Wang, 2006). A negative association is expected between loss and financial 
reporting quality. 
 
vii) Age 
Age is measured as the number of years since incorporation (Wang, 2006; Biddle 
and Hilary, 2006). Older firms are argued to have better financial reporting 


109 
quality as they are more likely to have more sophisticated financial reporting 
systems (Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds, 2002). Age is expected to be positively 
associated with financial reporting quality. 
4.3.1.3 Conservatism 

Conditional conservatism or persistence of transitory loss components in earnings 
is an additional measure used as a proxy for earnings quality. Timely loss 
recognition, also known as conditional conservatism, is an important attribute of 
financial reporting quality (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). As pointed out by Ball 
and Shivakumar, (2005), timely gain and loss recognition incorporates 
information regarding future cash flows into accounting income around the time 
the information arises. This requires accruals, which is a costly economic activity 
as independent verification is needed due to the fact that gains and losses have not 
been realized at the time that they occur. 
 
Moreover, the amount of resources devoted to increasing the timeliness of 
earnings will depend on the demand for it. Thus, consistent with Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) and Basu (1997), timely loss recognition or conditional 
conservatism is also utilized as a measure of financial reporting quality. The first 
measure of conditional conservatism is Basu’s (1997) linear regression that 
captures the relative persistence of losses and gains as per equation (4) below.   
∆NIit = α0 + α1D∆NIit-1 + α2∆NIit-1 + α3D∆NIit-1*∆NIit-1 + α4famdumit+α5 
famdumit*D∆NIit-1 + α6 famdumit*∆NIit-1 + α7 famdumit*D∆NIit-1 x ∆NIit-1 +εt (4) 
Where; 
∆NIit = change in net income from fiscal year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning of book 
value of total assets; 
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D∆NIt-1= a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the prior year change ∆NIt-1 is 
negative; 
D∆NIt-1 x ∆NIt-1 = Interaction variable to capture the differential sensitivity of net 
income to negative returns (differential verifiability required for recognition of 
gains versus losses); 
famdum= an indicator variable, where 1 is when family members is the largest 
percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the 
top management and, 0 otherwise;  
famdum x D∆NIt-1 = Interaction between dummy variable for prior year change 
∆NIt-1 is negative and family dummy; 
famdum *∆NIt-1 =Interaction between family dummy variable and change in net 
income from fiscal year t-1 to t; 
famdum*D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 = Interaction between family dummy variable and 
interactive variable to capture the differential sensitivity of net income to negative 
returns; 
it = company i year t; 
it-1 = company i year t-1; 
εit = Normally distributed error term. 
 
The coefficient of interest is α7. Specifically when family companies have more 
conditional conservatism, α 7 is expected to be negative. A negative α 7 suggests 
that family companies have better financial reporting quality, which lends support 
to Hypothesis 1. 
 
In order to capture the differential timeliness of earnings response to bad versus 
good news, an accruals model developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is also 
utilised.  This accruals model was also utilised by Peek, Cuijpers, and Buijink 
(2010) and Givoly et al. (2010). The model primarily relies on the correlation 
between accruals and contemporaneous cash flows. The underlying argument is 
that timely recognition of gains and losses is based on expected, not realized, cash 
flows and therefore is accomplished through accruals. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) argue that timely recognition of gains and losses is a source of positive but 
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asymmetric correlation between accruals and current period cash flows. The 
model tested is Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model as per equation (5) below: 
 
ACCit = α0 + α 1DOCFit + α 2OCFit + α 3DOCF it *OCFit + α 4 famdumit +  α 5 
famdum it * DOCF it + α6 famdumit *OCFit + α7famdum it *DOCF it * OCF it +εit 
 (5) 
 
Where; 
ACCit = ∆Inventory + ∆Debtors + ∆ Other Current Assets - ∆ Creditors - ∆ Other 
Current Liabilities – Depreciation, standardised by the beginning of period total 
assets; 
DOCFit  = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if OCF is negative and O otherwise; 
OCFit = net income adjusted for depreciation and amortization and changes in 
working capital accounts (Givoly, Hayn and Katz, 2010), standardised by the 
beginning of period total assets; 
DOCF it *OCFit = Interaction variable to capture the positive contemporaneous 
association between cash flows and accruals in bad news period; 
famdumit = famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is 
the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors 
or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; 
famdumit * DOCFit  = Interaction variable between family firm dummy and 
dummy variable for negative cash flows; 
famdumit *OCFit = Interaction between family firm dummy and relation between 
accruals and positive cash flows; 
famdumit *DOCFit  * OCFit  =Interaction variable to capture the positive 
contemporaneous association between cash flows and accruals in bad news period 
and dummy variable for family firms; 
it         = company i year t; 
εit         =error term. 
 
As with Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Givoly et. al. (2010), the role of accruals 
in mitigating the noise in operating cash flows would be reflected as α 2 < 0. More 
timely recognition of losses will lead to α 3 > 0. The coefficient of interest is α 7, 
when family companies have more conditional conservatism, that is, α 7 is 
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expected to be positive. A positive α 7 suggests that family companies have better 
financial reporting quality, which lends support to Hypothesis 1. 
 
4.3.1.4 Incidences of small positive earnings 

Prior literature suggests that managers manipulate earnings to meet or beat certain 
thresholds (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
provide evidence to suggest that managers’ use reporting discretion to avoid 
reporting negative earnings surprises. Similar to Chi et al. (2013), this thesis 
utilizes the zero earnings threshold. The intuition behind this model is that a high 
incidence of small positive earnings is evidence of earnings manipulation as. The 
following logistic regression model is adopted from Barth, Landsman and Lang 
(2008) and is shown in equation (6) below. The variable of interest is famdum. If 
the coefficient on famdum is positive and significant, this indicates that family 
firms engage less in earnings manipulation, it providing support for Hypothesis 1 
that family firms have better financial reporting quality. 
Prob it (SPOS=1)= α0 + α 1 famdumit + α 2Sizeit + α 3Lev it+ α 4 CFOit +  α 5 TURNit 
+ α 6 GROWTH it +εit  (6) 
Where; 
SPOS it = Indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings scaled by the beginning total 
assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise; 
famdum it =  Indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest 
percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the 
top management and, 0 otherwise; 
Size it = natural log of total asset; 
Leverage it = total debt divided by total assets; 
CFO it = operating cash flow scaled by total assets; 
Turn it = current net sales scaled by total assets; 
Growth it = current growth in total assets; 
it         = company i year t; 
εit         =error term. 
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(i) Family Dummy (famdum)  
Famdum is an indicator variable, where 1 is when family members are the largest 
percentage ultimate shareholder(s) and are either on the board of directors or in 
the top management and, 0 otherwise. As outlined above, family dummy is 
expected to be associated with less earnings manipulation. A positive association 
is expected between famdum and incidences of small positive earnings. 
 
(ii) Size  
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Wang, 2006). Larger 
firms are more visible and thus face more demand for higher quality financial 
reporting. A positive association is expected between size and incidences of small 
positive earnings (Chi et al, 2013). 
 
(ii) Leverage  
Leverage is measured by total liabilities divided by total assets (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994). A positive association is expected between leverage and 
incidences of small positive earnings (Chi et al, 2013). 
 
 
 (iii) Cash Flow from Operations (CFO)  
Cash flow is defined as operating cash flow scaled by total assets (Chi et al., 
2013). A negative association is expected between operating cash flow and 
incidences of small positive earnings (Davis, Soo and Trompeter, 2009). 
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(iv) Turnover (Turn)  
Turn is defined as current net sales scaled by total assets (Chi et al., 2013). 
Similar to Chi et al. (2013), this study does not predict an association for turn. 
 
(v) Growth  
Growth is defined as current growth in total assets. A positive association is 
expected between growth and incidences of small positive earnings (Chi et al, 
2013). 
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List of Variables for Research Question 1 
#=4:3!*)+!&%)0),#&#*
Variable Exp.Sign Definition 
Dependent: 
 
Jones  
  
 
Discretionary accruals using Jones(1991) 
Dechow-Dichev   Earnings quality proxy using modified 
Dechow-Dichev(1992) model 
Explanatory: 
Famdum 
+ Indicator variable, where 1 is when 
family members are the largest 
percentage ultimate shareholder(s) and 
are either on the board of directors or in 
the top management and, 0 otherwise 
Ownership + Ownership is the proportion ownership of 
the largest ultimate shareholder 
Size  + Natural log of total assets 
Leverage  +/- Total debt divided by total assets 
ROA  + Net income divided by total assets at the 
end of balance sheet date 
AbsROA  Absolute value of ROA 
Growth  - Growth rate in assets 
Age  + Firm age in years 
Loss  - Indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting 
net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise 
Audit  + Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the 
firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise 
 
#=4;3*,6:BB@7&%*)-+!*$&#
Dependent: 
∆NIit 
 Change in net income from fiscal year t-1 
to t, scaled by beginning of book value of 
total assets 
 
Explanatory: - A dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
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D∆NIt-1 the prior year change ∆NIt-1 is negative. 
D∆NIt-1 x ∆NIt-1   
- 
Interaction variable to capture the 
differential sensitivity of net income to 
negative returns (differential verifiability 
required for recognition of gains versus 
losses) 
 
famdum +/- An indicator variable, where 1 is when 
family members is the largest percentage 
ultimate shareholder and are either on the 
board of directors or in the top 
management and, 0 otherwise 
 
famdum x D∆NIt-1  +/- Interaction between dummy variable for 
prior year change ∆NIt-1 is negative and 
family dummy; 
 
famdum *∆NIt-1  +/- Interaction between family dummy 
variable and change in net income from 
fiscal year t-1 to t; 
 
famdum*D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1  - Interaction between family dummy 
variable and interactive variable to 
capture the differential sensitivity of net 
income to negative returns; 
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Dependent: 
ACCit  
 ∆Inventory + ∆Debtors + ∆ Other Current 
Assets - ∆ Creditors - ∆ Other Current 
Liabilities – Depreciation, standardised 
by the beginning of period total assets 
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Explanatory: 
DOCFit   
- An indicator variable set equal to 1 if 
OCF is negative and O otherwise 
 
OCFit  +/- Net income adjusted for depreciation and 
amortization and changes in working 
capital accounts, standardised by the 
beginning of period total assets. 
 
DOCF it *OCFit + Interaction variable to capture the positive 
contemporaneous association between 
cash flows and accruals in bad news 
period; 
famdumit  +/- Famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 
is when family members is the largest 
percentage ultimate shareholder and are 
either on the board of directors or in the 
top management and, 0 otherwise; 
 
famdumit * DOCFit   +/- Interaction variable between family firm 
dummy and dummy variable for negative 
cash flows 
 
famdumit *OCFit  +/- Interaction between family firm dummy 
and relation between accruals and 
positive cash flows 
 
famdumit *DOCFit  * 
OCFit   
+ Interaction variable to capture the positive 
contemporaneous association between 
cash flows and accruals in bad news 
period and dummy variable for family 
firms 
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Dependent: 
 
SPOS it  
 Indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings 
scaled by the beginning total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise 
 
Explanatory: 
famdum it  
+ Indicator variable, where 1 is when 
family members is the largest percentage 
ultimate shareholder and are either on the 
board of directors or in the top 
management and, 0 otherwise 
 
Size it  + Natural log of total asset 
 
Leverage it  + Total debt divided by total assets 
 
CFO it  _ Operating cash flow scaled by total assets 
 
Turn it  +/- Current net sales scaled by total assets 
 
Growth it  + Current growth in total assets 
 
 
4.3.2 Model specification for testing H2-3 - Family ownership and 
disclosure 
Hypothesis 2 addresses research question 2, which examines whether differences 
in types of ownership will affect differences in voluntary disclosure of private 
companies. Specifically, Hypothesis 2 predicts that family ownership will more 
likely be associated with lodging abbreviated financial reports or, in other words, 
family companies are less likely to provide voluntary disclosure of revenue and 
cost of sales in their financial reports compared to other types of private company 
ownership structures. Abbreviated financial reports proxy for proprietary costs as 
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sales and cost of sales are commercially sensitive information (Dedman and 
Lennox, 2009). 
 
To test the relation between family ownership and voluntary disclosure, the 
dependent variable is abbreviated report, coded 1 if the firm files abbreviated 
financial reports and 0, otherwise. The variable of interest is famdum. Hypothesis 
2 will be supported if famdum is positively and significantly associated with 
abbreviated financial reports as prior literature has provided evidence that family 
firms prefer less voluntary disclosure (Chen et al, 2008). 
 
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logit regressions are 
used to test the hypothesis on the predicted relationship between family 
ownership and disclosure. A logistic regression model is utilised as per equation 
(7) below: 
Ln [p/1-p] ABBREVit = α0+ α1Famdumit + α2Ownershipit +α3HERFit + α4Sizeit + 
α5Leverageit + α6Ageit+ α7Liquidityit +α8AssetTangibilityit + iα9ROAit + 
α10LTDebtit+ iα11LTDebtit +α12Growthit +α13Auditit + iα14INDUSTRYit+εit  (7) 
 
 
Where, 
ABBREVit = indicator variable with a value of 1 when company i did not disclose 
sales and cost of sales t which is a proxy for abbreviated financial reporting, 0 
otherwise; 
Famdumit= A dummy variable taking the for value, =1 if family company; else 0; 
Ownershipit= Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate 
shareholder; 
HERFit = The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as the sum of squares of 
market shares in the industry; 
Sizeit = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
Leverageit=Total debt divided by total asset; 
Ageit=Firm age in years; 
Liquidity it = Current assets over current liabilities; 
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Assets tangibilityit = Plant, property and equipment divided by total assets; 
ROAit= Net income divided by total assets at the end of balance sheet date; 
LTDebtit= Long Term debt divided by total assets; 
GROWTHit = Current growth in assets for year t; 
AUDITit = indicator variable with a value of 1 when firm i hires a BIG 4 auditor 
during year t, 0 otherwise; 
It         = company i year t; 
εit = Normally distributed error term. 
 
4.3.2.1 Explanatory variables 

(i) Family and ownership concentration 
Family company and ownership concentration variables are similarly defined as 
previously explained in Section 4.3.1.2.1 in explanatory variables related to 
equations 1-6. Chen et al. (2008) found evidence that family firms prefer less 
voluntary disclosure. Accordingly famdum is expected to be positively associated 
with filing abbreviated financial reports. Leuz (2004) found evidence that firms 
with lower ownership concentration are more likely to be associated with 
voluntary disclosure. 
4.3.2.2 Control Variables 

(i) Industry Concentration 
Extant research indicates that competition could be a determinant of disclosure. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is used to proxy for competition and is 
calculated as the sum of squares of sales in the industry (Dedman and Lennox, 
2009). Higher values of the Herfindahl index denote greater concentration of sales 
which is generally interpreted as indicating the industry is less competitive.  In 
order to calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, industry information was 
collected from information obtained from the Office of National Statistics 
website. In the UK, The United Kingdom Standard Industrial Classification of 
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Economic Activities (SIC) is used to classify business establishments by the type 
of economic activity. The new version of SIC 2007 was adopted in the UK from 
1st January 2007. Companies were identified by Industry using SIC 2007, as that 
is the classification available from the FAME database. In order to calculate the 
Herfindahl Index, the SIC 2007 codes were converted to SIC 2003. This was done 
by manually using the Industry Conversion Tool available in the FAME database. 
Once the SIC conversions for 2003 were obtained from FAME, each firm was 
coded manually using the SIC 2003 codes. This was done to avoid manipulating 
the industry information obtained from the Office of National Statistics. For 
industry information from 2005-2007, the amount of total turnover for each 
industry was collected from the Annual Business Inquiry results for 2005-2007, 
which was based on the SIC 2003 codes. Next, earnings quality figures were 
recalculated using the new industry figures.  
 
The theoretical literature provides mixed arguments on how competition affects 
incentives to disclose proprietary information (Verrecchia and Weber, 2006). 
Using an entry game scenario, Darrough and Stanton (1990) argue that the threat 
of competition will provide incentives for firms to disclose information in order to 
stop competitors from entering the market. In contrast, Verrechia (1990) argues 
that where the market consists of mature competitors, greater competition would 
inhibit disclosure. Shin (2002) provided empirical evidence to suggest that the 
type of product market competition affects the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Consistent with the proprietary cost argument, this thesis predicts that more 
intense competition will lead to lower disclosure. 
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 (ii) Size 
Firm size is measured by the natural log of total assets. Prencipe (2004) argues 
that competitive costs are expected to be lower for larger companies as, ceteris 
paribus, larger firms have more resources to defend themselves against 
competitors’ adverse actions. In addition, Prencipe (2004) argues that due to their 
size, larger companies have a stronger position in their contractual relations with 
their clients and suppliers, which reduces the possible negative effect of voluntary 
disclosure due to the revelation of commercially sensitive information to rivals. 
Therefore, firm size is expected to be positively associated with the filing of 
abbreviated financial reports as larger firms have lower incentives to withhold 
information. 
 
(iii) Leverage 
Leverage is measured by total debt over total assets (Hope et al., 2013). Sengupta 
(1998) found evidence that firms with greater disclosure have a lower cost of 
debt. Firms with higher leverage are predicted less likely to be associated with 
filing abbreviated financial reports. 
 
(iv) Age 
Similar to Dedman and Lennox (2009), age is included as a control variable. Age 
is measured by the number of years since incorporation (Biddle and Hilary, 
2006). There are two competing arguments with respect to age. Diamond (1989) 
argues that older companies are better known, thus reducing the incentives of 
these companies to file abbreviated financial reports, as their competitors 
probably know information about these companies. Conversely, Dedman and 
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Lennox, (2009) argue that one of the reasons for their longevity is due to these 
companies’ ability to hide the reason for their competitive advantage. Age is 
predicted to be positively associated with the filing of abbreviated financial 
reports as older firms have lower incentives to withhold information. 
 
(v) Liquidity 
Liquidity is measured by current assets over current liabilities. Firms with lower 
liquidity are less likely to file abbreviated financial reports as they may disclose 
full reports in order to justify their lower liquidity position (Wallace and Naser, 
1995). 
 
(vi) Asset Tangibility 
Asset Tangibility is measured as the ratio of fixed assets over total assets and is a 
proxy for barriers to entry.  Prior literature argues that a higher proportion of fixed 
assets are associated with less information asymmetry and a lower risk profile 
(Beuselinck, Deloof and Manigart, 2008) and thus will lead to less incentives to 
voluntarily disclose information. Thus, capital intensity is predicted less likely to 
be associated with filing abbreviated financial reports.  
 
(vii) Performance 
Performance is measured as the absolute value of return on assets at the end of 
balance sheet date (Kim and Yi, 2006). In the public firm setting, empirical 
evidence on how performance affects the decision to voluntarily disclose 
information is inconclusive. On the one hand, profitable companies may have 
fewer incentives to disclose as disclosure encourages entrants and competition 
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(Verrecchia and Weber, 2006). Accordingly, highly profitable companies have 
incentives to hide their success in order to prevent rivals from copying their 
success (Dedman and Lennox, 2009). Conversely, firms performing poorly may 
disclose less voluntary information in order to conceal poor performance (Chau 
and Gray, 2010). Dedman and Lennox (2009) found evidence in their study of 
UK private manufacturing companies that successful private companies are less 
likely to lodge full financial reports if they are more profitable. Performance is 
predicted to be positively associated with the filing of abbreviated financial 
reports as better performing firms have lower incentives to withhold information. 
 
 (viii) Long term debt financing 
Long term debt is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total liabilities. Prior 
literature has two competing arguments with regard to long term debt. The first 
argument is that long term relationships between private companies and banks 
reduce the need for companies to disclose information publicly (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994). In addition, in a more recent study of private firms in the US, 
Cassar (2011) argues that in the private firm setting, soft information obtained 
from long term relationships may be more important to lenders than information 
from financial statements. Conversely, Dedman and Lennox (2009) argue that as 
more is known about companies with long-term debt, they would benefit less 
from withholding information in their financial reports. Long term debt financing 
is predicted to be less likely associated with filing abbreviated financial reports. 
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(ix) Growth 
Growth is measured as the growth in total assets. Cohen (2003) argues that high 
growth companies are unlikely to provide high quality disclosures in order to 
preserve their growth opportunities. Growth is predicted to be less likely 
associated with filing abbreviated financial reports. 
 
(x) Audit 
Audit is an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm has been audited by Big 4 
Auditor and 0 otherwise. Similar to Birt et al. (2006), firms with a Big 4 auditor 
are predicted less likely to be associated with filing of abbreviated financial 
reports. 
 
(xi) Dechow 
Dechow’s earnings quality proxy using residuals from the modified Dechow-
Dichev (1992) model is also included in the model. Earnings quality is expected 
to be less likely associated with the filing of abbreviated financial reports. 
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Variable Exp.Sign Definition 
Dependent: 
ABBREVit  
 
 Indicator variable with a value of 1 when 
company i discloses abbreviated financial 
reports t, 0 otherwise 
 
Explanatory: 
Famdum 
+ A dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
family firm; else 0 
 
Ownership + Ownership is the proportion ownership of 
the largest ultimate shareholder 
 
HERF + The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is 
calculated as the sum of squares of 
market shares in the industry 
 
Size 
 
- Natural logarithm of total assets 
Leverage - Leverage is total debt divided by total 
assets 
Age - Age is firm age in years 
Liquidity   
 
- Current assets over current liabilities 
 
Assets Tangibility - Plant, property and equipment divided by 
total assets 
 
ROA 
 
+ Net income divided by total assets at the 
end of balance sheet date 
Long term Debt - Long term Debt is long-term debt over 
total liabilities 
GROWTH - Current growth in assets for year t 
 
AUDIT - Indicator variable with a value of 1 when 

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firm i hires a BIG 4 auditor during year t, 
0 otherwise 
Dechow - Residuals from the modified Dechow-
Dichev(1992) model 
 
 
4.3.3 Model specification for testing H4  - Family ownership, financial 
reporting quality and investment efficiency 
Hypothesis 4 addresses Research Question 3, which is whether variation in family 
ownership affects the relationship between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency. Prior literature has found evidence that financial reporting 
quality is associated with investment efficiency (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Chen et 
al., 2011). Biddle and Hilary (2006) argue that institutional features may also be 
related to firm-level capital investments. Furthermore, prior empirical research 
has provided evidence to suggest that ownership has an effect on investment 
efficiency (Wei and Zhang, 2008; Pindado et al, 2011). Specifically, Hypothesis 4 
predicts that the relationship between accounting quality and investment 
efficiency will be affected by family ownership. 
 
A key construct in this analysis is investment efficiency. Similar to Biddle et. al. 
(2009) and Chen et al. (2011),  investment efficiency is measured as deviation 
from expected investment using a model that predicts investment as a function of 
growth opportunities. A firm is investing efficiently if it undertakes projects with 
positive net present value (NPV). Accordingly, underinvestment (negative values 
of the residuals from equation 8) includes not taking up investment opportunities 
with positive NPV and overinvestment (positive values of the residuals from 
equation 8) is investing in projects with negative NPV. 
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To measure investment efficiency, the model used is based on Chen at al. (2011) 
as per equation (8) below: 
Invest it = α0 + α1NEGit-1 + α2%RevGrowthit-1 + α3 NEG * %RevGrowthit-1 + εit  
(8) 
Where: 
Investit = Sum of new investment in machinery, equipment, vehicles, land, 
buildings and research and development expenditures, less the sale of fixed assets, 
and scaled by lagged total assets ; 
Negit-1 = Indicator variable with the value 1 for negative revenue growth firm i in 
year t-1; 
%RevGrowthit-1= Annual revenue growth for firm i in year t-1; 
εit  = Normally distributed error term. 
 
Similar to Chen at al. (2011), the investment model is estimated cross-sectionally 
with at least 10 observations in each industry. Firms were then classified into two 
groups based on the residuals obtained from equation (8), which were used to 
estimate equation (9) below: 
 
InvEff it= α0 + α1FRQit-1 + α2FRQit-1 * Famdumit-1 + α3Ownershipit-1 + α4Sizeit-1 + 
α5Ageit-1 + α6Tangibilityit-1 + α7Leverageit-1 + α8Slackit-1+ α8Lossit-1 + εit   (9) 
 
Where:  
InvEffit= excess investment (underinvestment or overinvestment) is the residuals 
of the investment model (equation 8); 
FRQit-1= Proxies for Financial reporting quality (Residuals of equation 2 and 3 as 
above) firm i in year t-1; 
Family*FRQit-1= Interaction variable to capture the moderating effect of family 
ownership on financial reporting quality firm i in year t-1; 
Ownershipit-1= Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate 
shareholder firm i in year t-1; 
Firm sizeit-1=log of total assets firm i in year t-1; 
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Ageit-1 = firm age in years firm i in year t-1; 
Tangibilityit-1=the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets firm i in 
year t-1; 
Leverageit-1= total debt divided by total assets firm i in year t-1; 
Slackit-1= the ratio of cash to total assets firm i in year t-1; 
Lossit-1= an indicator variable, 1 if there is negative net income in the current 
year, 0 otherwise firm i in year t-1 
It         = company i year t; 
εit = Normally distributed error term. 
 
4.3.3.1 Dependant variable 

Investment efficiency is measured as the residuals of the investment model as 
outlined in equation (8). 
4.3.3.2 Explanatory variables 

(i) Financial Reporting Quality 
Financial reporting quality is measured using the residuals from equation (2) and 
(3) reported earlier. 
 
(ii) Famdum 
Family dummy is similarly defined as previously explained in explanatory 
variables related to equations 1-7 in Section 4.3.1.2.1. Family ownership is 
predicted to be positively (negatively) related to underinvestment 
(overinvestment). 
 
 (iii) Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration variables are similarly defined as previously explained 
in Section 4.3.1.2.1 in explanatory variables related to equations 1-7. Prior 
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literature has found evidence that ownership concentration mitigates investment 
efficiency (Wei and Zhang, 2008). Accordingly, this thesis predicts that there will 
be a positive (negative) association between ownership concentration and 
underinvestment (overinvestment). 
 
4.3.3.3 Control Variables 

Investment efficiency may be influenced by other factors than the explanatory 
variables outlined above. Derived from past literature (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; 
Chen et al., 2011), these variables are included as control variables as they are 
likely to be associated with investment efficiency. 
 
(i) Size 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Biddle et al., 2009). To 
account for differences in investment decisions due to firm size, size is included 
as a control variable (Anderson et al., 2012). Prior literature had found evidence 
that investment decreases significantly with firm size (Baderstcher et al., 2013; 
Biddle and Hilary, 2006). Notwithstanding, Chen et al. (2011) found evidence 
that size is effective in mitigating investment efficiencies. Size is predicted to be 
positively (negatively) associated with underinvestment (overinvestment). 
 
 (ii) Age 
Age is measured as number of years since incorporation (Biddle and Hilary, 
2006). Firms at different stages of their life cycles may have different investment 
behaviour (Anderson et al., 2012). The rationale here is that older firms may have 
reached the lifecycle when investment naturally slows down. Furthermore, Biddle 
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et al. (2009) found evidence that older firms have better investment efficiency in 
relation to overinvestment. Age is expected to be positively (negatively) 
associated with underinvestment (overinvestment). 
 
(iii) Asset Tangibility 
Asset tangibility is measured as the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total 
assets (Biddle et al., 2009). Asset tangibility increases a firm’s ability to obtain 
financing because it reduces contracting problems between the firms and external 
capital providers (Anderson et al., 2012). Asset tangibility is predicted to be 
positively (negatively) associated with underinvestment (overinvestment). 
 
 (iv) Leverage 
Leverage is measured by total debt over total asset (Hope et al., 2013). Prior 
literature argues that firms with more debt are unlikely to be able to obtain more 
debt to finance capital expenditures (Anderson et al., 2012). Moreover, firms with 
lower leverage are able to more easily take advantage of new investment 
opportunities (Baderstscher, Shroff and White, 2013).  
 
(v) Financial Slack 
Financial slack is measured as the ratio of cash to total assets (Biddle et al., 2009). 
The availability of cash to finance capital expenditures is expected to be 
associated with investment efficiency (Badertscher et al. , 2013). Financial slack 
is predicted to be positively (negatively) associated with underinvestment 
(overinvestment)  (Biddle and Hilary, 2006).  
 


132 
(vi) Loss 
Loss is measured by an indicator variable (Biddle et al., 2009).  Loss is coded 1 if 
the firm reports a negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. Loss is 
expected to be positively (negatively) associated with underinvestment 
(overinvestment) (Biddle et al., 2009). 
 
4.3.3.4 Robustness test 

Similar to Chen et al. (2011), this thesis conducts several additional tests such as 
using an expanded model of investment efficiency and using asset growth as a 
proxy for investment opportunities to determine the robustness of the results 
reported in Chapter 6.  
 
(i) Expanded model of Investment Efficiency 
To measure investment efficiency, an expanded model based on Richardson 
(2006) and Chen et al. (2011) was conducted. The rationale is that investment 
efficiency in the original model is too parsimonious and this could have an impact 
on the results. Specifically, firm size, age, financial slack and leverage were 
included as additional control variables to equations (8) and (9) and were both 
estimated cross-sectionally with at least 10 observations in each industry. 
Companies were then classified into two groups based on the residuals in 
equation (10), which were then used to reestimate equation (9). 
Invest it = α0 + α1NEGit-1 + α2%RevGrowthit-1 + α3 NEG * %RevGrowthit-1 + 
α4Sizeit-1 + α5Ageit-1 + α6Financial Slackit-1 + α7Leverageit-1 + εit  (10) 
Where: 
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Invest it= Sum of new investment in machinery, equipment, vehicles, land, 
buildings and research and development expenditures, less the sale of fixed assets, 
and scaled by lagged total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
Neg it-1 = Indicator variable with the value 1 for negative revenue growth; 
%RevGrowth it-1= Annual revenue growth for firm i in year t-1; 
Firm sizeit-1=log of total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
Ageit-1 = firm age in years for firm i in year t-1; 
Financial slackit-1= The ratio of cash to total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
Leverageit-1= total debt divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
It         = company i year t; 
εit  = Normally distributed error term. 
 
(ii) Asset Growth as a proxy for investment opportunities 
Similar to Chen et al. (2011), this thesis replaced growth opportunity 
(%RevGrowth) with Asset Growth as a proxy for investment opportunities in 
equation (8). Specifically, asset growth is measured as the natural log of total 
assets at the end of year t-1 divided by total assets at the end of year t-2 for the 
estimation of equation (8) (Chen et al. (2011); McNichols and Stubben, 2008). 
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Variable Exp.Sign 
UnderInv 
Exp.Sign 
OverInv 
Definition 
Dependent: 
InvEff 
   
Excess investment is the residuals 
from the investment model 
(equation 8). Underinvestment 
(UnderInv is negative values of the 
residuals from equation 8) includes 
not taking up investment 
opportunities with positive NPV 
and overinvestment (OverInv is 
positive values of the residuals 
from equation 8) is investing in 
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projects with negative NPV 
 
 
Ownership + - Ownership is the proportion 
ownership of the largest ultimate 
shareholder 
 
Jones + - Residuals from Discretionary 
accruals using Jones( 1991) 
Dechow-Dichev + _ Residuals from modified Dechow-
Dichev(1992) model 
Size 
 
+ - Natural logarithm of total assets 
Age + - Age is number of years since 
incorporation 
Tangibility + - Plant, property and equipment 
divided by total assets 
Leverage   Leverage is total debt divided by 
total assets 
Slack + - Slack is ratio of cash to total assets 
Loss + - Loss is coded 1 if the firm reports 
a negative net income in the 
current year and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Sources and sample data 
This thesis utilizes panel data of medium-sized UK private companies for the 
period 2004-2011. This time period was chosen because it provides a natural 
setting to test proprietary costs among private medium-sized companies in the 
UK. As outlined in Chapter 2, after January 2004, changes were made to the size 
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thresholds of private medium-sized companies, which enabled some companies 
who were previously filing full accounts to be eligible to file abbreviated financial 
reports which do not disclose turnover and cost of sales (Dedman and Lennox, 
2009). As data were collected in December 2012, 2011 was chosen as the final 
year-end of the sample. In the UK private companies have up to 9 months to 
lodge their Annual Return to Companies House and there is a lag between the 
fiscal year-end date and the data becoming available on FAME (Dedman and 
Lennox, 2009). Thus by choosing 2011, this thesis is able to only collect a 
complete data set up to the end of 2011. While financial data are collected from 
2004, ownership data only becomes available in the FAME database from 2005, 
as the bulk of companies in the sample had missing annual returns for the year 
2004. 
 
Financial and ownership data were obtained from Bureau Van Dijk (BVD) 
through their FAME database. This database has been used consistent with other 
studies, which have utilized private company financial reports such as Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) and Dedman and Lennox (2009). The FAME database 
contains information on UK and Irish companies, that is, it contains detailed 
financial statement information for two million private and public companies. 
Information from the database is compiled from records filed at the Companies 
House in the UK.  FAME contains financial information in detailed standardized 
format for up to ten years. Specifically, the FAME database contains a maximum 
of 62 profit and loss items, 74 balance sheet items and ten cash flow items. FAME 
also contains other company specific information such as company type, status, 
date of incorporation, filing changes and other company information. 
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The main advantage of using the FAME database is it provides detailed 
information on ownership structure for each company (where applicable)13 for the 
latest financial year (i.e., 2011). In particular it lists all shareholders for non-
quoted companies. Ownership information for the year 2004 was not available for 
most firms in the sample. Consequently, ownership information was collected 
from 2005-2011. Accordingly, eight years of financial data and seven years of 
ownership data were collected from FAME in December 2012. Lagged financial 
data are needed to calculate the earnings quality models that are utilized in this 
study 
 
Research Question 1 examines whether there are any differences in the financial 
reporting quality of family and non-family companies, while Research Question 3 
investigates whether the relationship between earnings quality and investment 
efficiency is dependent on family ownership utilizing data from 2004-2011. Using 
voluntary disclosure as a proxy for proprietary cost, Research Question 2 
examines whether differences in voluntary disclosure exist between family and 
non-family companies. Disclosure in this context refers to the option to file 
abbreviated financial reports. Specifically, the regulation allows medium-sized 
companies which meet the criteria specified in the Companies Act 1989, to file 
financial reports which do not disclose sales and cost of sales. This option was 
only available for private medium-sized companies prior to 2008. Given that sales 
and cost of sales are commercially sensitive information (Dedman and Lennox, 
2009), it provides an ideal setting to test the proprietary cost hypothesis. As 

13Detailed ownership structure is shown for the latest financial year. Ownership percentages for all 
previous years were calculated manually using information extracted from the Annual Returns. 
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highlighted by Dedman and Lennox, this is unlikely to be an agency issue as 
firms are required by law to provide shareholders with full financial reports 
irrespective of what they publicly choose to disclose. Moreover, the authors note 
that banks do not rely on financial statements filed at Companies house as 
companies usually provide banks with information needed on a timely basis. In 
2008, changes were again made to the reporting requirements for medium-sized 
company thresholds in order to align them with the EU maxima in the EU 4th 
Directive.  One of the changes that occurred is firms that meet the medium-sized 
criteria are now required to report sales in their financial reports. Accordingly, 
Research Question 2 utilizes data from 2004-2007 to examine this issue. 
 
The sample comprises only medium-sized companies as these companies are 
allowed to file abbreviated financial reports. The data excludes both large and 
small companies, as large companies do not have the option to file abbreviated 
financial reports, whereas small companies are subject to different legislation.14 
The definition of what constitutes a medium-sized entity changed for the fiscal 
year-ending after January 29 200415 and again for the accounting periods on or 
after 6 April 2008. In line with the Companies Act 2006 (Amendment) (Accounts 
and Reports) Regulation 2008, to qualify as a medium-sized company, at least 
two of the following three conditions are required; total assets are larger than £5.6 
million and not more than £11.4 million, turnover are larger than £11.2 million 

14 In the sample period, a small private company is required to publicly disclose only an 
abbreviated balance sheet. In addition, since 1997, qualifying small private companies may elect 
to prepare their financial reports under the Financial Reporting Standard for Smaller Entities 
(FRSSE) instead of the full range of accounting standards. The FRSSE was introduced by the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in 1997 in order to reduce the burden of preparing financial 
statements for small private entities or groups. 
15 As outlined in Chapter 2, the total assets threshold was raised from £5.6 million to £11.4 
million, the sales threshold was raised from £11.2 million to £22.8 million, whilst the employee 
size threshold remain unchanged at 250. 
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and not more than £22.8 million, and employees are more than 50 and not more 
than 250. In contrast to Dedman and Lennox (2009)16, this study is conducted on 
firms that meet the threshold to file for abbreviated financial reports, that is, they 
meet the conditions for medium-sized companies after the change in regulation in 
2004.  
1. £11.2 million ≥ sales < £22.8 million 
2. £5.6 million ≥ total assets < £11.4 million 
3. 50 ≥ employees< 250 
The gathering of ownership data began by extracting the information from 
FAME. Ownership information, specifically percentage share ownership of all the 
owners of a company can be extracted from FAME in the form of an excel sheet 
primarily for the time period 2009-2011. However, the bulk of the ownership 
information for the years 2005-2009 were missing in the excel sheets and had to 
be hand collected from images of the Annual Returns, which were manually 
downloaded individually from FAME’s website. In addition, annual returns for 
most of the companies in the sample were not available in the FAME database for 
2004. Thus, in order to incorporate changes in ownership across the seven years 
from 2005-2011, the bulk of the ownership data had to be compiled manually 
from the Annual Returns.  
An annual return is a “snapshot of general information about a company's 
directors, secretary (where one has been appointed), registered office address, 

16 Dedman and Lennox (2005) examined voluntary disclosure of manufacturing companies 
between 2004-2006. In their study 49 per cent, (1569 out of 3197 companies) had their year-end in 
2004. Their sample selection intentionally included companies that were able to file abbreviated 
financial reports under the old and new medium-sized company thresholds. Given that the focus of 
Research Question 2 in this study is on ownership and proprietary costs and ownership 
information is only available from 2005, this thesis only focuses on firms that meet the medium-
sized criteria after the change in regulation in 2004.  
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shareholders and share capital” (Company House, 2014). According to the 
Companies Act 2006, every company in the UK must submit an Annual Return to 
Companies House once at least every 12 months, within 28 days after the 
anniversary of the incorporation of a company or the anniversary of the made-up 
date of the last annual return. Ownership information was collected from the 
annual return as it contained information on who the directors are, the address of 
the directors, and the number of shares owned by each shareholder in the 
company. 
 
Similar to prior studies (Claessen et al. 2002; La Porta et al.1999), this study 
focuses on ultimate ownership. The procedure for identifying the ultimate owner 
is similar to the one utilized by La Porta et al. (1999). An ultimate owner is 
defined as the shareholder who is not controlled by anyone else and is identified 
by looking at the detailed ownership structure in the FAME database. Although a 
company can have more than one ultimate owner, consistent with Fan and Wong 
(2002), this thesis focused on the largest ultimate owner. Specifically, family 
companies are defined as those in which family members are key executives or 
directors and are the largest ultimate shareholder (i.e., Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). 
 
The procedure for identifying the ultimate owner is as follows: a company in the 
sample is searched in the database using the BVD ID number, which is a unique 
number assigned to the company. The BVD ID number for a particular company 
is the same in all of BVD’s databases such as Orbis. The company’s unique ID 
number acts as a control, as some of the companies in the sample may have had a 

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name change during the 8-year period. The unique ID number also enables the 
user to obtain information for the company from the other BVD databases. Once 
the company is identified, FAME enables the user to open a detailed ownership 
structure tree such as the one illustrated in Figure 1. Each box provides 
information on a single company or a shareholder. Within each box are several 
identifiers of an entity such as the name of the company and BVD ID (where 
relevant). If the box represents a company, the first item will be a BVD ID 
number. If the box represents an individual, the first item on the list will be the 
country of domicile but as can be seen for this particular shareholder, this 
information is not available. The next item in the box will be number of 
subsidiaries, which is essentially the number of links this entity has with its 
subsidiaries.17 ‘Number of shareholders’ is whether the entity has a shareholder, 
or in other words, whether it has an owner. ‘Source’ is from where the FAME 
database has obtained the information. In this example, ‘RT’ stands for Annual 
Return, which means that this information is obtained from the Annual Returns 
that have been lodged by these entities at Companies’ House. ‘Op revenue’ is the 
amount of operating revenue, total assets are the value of total assets and number 
of employees stands for the number of employees that the firm has. This 
information is obtained from the most current financial year available for the 
company on the FAME database. 


The Fame ownership database is a database of links between a shareholder and a subsidiary. A 
shareholder might be a corporation, an individual or a government. The subsidiary is always a 
corporation. As per the Fame User Guide, the term subsidiary in the ownership database is not a 
reference to the percentage of ownership between the parent and the daughter. In effect, if 
company A is recorded as having a stake in company B with a very small percentage, company B 
is said to be a subsidiary of company A although in effect, company B would normally be called 
an affiliated company. The justification given by the Fame database is that affiliations may consist 
of links with shareholders. Thus, in the ownership database, Fame uses the term subsidiary rather 
than affiliate for any company in which a parent owns a stake, irrespective of the percentage of 
ownership.
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After identifying a particular company, the ownership structure tree of that 
company is then examined in the FAME database. If the company is owned 
directly, then the proportion of ownership is calculated. Similarly, when an 
ultimate owner indirectly owns a company, the proportion of indirect ownership 
is calculated. For example, in Figure 1 above, Bonnington Limited (one of the 
companies in the sample) is directly owned by Bonnington Group Limited. 
However, as can be seen from Figure 1, Mr James McGettigan is the ultimate 
owner as in his box the number of shareholders is 0. Upon closer examination, his 
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wife18 is also a shareholder and he is a director of the company. Accordingly, 
ownership percentage is calculated as 100 per cent. In addition, as he and his wife 
are directors of the company, Bonnington Group Limited is coded as a family 
company19. This is done for all the years from 2005 to 2011. 
4.4.2 Sample selection 
The initial sample consists of all privately held companies domiciled in the 
United Kingdom. The sample is restricted using the following filtering criteria. 
First, only private companies were selected. Public limited companies, whether 
listed or unlisted, were excluded from the sample. Second, similar to Svanstrom 
(2013), inactive private companies were excluded from the sample. Inactive 
companies refer to companies that have been dissolved, liquidated, entered into 
receivership or declared non-trading. The rationale for excluding inactive 
companies is that prior research has shown that financially stressed companies are 
more likely to engage in earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), 
thus, including inactive companies may distort the results.  
 
Third, wholly owned subsidiaries of public companies were excluded from the 
sample similar to the procedure used in Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) argue that financial reports of subsidiaries have a different 
economic role and suggest that by definition, these financial reports are similar to 
internal reports. That is, their investment, financing and operating decisions are 

Although this thesis uses the term wife, Mrs Patricia McGettigan could also be any other female 
relative with the same surname as Mr James McGettigan such as his mother, his grandmother or 
his sister-in-law.
19In this study, a family company is a binary variable, coded 1 if the firm has family members 
either on the board of directors or top management, and is the largest ultimate shareholder, 0 
otherwise. Further explanation on the measure of family companies is provided in Section 
4.3.1.2.1 of this chapter. 
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likely to be influenced by their parent companies and their inclusion could bias 
the results. Moreover, including subsidiaries in the sample would affect the 
measure of financial reporting quality. For example, a random shock affecting the 
subsidiary would also be reflected in the financial report of the parent company, 
resulting in significant duplication of information.  
 
In addition, consistent with prior research, all companies from the financial 
services and energy and utilities industries are excluded as these companies have 
unique disclosures, a high degree of complexity and a unique accrual generating 
process. Public administrative institutions are also excluded (Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2008) as they have different objectives in comparison to profit 
making entities.  
 
Finally, all companies that do not meet the medium-sized criterion as outlined in 
section 4.4.1 above are excluded from the sample. The selection process of the 
sample is summarized in Table 4.7 below and after following the selection 
criteria, 3,152 firms were left in the sample. 
 
#=4@3 $'##+!&%)&**
 Number of 
companies 
Population of private companies available in the FAME 
database in December 2012 
7,755,657 
Less Inactive Companies  (5,065,130) 
Less Companies not meeting the medium-sized company 
criteria  
(2,604,531) 
Less Utilities, Financial and Insurance, and Public 
Administrative Institutions 
(9,953) 
Less subsidiaries (72,891) 
Initial sample for analysis 3,152 
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Table 4.8 summarizes the number of firm year observations that were included in 
the analysis after firm year observations with missing data were excluded from 
the sample. The table also illustrates the number of firm year observations for the 
different financial reporting quality measures used in the study, that is the 
‘Dechow-Dichev’ and the ‘Jones’ model, the two conservatism measures and the 
‘Incidences of small positive earnings’ measure. The dataset utilized in this thesis 
is an unbalanced panel. In a balanced dataset, each firm will have an observation 
in each time period. However, a disadvantage of a balance data set is the creation 
of survivorship bias as only firms that have data in the eight year period will be 
included in the sample. In addition, an advantage of having an unbalanced panel 
is that it limits the loss of observations or optimizes the sample size (Baum, 
2006). 
#=4A3,$)&!)$5)*)-+!&%*&)+ !)%+
'%%+)!#**!%+ +,0
Dechow-Dichev Number of firm-year observations 
Initial sample for analysis 22,064 
Less: missing variables (14,873) 
Final Sample 7,191 
Jones  
Initial sample for analysis 22,064 
Less: missing variables (13,908) 
Final sample 8,156 
Conservatism (Ball, 1997)  
Initial sample for analysis 22,064 
Less:missing variables (5,803) 
Final sample 16,261 
Conservatism Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) 
 
Initial sample for analysis 22,064 
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Less: Missing variables (7,286) 
Final sample 14,778 
Incidences of small positive earnings  
Initial sample for analysis 22,064 
Less: Missing variables (13,322) 
Final sample 8,742 
 
4.5 Additional Analyses 
4.5.1 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term 
in the OLS regression. An issue highlighted in the literature on ownership is the 
potential endogeneity problem that exists between ownership and performance. In 
order to address the potential endogeneity problem, this study utilizes a dynamic 
panel model using the generalized method of moments (GMM) system estimator. 
The advantage of using GMM is that it is a procedure that deals with endogeneity 
in panel data settings without having to rely on an exogenous external 
instrumental variable. GMM allows the efficient use of appropriate lags of the 
potentially endogeneous regressors as their own instruments Moreover, an 
advantage of GMM is that it is robust to heteroskedacity and /or autocorrelation 
of an unknown form. Results to test the null hypothesis that the errors are serially 
independent up to the second order AR(2) and the Hansen statistic for 
overidentification are satisfied and reported in Chapter 5. 
 
Notwithstanding, in order to control for endogeneity in the investment efficiency 
model (equation 9), this thesis was unable to include the family dummy into the 
GMM specification. This is because by doing so, the Hansen statistic was 
significant which suggests that there were errors in the model. Hence, similar to 
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Pindado et al. (2011), in order to control for endogeneity, this thesis predicted the 
probability of family control using first stage logit regressions. Specifically, the 
logit regression (equation 11 below), which predicts the likelihood of being 
family controlled were estimated cross-sectionally for each year to obtain the 
probability of being a family firm. The predicted value of being a family firm is 
then included in the GMM specification of equation (9). By including the 
predicted value of family obtained from equation (11) into equation (9), the 
Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the model is over-identified, as 
indicated by the non-significant chi-square values of 0.742 and 0.961 
respectively, which supports the hypothesis that there are no errors in the GMM 
model. 
Famdumit = α0+ α1Sizeit + α2SdEarningsit +α3Salesgrowthit +εit  (11) 
Where, 
Famdumit= A dummy variable taking the for value, =1 if family firm; else 0; 
SdEarningsit = Standard deviation of firm’s earnings; 
Salesgrowthit = Current growth in assets for year t; 
It         = company i year t; 
 
4.5.2 Outliers  
In order to alleviate potential outliers, which may affect the reliability of the 
regression model, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. 
There were no changes to the results in comparison to the original unwinsorized 
sample, except the goodness of fit of the models improved (as measured by the 
adjusted R-squared) in the truncated sample. 
 
4.5.3 Heteroscedasticity and Muticollinearity 
Heteroscedasticity is controlled for in several ways. In the calculation of the 
proxy for earnings quality, a constant in the model and the inclusion of lagged 
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total assets as a denominator for all variables in the Jones (1991) and Dechow-
Dichev models were undertaken in order to control for heteroscedasticity. In 
addition, the robust function in Stata which uses the Huber-White sandwich 
estimator (White, 1980) was also used in both the calculation of the dependant 
variable and the main regression in order to correct for heteroscedasticity.  
 
Multicollinearity exists when independent variables are highly correlated with 
each other. Prior research suggests that a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) factor 
greater than 10 is a cause for concern (Kennedy, 2008). The average VIF for 
variables in all models are within the acceptable conventional level (VIF<10), 
with the average VIF being 1.33. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a 
problem for variables in all the models. 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the data and research design utilized to test the hypothesis. 
As outlined within this chapter, financial data from 2004-2011 were obtained 
from FAME, which is part of the Bureau Van Dijk database. In addition, this 
chapter also provides justification for the choice of models and variables used to 
test the hypotheses. Measurement of dependent, explanatory and control variables 
were also described. Moreover, this chapter also provides details of additional 
analyses that were carried out as part of the robustness checks. Chapter 5 provides 
the results for Hypothesis 1 and Chapter 6 provides results for Hypothesis 2, 3 
and 4. 
 
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CHAPTER 5  
RESULTS OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
QUALITY AND FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents results for the first research question, which is whether 
differences in ownership structure, specifically family and non-family ownership, 
explain variation in earnings quality of private companies in the UK. Prior studies 
comparing public and private companies have implicitly assumed that private 
firms’ stakeholders have a homogeneous demand for financial information (Chi et 
al., 2013). Similar to Chi et al., (2013) and Hope et al., (2012), this thesis relaxes 
this assumption and argues that due to differing agency theoretic reasons, 
variation will exist in the demand for financial reporting quality of private 
companies’ financial reports (Chi et al, 2013; Hope et al. 2012). In particular, 
differences in ownership of family and non-family private companies, will affect 
incentives and subsequent financial reporting quality in the private company 
setting. 
 
Drawing upon agency theory, this thesis predicts that family ownership will be 
associated with higher financial reporting quality. One argument derived from 
agency theory is that family firms mitigate agency problems between owners and 
managers (Agency Problem Type I). This strand of agency theory argues that as 
family owners have a significant influence and control over management, they are 
able to effectively mitigate managerial expropriation. Conversely, another strand 
of agency theory argues that family ownership exacerbates agency problems 
between controlling and minority shareholders (Agency Problem Type II). 
Schulze et al. (2001) argue that this is a pertinent issue in private family firms as a 
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family’s controlling interest could provide them with greater opportunities for 
private rent extraction for the benefit of family members, which could be at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Furthermore, Carney et al. (2013) argue that 
the absence of capital market oversight further exacerbates other agency costs 
highlighted by Schulze et al. (2001) such as altruism. However, due to substantial 
and frequently exclusive ownership of private family firms, Carney et al. (2013) 
argue that private family firms are highly incentivized to monitor their firms and 
maximize profitability. Moreover, Stockmans et al. (2010) maintain that due to 
the close links between family and firm wealth in private family firms, private 
family firms will have fewer incentives to manage earnings opportunistically as it 
also reduces family wealth. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1 predicts that private 
family ownership will be associated with higher financial reporting quality.  
 
 
Section 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample. This includes 
results for differences of means tests and sample distributions by industry. Section 
5.3 reports the differences of means test between family and non-family 
companies, sample distributions by industry, a correlation matrix and regression 
diagnostics. Section 5.4 presents results of the multiple regressions. Results of 
further analysis are presented in section 5.5, while Section 5.6 provides a 
summary of the chapter. 
 
5.2 Descriptive analysis of main variables 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics (i.e., means, standard deviations, 
variance, maximum and minimum) for the full sample over the seven-year period 
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between 2005 and 2011. Companies in the sample show an average discretionary 
accruals value of  -0.099 for the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals and an 
average value of -0.05 for the Dechow-Dichev (2002) accrual quality model (see 
Table 5.1). As outlined in Chapter 4, the negative and positive values of 
discretionary accruals are not indicative of income increasing or income 
decreasing discretionary accruals. Following Chen et al’s. (2011) procedure, the 
absolute values of the discretionary accruals and accrual quality measures are 
multiplied by -1, that is, higher values representing better financial reporting 
quality. 
 
#>4:3*)!'+!-++!*+!*
 Mean Std 
Dev. 
Variance Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max. 
Dependant 
Variable 
       
Jones -0.099 0.114 0.013 -2.520 10.682 -0.654 -0.001 
Dechow-Dichev -0.054 0.061 0.004 -2.594 11.313 -0.362 -0.001 
Ownership 
structure 
       
Family Dummyǂ 0.593 0.491 0.241 -0.381 1.145 0 1 
Ownership 0.804 0.256 0.066 -1.121 3.193 0 100 
Firm 
characteristics 
       
ROA 0.034 0.099 0.010 -1.014 9.740 -0.431 0.356 
AbsROA 0.072 0.089 0.008 3.141 15.379 0.001 0.572 
Size (Total 
Assets)20 
12,172 11,828 140,000 3.780 20.341 1,554 83,864 
Leverage 0.312 0.242 0.059 1.270 5.058 0.004 1.263 
Growth 0.066 0.248 0.061 1.592 8.896 -0.546 1.225 
Age 28.929 20.48 419.42 0.994 3.160 5 79 
Lossǂ 0.209 0.407 0.165 1.430 3.044 0 1 
Auditǂ 0.204 0.403 0.163 1.467 3.152 0 1 
Jones is discretionary accruals using Jones (1991); Dechow-Dichev is earnings quality proxy using modified 
Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Family Dummy is an indicator variable, where 1 is when family members is 
the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management 
and, 0 otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; ROA is net 
income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; Size is total asset(in thousands); 
Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Growth is growth rate in total assets; Age is firm age in years; 
Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Audit is an 
indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; ǂ This indicates proportion of firms, rather 
than the mean proportion of associated variables. 
 

20 Size (Total assets) was logged and LnSize was included in the regressions. 
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Family companies represent around 59 per cent of the sample and the mean 
percentage ownership of the ultimate owner is 80.4 per cent, which suggests that 
private medium-sized companies in the UK have concentrated ownership. In 
contrast, Hope et al, (2012) report a mean of 60.5 per cent for ownership 
concentration in their sample of private companies in Norway. With respect to 
company characteristics, on average profitability (measured by net income scaled 
by total assets) is three per cent. Company size (measured by total asset) is 
£12,172,000 and standard deviation is £11,828,000. Using a sample of UK private 
companies between 1990-2000, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) similarly document 
that UK private companies in their sample exhibit a large standard deviation in 
size with a mean of  £3,900,000 and standard deviation of £6,700,000. The 
leverage (measured by total debt scaled by total assets) ratio of is 31 per cent is 
similar to Hope et al’s, (2012) sample of private companies in Norway of 26.7 per 
cent, but relatively low compared to private companies in Korea that have debt 
amounting to 71.7 per cent of total assets (Kim, Simunic, Stein and Yi, 2011). 
Growth opportunity (measured by asset growth) is seven per cent. From Table 
5.1, it can be seen that 21 per cent of the company observations report a loss. In 
addition, the number of companies audited by a Big Four audit firm is only 20 per 
cent. This is similar to Hope et al. (2012) who found that 18.1 per cent of private 
companies in their sample employ a Big Four auditor. This is quite low in 
comparison to private companies in Sweden where two-thirds of private 
companies use a Big Four auditor (Svanstrom, 2013). 
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5.3 Differences in means of family and non-family companies 
Table 5.2 presents the mean values for companies segregated by family and non-
family and the test statistics for mean differences. Both t-tests and Mann Whitney 
tests show that family and non-family companies have differing characteristics.  
 
#>4;3&$')!*&%&%*0$!#0%&%5$!#0&$'%!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Measure Family 
Company 
Non-Family 
Company 
t-test Mann-Whitney 
test 
Jones -0.079 -0.109 -14.916*** -12.467*** 
Dechow-Dichev -0.043 -0.062 -16.988*** -12.600*** 
Ownership 0.860 0.723 -38.22*** 29.310*** 
ROA 0.034 0.033 -0.928 2.297*** 
AbsROA 0.056 0.082 22.624*** 18.027*** 
Size 11,547 16,022 10.263*** 9.781*** 
Leverage  0.281 0.334 12.778*** 8.045*** 
Growth 0.057 0.072 4.238*** 0.959 
Age 30.5 25.27 -14.347*** -17.031*** 
Lossǂ 0.175 0.242 11.571*** 11.571*** 
Auditǂ 0.077 0.290 41.27*** 39.58*** 
Discretionary Accruals is abnormal accruals using Jones (1991); Dechow is earnings quality proxy 
using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Family Dummy is an indicator variable, where 1 is 
when family members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of 
directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the 
largest ultimate shareholder; ROA is net income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value 
of ROA; Size is total asset (in thousands); leverage is total debt divided by total assets; growth is 
growth rate in assets; Age is firm age in years; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting 
net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 
auditor, 0 otherwise; ǂ This indicates proportion of firms, rather than the mean proportion of 
associated variables.  
 
 
In particular, the mean for both the Jones and the Dechow-Dichev accrual 
measures for family companies are significantly larger compared to non-family 
companies (p < .01). Higher values represent better financial reporting quality, 
providing early support for Hypothesis 1, which predicts that family companies 
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have better financial reporting quality than non-family companies. In addition, the 
mean ownership percentages of the largest owner are 86 per cent for family and 
72.3 per cent for non-family companies, which suggests that family companies 
are more concentrated than non-family companies. This is in line with the idea of 
socio-emotive wealth argument outlined by Gomez-Mejia et al., (2007) where in 
private family companies, families gain satisfaction from non-economic goals 
such as keeping control of the company within the family. Niskannen, Karjalainen 
and Niskanen (2010) investigated private family ownership in Finland and their 
results show that mean shareholdings for family companies is 53.15 per cent for 
family companies and 63.5 per cent for companies that can be classified as being 
under family influence. This indicates that the mean percentage of ownership by 
ultimate owner is higher for both family and non-family companies in the UK 
compared to Finland. 
 
With respect to performance as measured by ROA, results from the t-test suggest 
that family and non-family companies in this sample do not differ with respect to 
performance. However, results from the Mann-Whitney test suggest that 
performance of family companies is slightly better than among non-family 
companies at the one per cent level. Using the absolute value of ROA as an 
alternative measure of performance, both t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests show 
that performance is significantly different for family and non-family companies. 
Upon further examination, the difference in performance using AbsROA is 
probably due to non-family companies reporting more losses which is shown by 
the loss indicator variable, which suggests that 24.2 per cent of non-family 
companies report losses in comparison to only 17.5 per cent of family companies. 
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Thus, to gauge the effect that performance may have on financial reporting 
quality, both ROA and AbsROA are included as control variables in the multiple 
regressions to control for the effect that performance may have on financial 
reporting quality (Ali et al., 2007;Wang, 2006).  
 
Table 5.2 also indicates that using total assets as a proxy for company size, non-
family companies are significantly larger than family companies at the one per 
cent level. As can be seen, the average total assets of family companies is  
£11,547,000 and for non-family companies is £16,022,000, which is consistent 
with prior literature that provides evidence that family companies tend to be 
smaller than non-family companies (Wang, 2006). Turning to leverage, family 
companies on average have less debt than non-family companies. This is in 
contrast to Kvaal et al. (2012) who documented higher levels of leverage for 
family companies in their sample of private companies. Notwithstanding, Wang 
(2006) and Ali et al. (2007) both documented a lower level of leverage for family 
companies in the public company setting. Strebulaev and Yang (2013) conjecture 
that this is consistent with the idea that family companies care about survival and 
maintaining the family legacy and thus are more likely to utilize debt 
conservatively. As Ball and Shivakumar, (2005) maintain that debt contracting 
differences could constitute an important determinant of financial reporting 
quality, leverage is included as a control variable in the main regression. 
 
Family and non-family companies also have significantly different rates of 
growth. Table 5.2 indicates that non-family companies grow faster than family 
companies at 7.2 per cent versus 5.7 per cent respectively. Similarly, Kvaal et al. 
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(2012) documented that family companies have slower growth in their study of 
private firms in Norway. On average, family companies are significantly older 
than non-family companies and the mean age in this sample is 30.5 for family 
companies and 25.27 for non-family companies. From Table 5.2, it can be seen 
that family and non-family companies differ significantly with respect to type of 
auditors, where 29 per cent of non-family companies are audited by a Big 4 audit 
firms in comparison to only 7.7 per cent of family companies. In their study of 
private companies in Norway, Hope et al. (2012) found evidence that in higher 
agency cost settings, companies respond by having a higher quality auditor. It 
follows that a possible explanation for the high percentage difference of 
companies audited by Big 4 between family and non-family companies in this 
sample is that in non-family companies, higher agency conflicts create a demand 
for more assurance and non-family private companies respond by having their 
financial statements audited by a Big 4 firm. 
 
Table 5.3 presents the industry distribution of family and non-family companies. 
While family companies are prevalent in all industries, the large and significant 
Chi square statistic (ᵡ2= 827.64, p <0.000) shows that the industry distribution of 
family companies is significantly different from that of non-family companies. 
Results suggest that family companies are more prevalent in the agriculture, 
construction and distribution industries. 

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UK SIC 
Code(2003) 
Industry Group ǂ Non-
family 
Family Total 
A Agriculture, Hunting and 
Forestry 
42 267 309 
B Fishing 17 13 30 
C  Mining and Quarrying 57 97 154 

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E Manufacturing 2,395 3,451 5,846 
F Construction 641 1,273 1,914 
G Distribution 1,703 3,569 5,272 
H Hotels and Restaurant 366 652 1,018 
I Transport, storage and 
communication 
545 843 1,388 
J Real Estate, renting and business 
activities 
1,912 1,363 3,275 
L Education 95 32 127 
M Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
164 126 290 
N Health and Social Work 364 437 801 
Total  8,301 12,123 20,424 
ǂExcludes Electricity,gas,steam and air conditioning supply,Water collection , treatment and 
supply, Financial and Insurance Activities, Public Administrative and Defence; Compulsory 
Social Security. 
 
 
Table 5.4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients and shows that family 
companies are significantly and positively correlated with all earnings quality 
proxies. This provides some support to the hypothesis that family companies are 
associated with better earnings quality. Percentage ownership by ultimate owner 
is not significant with any of the earnings quality proxies. The ultimate ownership 
percentage is significantly and positively correlated with the family dummy 
variable (r=0.26, p < .01).  
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Performance as measured by ROA is positively and significantly correlated with 
the Dechow model but negatively and significantly correlated with the Jones 
model. A possible explanation is that the Dechow model incorporates Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2006) improvement to the accruals model by incorporating timely 
gains and losses via adjusting for negative cash flows. In order words, the 
Dechow model includes a control for loss making companies whereas this was 
not incorporated in the Jones model. Similar to prior literature, loss and growth 
are significantly and negatively correlated with both earnings quality measures.  
 
An interesting observation revealed in Table 5.4 is that the auditor dummy 
variable, which is usually associated with better earnings quality, is negatively 
correlated with both earnings quality proxies.  This suggests that Big 4 auditors 
are associated with lower financial reporting quality. However, given that the 
descriptive statistics have shown that only 20 per cent of companies in the whole 
sample and only 7.7 per cent of family companies use Big 4, results from the 
multiple regression need to be examined before any further conclusion can be 
made regarding the relationship between Big 4 auditors and financial reporting 
quality.  
  
 
5.4 Regression analysis 
In order to test whether family ownership of private companies is associated with 
higher financial reporting quality (Hypothesis 1), this thesis estimated the models 
outlined in Chapter 4 cross-sectionally for each year and for each industry using 
the UK industry code (SIC 2003). In order to obtain meaningful cross-sections, 
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industries with less than ten observations in each year were dropped from the 
sample (Chi et al, 2013). In total, 12 two-digit industry regressions for each year 
over the seven year period were estimated in order to calculate the earnings 
quality proxies. A total of 7,191(Dechow-Dichev) and 8,156 (Jones) firm year 
observations were used in the final sample to calculate the earnings quality 
proxies. 
 
Table 5.5 reports pooled regression results as specified in equation (1) (Chapter 4) 
using discretionary accruals (Jones) and an accrual quality measures (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002) as the dependent variable. The coefficient from the Dechow-
Dichev model is 0.003 and is significant, suggesting that family companies are 
associated with higher accruals quality. Consistent with the Dechow-Dichev 
model, the Jones model is also positive and significant, and all models are 
significant at p<0.01. The adjusted R2 is 14.5 per cent or higher which is similar 
to other studies using earnings quality models (Wang, 2006). While, Table 5.5 
presents results from testing equation (1) (Chapter 4) using pooled regressions, 
Table 5.6 presents results using random effect regressions. Both models’ results 
remain qualitatively unchanged and show that family companies are positively 
associated with better financial reporting quality, which suggests that family 
companies have fewer incentives to manage earnings. 
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 (1) (2) 
   
VARIABLES Dechow-Dichev Jones 
   
famdum 0.003*** 0.009*** 
 (3.05) (3.80) 
ownership -0.004* -0.003 
 (-1.93) (-0.81) 
ROA 0.071*** -0.003 
 (4.81) (-0.11) 
AbsROA -0.425*** -0.196*** 
 (-29.79) (-9.07) 
Lnsize 0.002* 0.005** 
 (1.84) (2.56) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.013** 
 (-1.24) (-2.21) 
Growth -0.045*** -0.106*** 
 (-10.95) (-11.56) 
Age 0.000* 0.000** 
 (1.73) (2.11) 
Loss -0.014*** -0.009*** 
 (-8.53) (-2.69) 
Audit -0.004** -0.005 
 (-2.10) (-1.61) 
Constant -0.017* -0.069*** 
 (-1.69) (-3.73) 
Industry and Year Yes Yes 
Observations 7,191 8,156 
R2 0.422 0.148 
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.145 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage 
ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 
otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; ROA is net 
income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; LnSize is natural log of total 
asset; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Growth is growth rate in assets; Age is firm 
age in years; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 
otherwise; Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Year 
consists of 7 dummy variables; Industry consists of 12 dummy variable. 
 
 
 
 
 


	
# $
!"








 (1) (2) 
   
VARIABLES Dechow-Dichev Jones 
   
famdum 0.004*** 0.009*** 
 (3.04) (3.28) 
ownership -0.005* -0.004 
 (-1.76) (-0.78) 
ROA 0.068*** -0.003 
 (3.91) (-0.14) 
AbsROA -0.424*** -0.173*** 
 (-26.36) (-7.95) 
LnSize 0.002* 0.007*** 
 (1.69) (2.93) 
Leverage -0.005 -0.016** 
 (-1.37) (-2.23) 
Growth -0.043*** -0.100*** 
 (-11.51) (-11.55) 
Age 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.24) (2.21) 
Loss -0.014*** -0.008** 
 (-7.54) (-2.41) 
Audit -0.004* -0.007* 
 (-1.81) (-1.84) 
Constant -0.015 -0.087*** 
 (-1.32) (-3.97) 
Industry and Year Yes Yes 
Observations 7,191 8,156 
Number of ID 1,925 2,035 
R2 0.4222 0.1470 
Adjusted R2 0.4199 0.1440 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage 
ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 
otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; ROA is net 
income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; LnSize is natural log of total 
asset; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Growth is growth rate in assets; Age is firm 
age in years; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 
otherwise; Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Year 
consists of 7 dummy variables; Industry consists of 12 dummy variables 
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From an agency perspective, Type I and Type II agency problems will both create 
incentives to manage earnings (Ali et al., 2007). In non-family firms where 
arguably Type I agency problems are more severe, Ali et al. (2007) maintain that 
non-family firms are more likely to tie compensation contracts of managers to 
accounting numbers, which creates incentives for earnings manipulation. 
However, in private family firms, due to substantial and frequently exclusive 
ownership of private family firms, Carney et al. (2013) argues that private family 
firms are highly incentivized to monitor their firms and maximize profitability. 
Moreover, due to the fact that family owners are often more knowledgeable about 
the firm’s business activities (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), they are better able to 
mitigate managerial expropriation more effectively through direct monitoring. 
Indeed, in the private setting where managers are also owners, the manager is 
more likely to be committed to seek the interests of the family and will in turn 
have less incentives to manipulate earnings in order to meet short term 
performance goals (Yang, 2010). Accordingly, compared to non-family private 
firms, private family firms have fewer incentives to manage earnings from 
Agency Problem Type I. 
 
Notwithstanding, incentives derived from altruism and the family’s controlling 
interest could provide them with greater opportunities for private rent extraction 
for the benefit of family members, which could be at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Agency Problem Type II). However, factors such as preserving 
socio-emotive wealth mitigate incentives to manage earnings. Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2011), argue that higher quality financial reporting by family firms is consistent 
with families preserving socio-emotive wealth. The authors argue that in family 


firms, a good reputation and a positive family image outweigh any boost in 
earnings that may be obtained via earnings management. Furthermore, Stockmans 
et al. (2010) argue that due to the close link between family and firm wealth, 
Agency Problem Type II is less dominant in private family firms. The authors 
maintain that as expropriation of minority shareholders reduces family wealth, 
private family firms will have fewer incentives to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour. This lends support to the argument that family firms have longer time 
horizons, and are willing to forgo short-term benefits from earnings management 
as it may affect the long-term performance of the firm. Moreover, it is consistent 
with the view that family shareholders treat their ownership as an asset to pass on 
to their heirs, rather than wealth to consume during their lifetimes (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003). Accordingly, private family firms have fewer incentives to manage 
earnings. 
 
In sum, the results in Table 5.5 and 5.6 show consistently that earnings of family 
companies are of a higher quality, which this thesis argues is due to fewer 
incentives to manage earnings, which supports H1.  
 
Given that results in Table 5.5 and 5.6 show that ownership concentration is 
statistically significant in only the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model at the 10 per 
cent level, further analysis is warranted before any conclusions can be made 
regarding ownership concentration and earnings quality. Wang (2006) points out 
that there could be a non-linear relationship between family ownership and 
financial reporting quality. The intuition behind this argument is that incentives to 
manage earnings are likely to change with the level of ownership. The rationale is 
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that the relationship between ownership concentration and financial reporting 
quality will be increasing until a certain point, after which it will begin to decline. 
Thus, in order to test for non-linearity between ownership concentration and 
earnings management, similar to prior literature such as Wang (2006), this thesis 
adds the square of ownership to the models in Table 5.7 in order to test whether 
there is an inverted U-shaped relation between ownership concentration and 
earnings quality. As can be seen, the square of ownership is not significantly 
associated with proxies for financial reporting quality, which suggests that the 
relation between ownership concentration and earnings quality is not non-linear.  
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dechow-Dichev Jones 
   
famdum 0.004*** 0.009*** 
 (3.18) (3.43) 
ownership -0.025* -0.036 
 (-1.80) (-1.55) 
sqownership 0.015 0.024 
 (1.53) (1.41) 
ROA 0.068*** -0.004 
 (3.92) (-0.15) 
AbsROA -0.425*** -0.174*** 
 (-26.49) (-7.97) 
LnSize 0.002* 0.006*** 
 (1.68) (2.91) 
Leverage -0.005 -0.016** 
 (-1.37) (-2.24) 
Growth -0.043*** -0.100*** 
 (-11.52) (-11.55) 
Age 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.15) (2.09) 
Loss -0.014*** -0.008** 
 (-7.52) (-2.39) 
Audit -0.004* -0.007* 
 (-1.86) (-1.89) 
Constant -0.010 -0.078*** 
 (-0.78) (-3.43) 
Industry and Year Yes Yes 
Observations 7,191 8,156 
Number of ID 1,925 2,035 
R2 0.4226 0.1473 
Adjusted R2 0.4202 0.1442 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage 
ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 
otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; 
sqownership is ownership percentage squared;ROA is net income divided by total assets; 
AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; LnSize is natural log of total asset; Leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets; Growth is growth rate in assets; Age is firm age in years; Loss is an 
indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Audit is an 
indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Year consists of 7 dummy 
variables; Industry consists of 12 dummy variables. 
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From Tables 5.5 and 5.6, as expected the coefficients of several control variables 
are significantly associated with the proxies for financial reporting quality and are 
in line with stated predictions. Specifically, both earnings quality proxies in the 
pooled regressions and RE models are negatively related to loss. This suggests 
firms that report losses have lower financial reporting quality and concurs with 
prior literature (Wang, 2006), providing evidence that companies with negative 
income are associated with lower earnings quality.  
 
Prior literature (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) provides evidence that size is a 
determinant of earnings quality. From Tables 5.5 and 5.6, size is positive and 
significantly related to earnings quality. This is consistent with prior studies such 
as Wang (2006) who provides evidence that large firms are associated with higher 
financial reporting quality. 
 
Performance as measured by ROA is positively related to earnings quality in the 
Dechow-Dichev model in both the pooled and random effects regressions at the 
one per cent level. In addition, performance as measured by the absolute value of 
ROA is negatively and significantly associated with all earnings quality proxies. 
This suggests that better performing firms are more likely to have better financial 
reporting quality which is consistent with evidence from prior literature (Wang, 
2006). 
 
In addition, as can be seen in Table 5.5 and 5.6, leverage is negative and 
significant in the Jones discretionary accrual model. Thus, although a major 
source of finance in privately held companies is banks, (Vander Bauhede and 
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Willekens, 2004), this lends some support to the argument by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) that private companies are more likely to communicate with 
lending banks privately. Moreover, as highlighted by Dedman and Lennox 
(2009), banks do not need to rely on publicly available financial statements as 
banks can obtain this information directly from companies without the companies 
having to make the information publicly available.  
 
Prior literature has documented empirical evidence that Big N auditors provide 
higher quality audits in various contexts (Chung, Firth and Kim, 2003; Lin and 
Hwang, 2010), which lends support to the argument that Big N supply higher 
quality audits compared to smaller audit firms. However, in Europe, there is much 
less evidence to support quality differentiation along Big 4 versus non-Big 4 
segmentation (Maijoor and Vanstaelen, 2006). From Table 5.5 and 5.6, Big 4 
audit is significant and negatively related to financial reporting quality. Thus, the 
results are similar to Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2004) who found 
evidence that the extent of earnings management is not smaller for private firms 
in Belgium who were audited by Big 6 auditors. Vander Bauwhede and Willekens 
(2004) propose that the lack of audit quality differentiation in their sample of 
private Belgian firms could be due to the lack of demand for quality-differentiated 
services as well as the less risky audit environment. In their study of medium-
sized private firms in Finland, Niskanen et al. (2010) also document that private 
family firms are less likely to employ Big 4 auditors which they argue is in line 
with the argument that insider ownership decreases the demand for audit quality 
in terms of Big 4 auditors. In addition, Ho and Kang (2013) document that 
compared to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to hire top-tier auditors 
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and they incur lower audit fees. The authors argue that this is due both to a lower 
demand for Big 4 auditors and auditors’ perceived lower audit risk for family 
firms. Furthermore, they found that their evidence is stronger where family 
owners actively monitor their firms. 
 
However, as highlighted in Section 5.3, only 7.7 per cent of family companies 
employ Big 4 audit firms. Given the small number of companies in the sample 
audited by a Big 4 auditor, caution is needed in interpreting the negative 
association between Big 4 and financial reporting quality. Thus, this thesis 
segregates family and non-family companies into subsamples in order to identify 
the impact of Big 4 auditors on financial reporting quality. Table 5.8 shows that 
as the effect on audit is only negative and significant in the Jones model for non-
family companies (Column 4 Table 5.8), this suggests that the negative 
relationship between financial reporting quality and Big 4 auditors is probably 
driven by the small number of Big 4 auditors in the sample, rather than due to the 
lack of audit quality differentiation between Big 4 and non Big 4 firms. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Family Non-Family 
VARIABLES Dechow-Dichev Jones Dechow-Dichev Jones 
     
ownership 0.004 -0.017 -0.023 -0.036 
 (0.16) (-0.39) (-1.20) (-1.18) 
sqownership -0.001 0.016 0.010 0.020 
 (-0.04) (0.51) (0.66) (0.81) 
ROA 0.095*** 0.013 0.054** -0.007 
 (4.09) (0.30) (2.14) (-0.21) 
AbsROA -0.440*** -0.185*** -0.419*** -0.172***
 (-18.59) (-5.38) (-17.85) (-5.69) 
LnSize 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.010*** 
 (1.36) (1.57) (1.11) (2.72) 
Leverage -0.006 -0.023** -0.005 -0.011 
 (-1.44) (-2.40) (-0.84) (-1.01) 
Growth -0.035*** -0.079*** -0.053*** -0.118***
 (-8.04) (-6.71) (-8.71) (-9.50) 
Age 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (1.40) (2.26) (0.01) (0.97) 
Loss -0.012*** -0.005 -0.014*** -0.009 
 (-5.49) (-1.07) (-4.33) (-1.63) 
Audit -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.011** 
 (-1.29) (0.18) (-1.01) (-2.17) 
Constant -0.018 -0.061** -0.011 -0.112***
 (-1.20) (-2.04) (-0.50) (-2.98) 
Industry and Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,535 4,759 2,656 3,397 
Number of ID 1,218 1,261 773 853 
R2 0.3640 0.1157 0.4563 0.1680 
Adjusted R2 0.3599 0.1157 0.4503 0.1608 
 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; sqownership is 
ownership percentage squared; ROA is net income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute 
value of ROA; LnSize is natural log of total asset; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; 
Growth is growth rate in assets; Age is firm age in years; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm 
is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise;  Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm 
has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Year consists of 7 dummy variables; Industry consists of 12 
dummy variables. 
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5.5 Additional analysis  
5.5.1 Change in regulation (Companies Act 2006) 
As outlined in Chapter 2, in 2008 there were changes made to the Companies Act 
2006 (Amendment), which increased the thresholds for medium companies in the 
UK. Even though a year indicator variable was included as a control in the earlier 
regressions, this thesis separately includes a regulation indicator variable to assess 
if there any changes in the regression models. As can be seen from Table 5.9, the 
interaction between family and the regulation change dummy is not significant, 
suggesting that the change in regulation did not affect family firm financial 
reporting behaviour. The ownership concentration and regulation indicator is only 
marginally significant for the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model at the 10 per cent 
level. This provides some evidence that companies with higher ownership 
concentrations improved their financial reporting quality after the change in 
regulation in 2008. 
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dechow Jones 
   
famdum 0.006*** 0.008** 
 (3.21) (2.03) 
Famdum*regchangedummy 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.77) (-0.61) 
ownership -0.009** -0.006 
 (-2.54) (-0.77) 
ownership*regchangedummy 0.009* -0.003 
 (1.86) (-0.26) 
regchangedummy -0.009** -0.013 
 (-2.25) (-1.59) 
ROA 0.075*** 0.022 
 (3.87) (0.81) 
AbsROA -0.422*** -0.190*** 
 (-25.58) (-7.97) 
Size 0.003** 0.006** 
 (2.20) (2.49) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.015** 
 (-0.91) (-2.04) 
Growth -0.044*** -0.103*** 
 (-10.53) (-11.00) 
Age 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.51) (1.99) 
Loss -0.014*** -0.006 
 (-6.68) (-1.58) 
Audit -0.002 -0.006* 
 (-1.09) (-1.67) 
Constant -0.020* -0.078*** 
 (-1.65) (-3.35) 
Industry Yes Yes 
Observations 5,766 7,132 
Number of ID 1,915 2,020 
R2 0.4143 0.1574 
Adjusted R2 0.4115 0.1542 
 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate 
shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; 
famdum*regchangedummy is interaction between family dummy and regulation change dummy, Ownership 
is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; ownership*regchangedummy is interaction 
between ownership and regulation change dummy;regchangedummy is indicator variable, 1 for after 2008, 0 
otherwise; ROA is net income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; LnSize is natural 
log of total asset; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Growth is growth rate in assets; Age is firm 
age in years; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; 
Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Year consists of 7 dummy 
variables; Industry consists of 12 dummy variables 
 


 
5.5.2 An alternative measure of family company 
As outlined in Chapter 2, although there is broad agreement that family firms are 
firms where a family exercises a large influence over the firms, many operational 
definitions are utilized in order to capture the family firm construct. Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2011) argue that often the operational threshold utilized to capture family 
firms is too low outside the realm of the largest publicly traded American firms.  
In the regressions reported earlier, the family dummy variable captures family 
control and ownership, but it does not specify a cut off for the level of ultimate 
family ownership. In order to capture whether level of ownership matters, family 
is divided into separate categories of ownership of 50 per cent and over and 
ownership of less than 50 per cent. In both categorizations, family members are in 
top management. The random effects regression results are presented in Table 
5.10. As can be seen, family has only a positive effect on earnings quality when 
ownership is 50 per cent and more. This seems to suggest that where family 
owners have significant influence and control over management, they are able to 
effectively mitigate managerial expropriation in line with the alignment effect. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled Random Effects 
VARIABLES Dechow-Dichev Jones Dechow-Dichev Jones 
     
Famdum>50% 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 
 (3.05) (3.88) (3.08) (3.24) 
Famdum<50% 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.007 
 (0.92) (0.95) (0.75) (1.05) 
Ownership -0.005* -0.005 -0.005* -0.005 
 (-1.89) (-1.02) (-1.82) (-0.86) 
ROA 0.071*** -0.002 0.068*** -0.003 
 (4.82) (-0.11) (3.92) (-0.14) 
AbsROA -0.424*** -0.195*** -0.424*** -0.173*** 
 (-29.79) (-9.06) (-26.37) (-7.95) 
Size 0.002* 0.005** 0.002* 0.007*** 
 (1.84) (2.57) (1.69) (2.94) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.013** -0.005 -0.016** 
 (-1.22) (-2.19) (-1.34) (-2.23) 
Growth -0.045*** -0.106*** -0.043*** -0.100*** 
 (-10.96) (-11.56) (-11.51) (-11.55) 
Loss -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.008** 
 (-8.53) (-2.66) (-7.53) (-2.40) 
Audit -0.004** -0.005 -0.004* -0.007* 
 (-2.10) (-1.61) (-1.80) (-1.84) 
Age 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.76) (2.15) (1.29) (2.24) 
Constant -0.016* -0.069*** -0.015 -0.087*** 
 (-1.66) (-3.68) (-1.28) (-3.93) 
Observations 7,191 8,156 7,191 8,156 
R2 0.422 0.148 0.4222 0.1471 
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.145 0.4120 0.1440 
Number of ID   1,925 2,035 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
famdum ≥50% is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate 
shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and ownership is 50% or more, 
0 otherwise; famdum< 50% is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest 
percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and 
ownership is 50% or less, 0 otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate 
shareholder; Size is natural log of total asset; leverage is total debt divided by total assets; growth is growth 
rate in assets; ROA is net income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; loss is an 
indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Audit is an indicator 
variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; Age is firm age in years,Year consists of 7 dummy 
variables; Industry consists of 12 dummy variables. 
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Table 5.11 reports regressions with an interaction effect between famdum and 
ownership. The interaction variable famdum*ownership is consistent with the 
results in Table 5.10, which seems to suggest that where family owners have 
significant influence and control over management, family firms will be 
associated with higher reporting quality. 
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 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dechow-Dichev Jones 
   
famdum -0.006 -0.004 
 (-1.62) (-0.52) 
ownership -0.010*** -0.011 
 (-2.65) (-1.54) 
Famdum*ownership 0.013*** 0.017* 
 (2.70) (1.74) 
ROA 0.068*** -0.003 
 (3.94) (-0.13) 
AbsROA -0.424*** -0.173*** 
 (-26.45) (-7.93) 
Size 0.002* 0.007*** 
 (1.88) (3.08) 
Leverage -0.005 -0.016** 
 (-1.29) (-2.20) 
Growth -0.043*** -0.100*** 
 (-11.55) (-11.56) 
Age 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.42) (2.33) 
Loss -0.014*** -0.008** 
 (-7.50) (-2.34) 
Audit -0.004* -0.006* 
 (-1.70) (-1.77) 
Constant -0.014 -0.086*** 
 (-1.21) (-3.92) 
   
Observations 7,191 8,156 
Number of ID 1,925 2,035 
R2 0.4229 0.1475 
Adjusted R2 0.4204 0.1442 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are 
either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the 
largest ultimate shareholder; famdum*ownership is interaction between family dummy and ownership, ROA is net income 
divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; LnSize is natural log of total asset; Leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets; Growth is growth rate in assets; Age is firm age in years; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is 
reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 
otherwise; Year consists of 7 dummy variables; Industry consists of 12 dummy variables. 
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5.5.3 Performance and endogeneity 
An issue highlighted in the literature on ownership is the potential endogeneity 
problem that exists between ownership and performance. In particular, Hutton 
(2007) maintains that if families only retain ownership and control of successful 
firms, then the relationship between financial reporting quality and family firms is 
spurious. As previously outlined, following Kim and Yi (2006), 2 measures of 
performance have been included in order to control for the effect that 
performance may have on financial reporting quality. In addition, a robustness 
check is carried out to address the potential endogeneity problem between 
performance and earnings quality. Specifically, as outlined in Chapter 4, Section 
4.5.1, in order to address the potential endogeneity problem, this study utilizes a 
dynamic panel model using the generalized method of moments (GMM) system 
estimator which deals with endogeneity in panel data settings without having to 
rely on an exogenous external instrumental variable. GMM results are presented 
in Table 5.12. As can be seen, family remains positively and significantly 
associated with all the earnings quality proxies. This suggests that the relationship 
between family and earnings quality is not influenced by an endogeneity problem. 
However, ownership concentration is not significant in all the models. This 
further suggests that it is family control and not ownership concentration that is 
associated with better financial reporting quality. 
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 (1) (2) 
   
VARIABLES Dechow-Dichev Jones 
   
famdum 0.003** 0.009*** 
 (2.35) (3.11) 
ownership -0.004 -0.004 
 (-1.48) (-0.67) 
ROA 0.056** -0.049 
 (2.07) (-1.32) 
AbsROA -0.420*** -0.114*** 
 (-17.34) (-3.10) 
Size 0.002* 0.007*** 
 (1.68) (2.99) 
Leverage -0.007* -0.017** 
 (-1.71) (-2.13) 
Growth -0.038*** -0.085*** 
 (-10.12) (-9.91) 
Age 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.45) (1.98) 
Loss -0.013*** -0.011** 
 (-5.10) (-2.54) 
Audit -0.005** -0.009** 
 (-2.12) (-2.39) 
Constant  -0.106*** 
  (-4.54) 
   
Observations 7,191 8,156 
Number of ID 1,925 2,035 
AR (2) 0.257 0.776 
Hansen 0.702 0.412 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage 
ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 
otherwise; Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; Size is 
natural log of total asset; leverage is total debt divided by total assets; growth is growth rate in 
assets; ROA is net income divided by total assets; AbsROA is absolute value of ROA; Audit is an 
indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a 
firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Year consists of 7 dummy variables; 
Industry consists of 12 dummy variables 
 
 
 


5.6 Conditional conservatism and family companies 
As outlined in Chapter 4, this thesis also utilizes conditional conservatism as a 
measure of financial reporting quality. Specifically, both Basu (1997) and Ball 
and Shivakumar’s (2005) accrual based models are used in this analysis. 
Consistent with the model design in both Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Hope 
et al. (2013), a negative (positive) coefficient in Table 5.13 is consistent with a 
positive (negative) coefficient in Table 5.14. In particular, a negative coefficient 
for famdum*DNI it-1*ΔNI it-1 (Table 5.13) and a positive coefficient for 
famdum*DOCF*OCF (Table 5.14) would suggest that family companies are 
more conservative than non-family companies.  Contrary to expectations, 
famdum*DNI it-1*ΔNI it-1 is significantly positive in Table 5.13 and 
famdum*DOCF*OCF is significantly negative at the 1 per cent level in Table 
5.14. Both these interaction variables indicate that family companies are reporting 
less conservatively compared to non-family companies.   
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VARIABLES Basu 
ΔNI it-1 -0.051*** 
 (-2.64) 
DNI it-1 -0.012 
 (-1.03) 
DNI it-1 *ΔNI it-1 -0.559*** 
 (-6.90) 
famdum -0.008 
 (-0.43) 
  
famdum*DNI it-1 0.044** 
 (2.07) 
famdum*NI it-1 0.009 
 (0.47) 
Famdum*DNI it-1*ΔNI it-1 0.586*** 
 (7.08) 
Constant 0.006 
 (0.46) 
  
Observations 16,261 
Number of ID 2,879 
R2 0.0036 
Adjusted R2 0.0032 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
ΔNI change in net income scaled by lagged total assets; DNI is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if ΔNI t-1 is negative and 0 otherwise; famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family 
members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or 
in the top management and, 0 otherwise. 
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 Ball and  
VARIABLES Shivakumar 
  
OCF it -0.954*** 
 (-20.44) 
DOCF it -0.044*** 
 (-3.15) 
DOCF it *OCF it  0.126 
 (1.08) 
famdum -0.038*** 
 (-5.07) 
Famdum*DOCF it 0.046*** 
 (3.16) 
famdum*OCF it  0.230*** 
 (3.72) 
famdum*DOCF it *OCF it -0.368*** 
 (-2.95) 
Constant 0.054*** 
 (8.29) 
  
Observations 14,778 
Number of ID 2,685 
R2 0.8768  
Adjusted R2 0.8767 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets; DOCF is indicator variable for negative OCF; 
famdum is an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage 
ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 
otherwise. 
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Prior literature highlights agency costs and litigation as two key drivers of 
conservatism (Chen, Chen and Cheng, 2013). In particular, conservatism can 
alleviate Agency Problem Type I as it limits the ability of managers to defer 
reporting bad news (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Compared to public family 
companies, arguably private family companies are less susceptible to Agency 
Problem Type I. Furthermore, as they are more likely to communicate with debt 
holders on an insider basis (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005), there is less demand for 
conservatism from debt holders. Moreover, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) maintain 
that litigation concerns are lower for private companies. Accordingly, the result 
that private family companies report less conservatively could be driven by the 
fact that they have fewer incentives from both agency costs and litigation 
concerns to implement conservative financial reporting. Chen et al., (2013) 
provide similar results in their sample of S&P 500 companies, who report that 
although conservatism increases with non-CEO family ownership, this result 
becomes non-significant in family companies that have founders as CEOs. 
Moreover, results from this thesis are also consistent with results from LaFond 
and Roychowdury (2008), who found that conservatism decreases with CEO 
ownership. 
 
Results from this thesis suggest that private companies exhibit both higher 
financial reporting quality and lower conditional conservatism than their non-
family counter parts. Following Givoly et al’s. (2010) arguments these results are 
not contradictory, as earnings management is situational or it is likely to occur in 
situations where there are incentives to manage earnings such as loss avoidance or 
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meeting performance targets. Also consistent with theory, family companies have 
less incentive to manage earnings opportunistically and this is demonstrated by 
results in Section 5.4, which shows that family companies have better earnings 
quality and a lower incidence of small positive earnings compared to non-family 
companies (Section 5.7). Furthermore, due to lower agency costs and litigation 
risks, private family companies have fewer incentives to implement conservative 
financial reporting. 
5.7 Incidences of small positive earnings and family companies  

 Burstahler and Dichev (1997) argue that firms’ have incentives to manage 
earnings when unmanaged earnings are marginally lower than earnings 
benchmarks such as zero-earnings thresholds. Accordingly, a high incidence of 
small positive earnings is an indication of earnings manipulation (Burstahler and 
Dichev, 1997). The rationale is that managers use discretion to avoid reporting 
losses. As can be seen in Table 5.15, the family dummy variable is negatively 
associated with incidences of small positive earnings. This suggests family 
companies are less likely to manipulate earnings in order to avoid reporting 
losses.  
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VARIABLES SPOS  
   
famdum -0.215**  
 (-2.16)  
ownership -0.065  
 (-0.36)  
AbsROA 2.980***  
 (4.63)  
Size -0.631***  
 (-7.81)  
Leverage 3.068***  
 (14.62)  
Age 0.003  
 (1.64)  
Growth -2.613***  
 (-13.34)  
Audit 0.422***  
 (3.23)  
Turn -0.224***  
 (-5.46)  
OpCF -6.778***  
 (-18.25)  
Constant 4.051***  
 (5.17)  
   
Observations 8,742  
Number of ID 1,982  
Pseudo R2 0.2711  
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
SPOS is an indicator variable that equals 1 for small positive earnings and 0 otherwise; famdum is 
an indicator variable, where  1 is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate 
shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; 
Ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; AbsROA is absolute 
value of ROA; Size is natural log of total asset; leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Age 
is number of years since incorporation; growth is growth rate in assets; Audit is an indicator 
variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is 
reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise; Turn is current sales scaled by total assets, 
OpCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets. 
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Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) maintain that a possible explanation for 
companies avoiding losses is that terms of transaction between a firms and its 
stakeholders are better for firms with higher rather than lower earnings. As 
private family companies are more likely to communicate privately with their 
stakeholders, this reduces the incentives to manage earnings from small losses to 
small positive earnings. Furthermore, as private family companies are relatively 
insulated from short term pressures to manage earnings, private family companies 
have arguably fewer incentives to manage earnings (Carney et al., 2013). 
Similarly, using a proxy for small positive earnings surprises as measured by the 
frequency of times the seasonally adjusted quarterly earnings scaled by beginning 
total assets fall within a small window, Tong (2007) found that family companies 
in the S&P 500 report fewer small positive earnings surprises. The negative 
association between family companies and incidences of small positive earnings 
as demonstrated in this analysis provides additional support for Hypothesis 1, 
which is that family companies have better financial reporting quality.  
 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the results of Research Question 1 which is whether 
differences in the type of ownership, specifically family and non-family, explain 
variation in earnings quality of medium-sized private companies in the UK. 
Results of the multiple regressions reveal that family ownership is associated with 
higher financial reporting quality. This is evident using the Dechow-Dichev 
(2002) measure of accrual quality and the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals 
model.  In addition, family companies are associated with less earnings 
manipulations via the reporting of fewer small positive earnings. This suggests 
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that even in the private company setting where there is arguably less capital 
market pressure to produce higher quality financial reports, private family 
companies are associated with higher quality financial reports compared to 
private non-family companies (Wang, 2006; Ali et al. 2007). Notwithstanding, 
using two measures of conditional conservatism, results show that family 
companies are less conservative than non-family companies. This is contrary to 
Wang’s (2006) results who found evidence that public family companies report 
more conservatively than public non-family companies. Overall, the empirical 
evidence in this thesis is consistent with studies such as Ali et al. (2007) and 
Wang (2006) who examine family companies in the public setting and find 
evidence that family companies exhibit better accounting quality as measured by 
higher earnings quality and a lower incidence of small positive earnings. 
Furthermore, family companies are found to exhibit higher earnings quality even 
after taking into account potential endogeneity issues using system GMM and an 
alternative specification of family companies.  
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CHAPTER 6  
RESULTS OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND  
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY AND INVESTMENT  
EFFICIENCY AMONG FAMILY FIRMS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents results for Research Question 2, which is whether voluntary 
disclosure is different between family and non-family companies.  Drawing upon 
proprietary cost theory, Hypothesis 2 thesis predicts that family companies will 
less likely be associated with the voluntary disclosures of sales and cost of sales 
compared to other types of private company ownership structures. Furthermore, 
Hypothesis 3 addresses the effect of family relationships on disclosure, 
conditional on earnings quality and predicts that family companies that are 
associated with voluntary disclosures of sales and cost of sales are more likely to 
exhibit higher financial reporting quality compared to other private company 
types not associated with voluntary disclosures of sales and cost of sales. 
 
In addition, this chapter presents results for Research Question 3, which is 
whether family ownership affects the relationship between financial reporting 
quality and investment efficiency. Given that prior literature suggests that private 
companies exhibit lower financial reporting quality (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005), 
regressions were first estimated without the inclusion of the family ownership 
dummy variable in order to determine whether the relationship between financial 
reporting quality and subsequent investment efficiency can be observed within 
this sample of private companies. Next, the ownership variables (i.e., the family 
dummy variable and ownership concentration) were included in order to test 
Hypothesis 4, which predicts that family ownership will affect the relationship 
between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency.  

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Section 6.2 presents results of Research question 2. This includes sample 
distribution by industry (section 6.2.1), findings mean difference tests (Section 
6.2.2), Pearson correlation matrix (Section 6.2.3) and regression analysis (section 
6.2.4).  Section 6.3 presents results for Research Question 3. This includes 
descriptive statistics (Section 6.3.1), Pearson correlation matrix (Section 6.3.2), 
and regression analysis (section 6.3.3).  Section 6.4 provides a summary of this 
chapter. 
6.2 Results for Research Question 2 
This section presents the results for tests of Hypothesis 2, which predicts that 
family ownership will more likely be associated with lodging abbreviated 
financial reports or, in other words, family companies are less likely to provide 
voluntary disclosure of sales and cost of sales in their financial reports. Whereas 
Chapter 5 examined financial reporting quality utilizing various proxies for 
earnings quality, results in this section provide a different insight into the 
financial reporting behaviours of private family companies. 
 
6.2.1 Sample distribution by Industry 
Table 6.1 presents the industry distributions of companies that lodge abbreviated 
and full financial reports. The large and significant Chi square statistic (χ2 
=264.1214, p<0.000) demonstrate that the industry distributions of companies 
that lodge abbreviated financial reports is significantly different from that of 
companies that report full financial reports. Approximately 43 per cent of 
companies (the highest percentage) in the Education sector lodge abbreviated 
financial reports, whereas 13.5 per cent of companies (the lowest percentage) in 
the Real Estate, renting and business activities sector lodge abbreviated reports. 
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UK SIC Code 
(2003) 
Industry Group ǂ Number of 
companies 
Abbreviated 
Accounts % 
A Agriculture, Hunting and 
Forestry 
133 35.3 
B Fishing 15 0 
C  Mining and Quarrying 70 30.0 
E Manufacturing 2734 30.6 
F Construction 800 25.4 
G Distribution 2254 34.5 
H Hotels and Restaurant 458 31.7 
I Transport, storage and 
communication 
615 26.7 
J Real Estate, renting and 
business activities 
1681 13.5 
L Education 63 42.9 
M Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
146 21.2 
N Health and Social Work 388 22.9 
Total  9357 27.4 
ǂExcludes Electricity,gas,steam and air conditioning supply, Water collection, treatment and 
supply, Financial and Insurance Activities , Public Administrative and Defence; Compulsory 
Social Security 
 
Table 6.1 reports that on average around 27.4 per cent of the companies in the 
entire sample lodged abbreviated financial reports. This is similar to Collis 
(2008), who provides evidence that 68 per cent of SMEs in her study of private 
SMEs in the UK lodged full financial statements in 200621. In contrast, Dedman 
and Lennox (2009) document that nearly half of the companies in their sample 
chose to file full accounts. An explanation as to why there is a difference in the 
proportion between the number of companies that file abbreviated financial 
reports in both Collis (2008)’s and Dedman and Lennox (2009)’s samples could 
be due to the differing time periods that the two studies were conducted in. For 
example, Dedman and Lennox (2009) include the old and the new thresholds (i.e., 
pre-2004 and post -2004), whereas this study only includes companies that are 

The time frame for companies in Collis (2008)’s study is all companies in the UK and Northern 
that filed their 2006 accounts by the end of August 2007 (except for those in financial 
intermediation). 


considered medium-sized under the new threshold post-2004. Furthermore, 
another possible explanation could be the sample selection criteria utilized in 
these studies. Similar to Collis (2008), this thesis utilized small and medium-sized 
companies in several industries whereas, Dedman and Lennox (2009) focused 
solely on medium-sized companies in the manufacturing sector. 
 
6.2.2 Differences in means of firms by abbreviated and full financial 
statements 
Table 6.2 presents the mean values for firms segregated by abbreviated and full 
financial statements and the test statistics for mean differences. The t-tests and 
Mann Whitney tests show firms that lodge abbreviated and full financial 
statements have several different company specific characteristics. With regards 
to the lodgement of full financial reports, 52 per cent of the full financial reports 
lodged were by family companies. Meanwhile, 75 per cent of family companies 
lodged abbreviated financial reports. In addition, both the t-test and Mann-
Whitney tests suggest companies that file abbreviated financial statements have 
higher ownership concentrations. Turning to the measure used for accruals 
quality, the mean value for the Dechow measure is significantly larger (at the one 
per cent level) for firms that produce abbreviated financial statements. This 
suggests that companies that file abbreviated financial statements have higher 
financial reporting quality. 
 
	
"!

 






Measure Full Abbreviated t-test Mann-
Whitney test 
Family Dummyǂ 0.52 0.75 -19.88*** -19.40*** 
Ownership 0.77 0.84 -9.09*** -7.606*** 


Herfindahl Index 0.000016 0.000015 0.50 9.673*** 
Dechow22 -0.06 -0.04 -7.08*** -6.078*** 
LnSize 9.20 8.94 18.79*** 18.34*** 
Leverage  0.33 0.289 6.07*** 4.482*** 
Age 26.23 31.09 -9.41*** -13.12*** 
Liquidity 1.66 1.91 -6.92*** -7.545*** 
Asset Tangibility 0.37 0.43 -8.49*** -9.31*** 
ROA 0.04 0.04 -3.32*** -2.857*** 
Long Term Debt 0.25 0.24 1.06 -0.11 
Growth 0.11 0.08 5.67*** 1.92** 
Auditǂ 0.28 0.05 24.35*** 23.62*** 
Disclosure Indicator is an indicator variable, where 1 is lodging an abbreviated profit and loss account (i.e., 
does not disclose sales and cost of sales) and 0 when firms file full financial reports; Family Dummy is an 
indicator variable, where 1 is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are 
either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; Ownership is the proportion 
ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; Herfindahl Index is Herfindahl Index of concentration in the 
firm’s industry; Dechow is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Size is 
natural log of total asset; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Age is firm age in years; Liquidity is 
current assets over current liability ; Asset tangibility is fixed assets divided by total assets; ROA is net 
income divided by total assets; Long term Debt is long-term debt over total liabilities, Growth is growth rates 
in assets; Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; ǂThis indicates 
proportion of firms, rather than the mean proportion of associated variables.  
 
Using ROA as a proxy for profitability, evidence suggests that better performing 
firms provide minimal disclosure. This is similar to the evidence documented by 
Dedman and Lennox (2009) and is consistent with the argument that better 
performing companies have more to lose by releasing commercially sensitive 
information such as sales and cost of sales. Table 6.2 also indicates that larger 
companies provide full financial reports. Again, this is consistent with both 
Dedman and Lennox (2009) and the literature which suggests that larger 
companies have less incentive to file abbreviated financial reports. 
 

22Given that companies that lodge abbreviated financial reports do not disclose a value for 
turnover (sales), the Jones discretionary accruals was not utilized as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality as it requires the value of turnover to be used in the measure. 


T-test results suggest that the Herfindahl Index is not significantly different 
between companies that lodge full and abbreviated financial reports. In contrast to 
Dedman and Lennox (2009), this suggests that industry concentration is not 
different for medium-sized companies that lodge full and abbreviated financial 
reports. However, Mann-Whitney tests suggest that the underlying distribution for 
the Herfindahl Index is significantly different for firms that lodge full and 
abbreviated financial reports. Upon further examination, the Herfindahl Index is 
shown not to be normally distributed23, suggesting that the Mann-Whitney test is 
a more appropriate test.  
 
Firms that provide full financial reports also have higher leverage levels. In 
addition, results suggest that companies disclosing abbreviated financial reports 
have higher asset tangibility, which is consistent with the literature suggesting 
firms that have more fixed assets have a lower risk profile (Beuselinck et al., 
2008) and are less likely to provide voluntary disclosure. Around 28 per cent of 
firms that provided full financial reports are audited by a Big 4 auditor, whereas 
only five per cent of abbreviated financial reports are audited by a Big 4 auditor.  
 
 
6.2.3 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Table 6.2.3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients, which show that family 
companies are significantly and positively correlated with lodging abbreviated 
financial reports. This provides early support to the hypothesis that family 
companies are less likely to provide voluntary disclosure.  

Shapiro-Wilk test for normality on the Herfindahl Index indicate that p = 0.000, which rejects 
the null hypothesis that the Herfindahl Index is normally distributed.
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Percentage ownership by ultimate owner is also significantly and positively 
correlated with filling abbreviated financial reports. This suggests that companies 
with concentrated ownership also have fewer incentives to disclose voluntary 
information. Both these results provide early support for the conjecture that 
proprietary costs will limit incentives to disclose voluntary information.  In 
particular, due to lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, 
both family companies and companies with concentrated ownership levels are 
arguably more likely to derive a lower benefit from voluntarily filing full 
financial statements. Furthermore, they potentially lose more in terms of 
proprietary cost (i.e., via enabling competitors to obtain commercially sensitive 
information) which consequently limits incentives to disclose voluntary 
information. In addition, from Table 6.3, it can be seen that the Dechow measure 
which is a proxy for financial reporting quality is also significantly and positively 
correlated with lodging abbreviated financial reports. This provides early support 
to the hypothesis that filing abbreviated financial reports is not an indicator of 
lower financial reporting quality (Hypothesis 4).  
  
6.2.4 Regression analysis - Hypotheses 2 and 3 
Table 6.4 presents the results of logit regressions examining a company’s 
decisions to file abbreviated financial statements. It can be seen that both the 
family dummy variable and ownership concentration is positively and 
significantly associated with the likelihood of filing of abbreviated financial 
statements.  
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VARIABLES Abbreviated Financial Statements 
   
famdum 1.146***  
 (5.23)  
ownership 1.953***  
 (4.87)  
Herfindahl Index -859.277  
 (-1.02)  
Size -1.603***  
 (-8.53)  
Leverage 0.883*  
 (1.67)  
Age 0.016***  
 (3.08)  
Liquidity 0.204**  
 (2.25)  
Asset tangibility 1.371***  
 (2.73)  
ROA 1.813*  
 (1.88)  
LTdebt -0.529  
 (-0.86)  
Growth 0.145  
 (0.63)  
Audit -2.861***  
 (-5.77)  
Constant 8.199***  
 (5.02)  
   
Observations 5,123  
Number of ID 2,047  
Pseudo R2 0.1357  
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Disclosure Ind is an indicator variable, coded 1 when firms file abbreviated profit and loss accounts (i.e., 
does not disclose sales and cost of sales) and coded 0 when firms file full financial reports; famdum is an 
indicator variable coded 1 is when family members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are 
either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; ownership is the proportion 
ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; Herfindahl Index is Herfindahl Index of Concentration; Size is 
natural log of total assets; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Age is number of years since 
incorporation; Liquidity is current assets over current liability; Asset tangibility is fixed assets divided by 
total assets; Gross profit is gross profit divided by total asset ; ROA is net income divided by total assets; LT 
Debt is long term debt divided by total liabilities; Growth is growth rate in assets; Audit is an indicator 
variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise 
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This factor is also documented by Ali et al. (2007) in the public firm setting. Ali 
et al. (2007) found that despite family firms exhibiting better earnings quality, 
family firms in their sample provided less transparent disclosures of their 
corporate governance practises. This is consistent with the conjecture that that 
family and non-family firms have different preferences for voluntary disclosure. 
More specifically, because of family firm’s exhibiting more concentrated 
ownership, an undiversified portfolio and better access to information (Anderson  
and Reeb, 2003) these family companies place a lower preference for voluntary 
disclosure. A possible explanation is that family companies will bear all the 
proprietary costs of disclosing private information such as providing competitors 
with commercially sensitive information which may result in a loss of profits 
(Chen et al., 2008). Furthermore, it is not clear that they stand to gain benefits 
from voluntary disclosure, as they are able to communicate with their 
stakeholders privately. Accordingly, voluntary disclosure of sales and cost of 
sales by family firms is a response to whether sales and cost of sales is viewed as 
commercially sensitive information, thus family firms that stand to lose more will 
unlikely be associated with the likelihood of lodging full financial reports.  
 
In summary, the results in Table 6.4 show consistently that family firms are 
positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of filing of abbreviated 
financial statements, which this thesis argues is due to fewer incentives to provide 
voluntary disclosure, which supports Hypothesis 2.  
 
Ownership is also positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of 
filing abbreviated financial reports. Similarly, ownership concentration provides 

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fewer incentives to voluntarily disclose information as they already have access to 
relevant information and bear more of the costs of voluntarily disclosing 
commercially sensitive information. 
 
With respect to the control variables, as predicted size is significantly and 
negatively associated with the likelihood of filing abbreviated financial 
statements. Age is also positively associated with the likelihood of filing 
abbreviated financial reports and is consistent with the argument by Dedman and 
Lennox (2009) that one of the reasons for their longevity is due to these 
companies’ ability to hide the reason for their competitive advantage.  
 
Performance as measured by return on assets is positively and significantly 
associated with the likelihood of filing abbreviated financial statements. This is 
consistent with Dedman and Lennox (2009) who found evidence in their study of 
UK private manufacturing companies that successful private companies are less 
likely to lodge full financial reports if they are more profitable. This result 
provides some support to the argument that highly profitable companies have 
incentives to hide their success in order to prevent rivals from copying their 
success (Dedman and Lennox, 2009).  
 
Table 6.5 presents results of logit regressions examining the association between 
the company’s decision to file abbreviated financial statements and financial 
reporting quality using the Dechow measure as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. Table 6.5 (Column 1) shows that the coefficient for the Dechow measure 
is not significant and the interaction term (as shown in Column 2) between family 


and financial reporting quality is similarly not significant. The results show that 
regardless of the firm’s financial reporting quality, there is no significant 
difference as to whether family companies submit an abbreviated or full financial 
report which provides no support for Hypothesis 3. 
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 (1)  (2)  
VARIABLES Abbreviated Financial Statements 
famdum 1.426***  1.293***  
 (4.26)  (3.37)  
ownership 2.458***  1.701**  
 (4.00)  (2.34)  
famdum*Dechow   -3.276  
   (-0.81)  
Ownership*Dechow   -16.905*  
   (-1.90)  
Dechow-Dichev 0.845  16.949**  
 (0.42)  (2.14)  
Herfindahl Index -2,259.530**  -2,234.572**  
 (-2.05)  (-2.03)  
Size -2.837***  -2.841***  
 (-6.81)  (-6.75)  
Leverage 0.364  0.445  
 (0.42)  (0.51)  
Age 0.016**  0.016**  
 (2.20)  (2.14)  
Liquidity 0.665***  0.682***  
 (3.22)  (3.47)  
Asset Tangibility 2.703***  2.652***  
 (3.25)  (3.21)  
ROA 1.876  1.906  
 (1.16)  (1.14)  
LTdebt -0.806  -0.846  
 (-0.78)  (-0.82)  
Growth 0.872*  0.800*  
 (1.95)  (1.77)  
Audit -3.634***  -3.622***  
 (-5.07)  (-5.22)  
Constant 18.252***  18.977***  
 (5.18)  (5.28)  
Observations 2,887  2,887  
Number of ID 1,613  1,613  
Pseudo R2 0.2238  0.2269  
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Disclosure Ind is an indicator variable, coded 1 when firms file abbreviated profit and loss accounts (i.e. does 
not disclose sales and cost of sales) and coded 0 when firms file full financial reports; famdum is an indicator 
variable coded 1 when family members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the 
board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; ownership is the proportion ownership of the 
largest ultimate shareholder; Herfindahl Index is Herfindahl Index of Concentration; Dechow-Dichev is 
earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Size is natural log of total assets; 
Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Age is number of years since incorporation; Liquidity is current 
assets over current liability; Asset in place is fixed assets over total assets; Gross profit is gross profit divided 
by total asset ; ROA is net income divided by total assets; LT Debt is long term debt divided by total 
liabilities; Growth is growth rate in assets; Audit is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm has a Big 4 auditor, 0 
otherwise 
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A possible explanation could be that financial reporting quality and voluntary 
disclosure have different economic roles in medium-sized private family 
companies. Given that the quality of financial reports has important stewardship 
roles in private companies such as in executive compensation (Schulze et al., 
2001) and investment efficiency (McNichols and Stubbens, 2008), family 
companies exhibit higher quality financial reports. In particular, Chaney et al.  
(2004) argue that accounting information might play a more important role in the 
evaluation of managerial performance in private companies due to the fact that 
private companies do not have market measures of company value. In contrast, as 
outlined earlier, family companies have potentially less to gain from voluntary 
disclosure thus they are less likely to do so. Furthermore, it suggests that not 
disclosing potentially sensitive information is not indicative of lower financial 
reporting quality. Nonetheless, the interaction term (see Column 2) between 
family and financial reporting quality is significant at the ten per cent level. This 
provides some evidence that companies with concentrated ownership are 
associated with low financial reporting quality.24 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.5, after controlling for financial reporting quality, 
the Herfindahl Index becomes significant. This is consistent with Verrechia and 
Weber (2006) who provide evidence that firms in less concentrated industries 
(i.e., in industries with high competition) are more likely to withhold information. 
All other control variables remain unchanged. 
 

In Column 2, there is no unique effect of the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model on its own as it 
depends on the level of ownership concentration. Specifically, the effect of one variable that forms 
the interaction depends on the level of the other variable in the interaction. Please refer to 
Braumoeller (2004) and Bramber, Clark and Golder (2005). 


In summary, evidence from this thesis show consistently that family firms are 
positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of filing of abbreviated 
financial statements which provides support for Hypothesis 2. The result is 
consistent with the conjecture that family companies have fewer incentives to 
provide voluntary disclosure as they incur more costs in terms of loss of 
proprietary information. Also, due to the family’s substantial ownership and 
involvement in management, they derive less benefit from voluntary disclosure. 
In particular, it corroborates evidence from studies such as Chen et al. (2008) on 
public family companies and suggests that family owners prefer less voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
Furthermore, the results show that regardless of the firm’s financial reporting 
quality, there is no significant difference as to whether family companies submit 
an abbreviated or full financial report. This suggests that Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported and is similar to the effect found by Ali et al. (2007).  
 
6.3 Results of Research Question 3 
This section presents the results for Research Question 3, which is whether family 
ownership affects the relationship between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency. Prior literature has provided evidence that financial 
reporting quality enhances investment efficiency. As outlined by Biddle and 
Hilary (2006), accounting quality will play a stronger role in the relationship 
between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency in the public 
company setting where “investment decisions rely more heavily on public 
accounting disclosures”(pg. 964). Notwithstanding, Chen et al. (2011) found 


evidence that accounting quality does play a role in investment efficiency in a 
sample of private companies in the emerging markets. Given the prior literature 
suggests that private firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005), similar to studies such as Biddle and Hilary (2006), Chen et 
al. (2011), regressions are estimated to determine whether the relationship 
between financial reporting quality and subsequent investment efficiency can be 
observed within this sample of private companies.  
 
In addition, prior literature has argued that specificities of family ownership such 
as the long term investment horizon provides incentives for controlling 
shareholder to maximize firm value over a longer time period, thus attenuating 
deviation from the optimal level of investment (i.e.; James, 1999; Pindado et al, 
2011).  In recent research, Pindado et al. (2011) found evidence to suggest that 
family control mitigates investment efficiencies that are derived from capital 
market imperfections.  Next, ownership variables (family and ownership 
concentration) are included in order to test hypothesis 4, which predicts that 
family ownership of private companies will be positively (negatively) related to 
underinvestment (overinvestment). 
 
6.3.1 Descriptive analysis of main variables  
Table 6.6 presents the descriptive statistics (i.e., means, standard deviations, 
variance, maximum and minimum) of the variables for the full sample. From 
Table 6.6, it can be seen that in the full sample, 6,017 companies (62 per cent) 
belong to the overinvestment group whereas only 3,705 (38 per cent) firms belong 
to the underinvestment group, indicating that overinvestment is the more 


prevalent scenario in the UK. This is in contrast to Chen et al.’s (2011) study of 
private firms in the emerging market25. Most firms in their sample belonged to the 
underinvestment group. This suggests that unlike Chen’s sample of private 
companies in the emerging markets, SMEs in the UK are not as cash constrained. 
Anecdotal evidence to support this argument is that the UK government itself has 
several policies to help SMEs obtain finance. For example, the UK government 
established the first Enterprise Capital Funds in 2006, which is a commercially 
managed venture capital funds providing equity finance to SMEs with high 
growth potential (BIS Economics Paper, No. 16,2012). 

Although the time period in Chen et al’s (2011) study is not directly comparable to the time 
period of the sample in this study, nonetheless, they utilised data from a pre-GFC period between 
2002-2005, which is arguably a period where access to credit is relatively easier. 
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6.3.2 Pearson Correlation Table 
Table 6.7 presents the results for the Pearson Correlation Matrix divided into 
underinvestment (Panel A) and overinvestment (Panel B). Initial results show that 
financial reporting quality is significantly and positively (negatively) correlated 
with underinvestment (overinvestment). This provides initial evidence that 
financial reporting quality is effective in mitigating underinvestment and 
overinvestment.  Family companies are only significantly and positively 
correlated with overinvestment, suggesting that families are more likely to be 
overinvesting. 
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6.3.3 Regression analysis (Results of Research question 3, testing 
Hypothesis 4) 
 
In order to test whether financial reporting quality affects subsequent investment 
efficiency, the investment model (Equation 9 Chapter 4) based on Chen et al. 
(2011) is estimated cross-sectionally with at least 10 observations in each 
industry. Firms are classified into two groups based on the residuals stated in 
Equation (9), which are then utilized as the dependent variable in Equation (10) 
(Chapter 4). Equation 10 is tested separately for overinvestment (positive values 
of the residuals from Equation 9) and underinvestment (negative values of the 
residuals from Equation 9). This enables assessment of whether higher financial 
reporting quality mitigates both underinvestment and overinvestment (Chen et al., 
2011).  The relationship between financial reporting quality and subsequent 
investment efficiency is tested by regressing the measure of investment efficiency 
in year t on the measures of financial reporting quality, ownership and control 
variables in year t-1. 
 
Table 6.8 reports the multiple regression results from pooled and random effects 
regressions of equation 10 (Chapter 4) with underinvestment as the dependent 
variable. Coefficients for the earnings quality proxies are expected to be 
positively (negatively) associated with underinvestment (overinvestment). Table 
6.8 shows that coefficients for both earnings quality variables are positive and 
significant in all regressions. The adjusted R2 in the regressions is 5.1 per cent or 
higher.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Pooled Random Effects 
Dechow-Dichev 0.320***  0.314***  
 (3.06)  (2.98)  
Jones  0.166***  0.151*** 
  (3.64)  (3.48) 
Size 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.008 
 (1.26) (0.85) (1.28) (1.43) 
Age 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.10) (2.22) (1.14) (2.22) 
Tangibility -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.047** -0.050** 
 (-2.64) (-3.08) (-2.37) (-2.39) 
Leverage -0.046 -0.040 -0.045 -0.031 
 (-1.49) (-1.45) (-1.39) (-1.02) 
Slack 0.002 -0.024 0.002 -0.026 
 (0.08) (-1.20) (0.08) (-1.23) 
Loss 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.004 
 (1.20) (0.57) (1.16) (0.51) 
Constant -0.083* -0.058 -0.121** -0.138*** 
 (-1.69) (-1.24) (-2.25) (-2.75) 
     
Industry and Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,812 2,281 1,812 2,281 
R2 0.0646 0.0705 0.0646 0.0694 
Adjusted R2 0.0547 0.0622 0.0510 0.0587 
Number of ID   972 1,141 
 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dechow-Dichev is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Jones is 
discretionary accruals using Jones (1991); Size is natural log of total assets; Age is number of 
years since incorporation; Tangibility is fixed assets over total assets; Leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets; Slack  is cash over total assets; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is 
reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise.  
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Table 6.9 reports the regression results from pooled and random effects 
regressions using overinvestment as the dependent variable. In this case, 
coefficients for the earnings quality proxies are expected to be negatively 
associated with overinvestment. As can be seen from Table 6.9, the coefficients 
for both earnings quality variables are negative and significant in all regressions. 
The adjusted R2 in the regressions is five per cent or higher and these R2 values 
are similar to results obtained by Biddle et al. (2009).  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Pooled  Random Effects 
Dechow-Dichev -0.254***  -0.188***  
 (-3.70)  (-2.88)  
Jones  -0.053**  -0.037 
  (-2.53)  (-1.56) 
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.33) (0.44) (0.27) (0.21) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.39) (1.06) (0.15) (0.75) 
Tangibility 0.023*** 0.015** 0.024** 0.016* 
 (2.99) (2.24) (2.35) (1.72) 
Leverage 0.024** 0.030*** 0.028** 0.035*** 
 (2.20) (3.10) (1.97) (2.59) 
Slack 0.032* 0.028** 0.024 0.020 
 (1.94) (2.22) (1.37) (1.41) 
Loss 0.000 0.008*** -0.004 0.003 
 (0.05) (2.68) (-0.83) (0.90) 
 (1.62) (1.16)   
Constant 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.023 
 (0.19) (0.40) (0.48) (0.79) 
     
Industry and Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,865 3,780 2,865 3,780 
R2 0.073 0.051 0.0696 0.0493 
Adjusted R2 0.0667 0.0459 0.0611 0.0427 
Number of ID   1,276 1,501 
 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dechow-Dichev is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Jones is 
discretionary accruals using Jones(1991); Size is natural log of total assets; Age is number of 
years since incorporation; Tangibility is fixed assets over total assets; Leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets; Slack  is cash over total assets; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is 
reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise.  
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Results from both Table 6.8 and 6.9 suggest that financial reporting quality 
enhances investment efficiency. Financial reporting quality is positively 
(negatively) and significantly associated with underinvestment (overinvestment). 
These results are consistent with earlier evidence obtained from Pearson 
correlation coefficients. The results suggests that although prior literature 
provides evidence that financial reporting quality is lower in private companies, 
evidence suggests that the quality of financial reporting affects subsequent capital 
investment efficiency. The intuition behind this association is that higher quality 
financial reporting would provide outside suppliers of capital with more 
information and mitigates information asymmetries which results in increased 
investment efficiency through the reduction of both moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Biddle and Hilary, 2006). Furthermore, Chen et al., (2011) maintains 
that higher quality financial reporting would enable better monitoring and hence 
provide external suppliers of capital with greater assurance regarding managers’ 
activities. Notwithstanding, even in the absence of both moral hazard and adverse 
selection, McNichols and Stubben (2008) maintain that high quality information 
is important for internal decision-making as it enables managers to make better 
decisions on the outcome of investments choices.  
 
As expected the coefficients of several control variables are statistically 
significantly associated with both underinvestment and overinvestment. 
Specifically, size is not significant with both under and overinvestment. This is in 
contrast to Chen et al. (2011), as in their study of private firms in the emerging 
markets, size was shown to be significantly associated with both under and 
overinvestment.  

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In addition, asset tangibility is negatively (positively) and significantly associated 
with underinvestment (overinvestment). Biddle et al., (2009) also found a positive 
and significant relation between asset tangibility and overinvestment. A possible 
explanation for this could be companies that have higher tangible assets are able 
to use these assets as collateral, which enables them to invest even though it may 
not necessarily be efficient for them to do so. 
 
Table 6.10 shows the regression model after the inclusion of both the family 
dummy and ownership concentration variables. As can be seen, the family 
dummy variable is not significantly associated with either underinvestment or 
overinvestment. This is in line with earlier evidence from the correlation matrix, 
which suggests that the family dummy variable is not significantly associated 
with investment efficiency. This is in contrast to evidence from Pindado et al, 
(2011), who found evidence that family control alleviates investment-cash flow 
sensitivity (a proxy for investment efficiency). Specifically, lower investment-
cash flow sensitivity is indicative of higher investment efficiency. A possible 
explanation could be that whilst Pindado et al. (2011) examined the impact of 
family ownership on investment efficiency, Pindado et al. (2011) did not include 
financial reporting quality in their model. 
 
From Table 6.10, it can be seen that ownership is ineffective in mitigating 
underinvestment. Hadlock (1998) maintains that if asymmetric information 
causes external funds to be too expensive, managers will be more hesitant to raise  
 

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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Dechow-Dichev 0.342***  -0.196***  
 (3.09)  (-3.01)  
Jones  0.158***  -0.041 
  (3.38)  (-1.58) 
famdum 0.009 0.015** -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.24) (2.29) (-0.31) (-0.30) 
ownership -0.027** -0.033*** 0.003 0.006 
 (-2.12) (-2.94) (0.36) (1.02) 
Size 0.009 0.009* -0.000 -0.001 
 (1.53) (1.67) (-0.15) (-0.40) 
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.65) (1.62) (-0.21) (0.29) 
Tangibility -0.046** -0.047** 0.026*** 0.019** 
 (-2.22) (-2.06) (2.62) (2.17) 
Leverage -0.050 -0.035 0.023 0.033** 
 (-1.43) (-1.06) (1.60) (2.44) 
Slack -0.002 -0.024 0.005 0.002 
 (-0.11) (-1.11) (0.34) (0.17) 
Loss 0.008 -0.000 -0.005 0.002 
 (0.92) (-0.04) (-1.11) (0.78) 
Constant -0.116** -0.137*** 0.031 0.036 
 (-2.15) (-2.68) (1.03) (1.38) 
Industry and Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,755 2,155 2,734 3,507 
Number of ID 944 1,086 1,225 1,417 
R2 0.0719 0.0771 0.0677 0.0530 
Adjusted R2 0.0568 0.0649 0.0580 0.0454 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dechow is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Jones is 
discretionary accruals using Jones(1991); famdum is an indicator variable coded  1 when family 
members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or 
in the top management and, 0 otherwise; ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest 
ultimate shareholder; Size is natural log of total assets; Age is number of years since 
incorporation; Tangibility is fixed assets over total assets; Leverage is total debt divided by total 
assets; Slack  is cash over total assets; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net 
income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise. 
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external funds as they internalize more of the mispricing. Consequently, they pass 
up projects with positive net present value due to the inflated cost of external 
funds.  Wei and Zhang (2008) extend Hadlock’s (1998) argument and argue that 
the underinvestment problem becomes aggravated when there is little divergence 
between cash flow rights and voting rights. Accordingly, this thesis argues that 
the lack of divergence between cash flows and voting rights in private firms is a 
possible explanation for why concentrated ownership is ineffective in mitigating 
underinvestment problem in private firms.  
 
Furthermore, Table 6.11 shows the interaction between the family dummy and the 
financial reporting dummy variables in order to examine whether the relationship 
between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency is dependent on the 
type of ownership in the company. As can be seen, all the interaction terms are 
not significant. This suggests that despite family firms having better financial 
reporting quality (as evidenced from results in Chapter 5), family ownership does 
not seem to have an effect on the relationship between financial reporting quality 
and subsequent investment efficiency in this sample. Thus, evidence suggests that 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported. Furthermore, the interaction between ownership 
and the financial reporting dummy is also not significant. Both these results 
suggest that although prior literature document that both financial reporting 
quality and ownership can mitigate under- and overinvestment, the results suggest 
that financial reporting quality is more effective in alleviating investment 
inefficiencies. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Dechow-Dichev 0.394**  -0.439*  
 (2.20)  (-1.95)  
famdum*Dechow -0.159  0.141  
 (-0.64)  (1.35)  
ownership*Dechow 0.031  0.239  
 (0.09)  (0.86)  
famdum 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.002 
 (0.12) (0.67) (1.04) (0.40) 
famdum*Jones  -0.102  0.037 
  (-1.02)  (0.75) 
ownership -0.025 -0.007 0.013 0.018* 
 (-1.57) (-0.46) (1.16) (1.74) 
Ownership*Jones  0.300*  0.150 
  (1.75)  (1.27) 
Size 0.008 0.009 -0.000 -0.001 
 (1.49) (1.63) (-0.00) (-0.36) 
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.73) (1.57) (-0.29) (0.37) 
Tangibility -0.047** -0.046** 0.026** 0.018** 
 (-2.34) (-2.02) (2.58) (2.07) 
Leverage -0.049 -0.033 0.022 0.034** 
 (-1.45) (-1.01) (1.54) (2.56) 
Slack -0.002 -0.024 0.005 -0.000 
 (-0.12) (-1.12) (0.33) (-0.03) 
Loss 0.008 -0.001 -0.005 0.002 
 (0.90) (-0.13) (-1.02) (0.75) 
Constant -0.109** -0.150*** 0.015 0.024 
 (-2.03) (-2.89) (0.45) (0.87) 
Industry and Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,755 2,155 2,734 3,507 
Number of ID 944 1,086 1,225 1,417 
R2 0.0730 0.0802 0.0742 0.0565 
Adjusted R2 0.0569 0.0672 0.0639 0.0484 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dechow is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Jones is discretionary 
accruals using Jones (1991); famdum is an indicator variable coded  1 when family members is the largest 
percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 
otherwise; famdum*Dechow is an interaction variable between family ownership and earnings quality proxy 
using modified Dechow-Dichev (1992) model, famdum*Jones is an interaction variable between family 
ownership and earnings quality proxy using Jones(1991) model; ownership is the proportion ownership of 
the largest ultimate shareholder; ownership*Dechow is an interaction variable between family ownership and 
earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (1992) model, ownership *Jones is an interaction 
variable between family ownership and earnings quality proxy using Jones(1991) model; Size is natural log 
of total assets; Age is number of years since incorporation; Tangibility is fixed assets over total assets; 
Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Slack  is cash over total assets; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 
if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise. 
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6.3.4 Alternative Investment Efficiency Model Specifications 
This thesis also conducted several sensitivity tests related to the measure of 
investment26 efficiency. Similar to Chen et al. (2011), the first test is using an 
expanded model to measure investment efficiency (Equation 10, Chapter 4.) In 
particular, company size, age, financial slack and leverage were included as 
additional control variables to equations (8) and (9) and were both estimated 
cross-sectionally with at least 10 observations in each industry. Companies were 
then classified into two groups based on the residuals in equation (10), which 
were then used to re-estimate equation (9). The rationale is that investment 
efficiency in the original model is too parsimonious and this could have an impact 
on the results. As can be seen from Table 6.12, the results remained unchanged. 
Specifically, financial reporting quality is effective in mitigating both 
underinvestment and overinvestment but the family dummy variable remains 
insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

In Column 2, there is some support for famdum being effective in mitigating underinvestment. 
A possible explanation for this could be that while the Dechow-Dichev controls for non-linearity 
by incorporating timely gains and losses via adjusting for negative cash flows, the Jones model 
does not. As can be seen, in the Dechow-Dichev model, loss is significant at the one per cent 
level. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Dechow-Dichev 0.264***  -0.215***  
 (3.07)  (-2.97)  
Jones  0.157***  -0.040 
  (3.55)  (-1.54) 
famdum 0.004 0.011* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.64) (1.88) (0.09) (0.03) 
ownership -0.023** -0.029*** 0.001 0.004 
 (-1.97) (-2.68) (0.19) (0.73) 
Size 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.001 
 (1.05) (1.23) (0.09) (0.46) 
Age 0.000 0.000** -0.000** -0.000 
 (1.45) (2.27) (-2.11) (-0.89) 
Tangibility -0.045*** -0.057*** 0.020** 0.014* 
 (-3.53) (-4.12) (2.19) (1.77) 
Leverage -0.028 -0.019 0.022 0.027** 
 (-1.27) (-0.92) (1.51) (2.17) 
Slack -0.007 -0.023 0.003 0.003 
 (-0.41) (-1.24) (0.21) (0.27) 
Loss 0.014* 0.007 -0.000 0.005 
 (1.88) (1.10) (-0.10) (1.64) 
Constant -0.080 -0.089** 0.029 0.015 
 (-1.63) (-1.99) (1.11) (0.60) 
     
Industry and Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,908 2,336 2,581 3,326 
Number of ID 1,015 1,156 1,207 1,401 
R2 0.0640 0.0725 0.0833 0.0679 
Adjusted R2 0.0500 0.0612 0.0732 0.600 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dechow is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Jones is 
discretionary accruals using Jones(1991); famdum is an indicator variable coded  1 when family 
members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or 
in the top management and, 0 otherwise; ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest 
ultimate shareholder; Size is natural log of total assets; Age is number of years since 
incorporation; Tangibility is fixed assets over total assets; Leverage is total debt divided by total 
assets; Slack  is cash over total assets; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net 
income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise. 
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In addition, another sensitivity test conducted is with asset growth, which is used 
as a proxy for investment opportunities instead of revenue growth in Equation 8 
(Chapter 4).  Asset growth also controls for the fact that in the period 2004-2008, 
some medium-sized private firms did not disclose their sales figures, which 
excluded them from earlier regression models. As can be seen from Table 6.13, 
the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Underinvestment Overinvestment 
     
Dechow-Dichev 0.300***  -0.183***  
 (3.06)  (-3.28)  
Jones  0.167***  -0.064*** 
  (3.25)  (-2.59) 
famdum 0.007 0.017** -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.06) (2.31) (-0.32) (-0.25) 
ownership -0.025** -0.037*** 0.001 0.006 
 (-2.21) (-3.01) (0.23) (1.04) 
Size 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.001 
 (1.00) (1.01) (0.47) (0.39) 
Age 0.000** 0.000* -0.000 0.000 
 (2.02) (1.67) (-0.32) (0.44) 
Tangibility -0.051*** -0.059*** 0.021*** 0.018** 
 (-3.30) (-2.93) (2.93) (2.30) 
Leverage -0.032 -0.040 0.022* 0.029** 
 (-1.11) (-1.30) (1.86) (2.37) 
Slack -0.028 -0.031 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-1.43) (-1.35) (-0.79) (-0.75) 
Loss 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.005* 
 (1.16) (0.25) (0.53) (1.69) 
Constant -0.082 -0.092* 0.033 0.022 
 (-1.55) (-1.66) (1.38) (0.90) 
Industry and Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,382 2,081 4,005 3,614 
Number of ID 1,172 1,083 1,542 1,443 
R2 0.0579 0.0643 0.0780 0.0555 
Adjusted R2 0.0467 0.0515 0.0715 0.0481 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dechow is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Jones is 
discretionary accruals using Jones(1991); famdum is an indicator variable coded  1 when family 
members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder and are either on the board of directors or 
in the top management and, 0 otherwise; ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest 
ultimate shareholder; Size is natural log of total assets; Age is number of years since 
incorporation; Tangibility is fixed assets over total assets; Leverage is total debt divided by total 
assets; Slack  is cash over total assets; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net 
income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise.  
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6.3.5 Robustness Checks 
In addition, this thesis also controls for the pre- and post-Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) periods. The rationale is that during this period there was less funding for 
investment and results documented earlier could be affected by the impact of a 
credit-constrained environment. This is a pertinent issue as the ability of SMEs to 
access finance is likely to affect their ability to fund business investment (BIS 
Economics Paper, No 16). The GFC period is defined as the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis and a dummy variable was utilised to capture this period (Rudolph and 
Schwetzler, 2013). As can be seen, the interaction term between both the financial 
reporting quality and crisis dummy variables is not significant. This suggests that 
financial reporting quality remains important, regardless of the GFC crisis period. 
In addition, it can be seen that both the famdum*crisisdum and 
ownership*crisisdum are also not significant. This suggests that neither of these 
variables had an effect on financial reporting quality before or after the GFC. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Dechow-Dichev 0.417***  -0.223***  
 (2.70)  (-2.73)  
Jones  0.178***  -0.040 
  (3.24)  (-1.38) 
famdum 0.011 0.020** 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.14) (2.16) (0.09) (-0.08) 
ownership -0.030* -0.040*** 0.002 0.008 
 (-1.92) (-2.69) (0.24) (1.22) 
crisisdum -0.004 0.008 0.003 0.003 
 (-0.18) (0.36) (0.38) (0.46) 
Dechow*crisisdum -0.174  0.074  
 (-0.78)  (0.76)  
Jones*crisisdum  -0.033  -0.008 
  (-0.23)  (-0.18) 
famdum*crisisdum -0.004 -0.013 -0.005 -0.003 
 (-0.28) (-0.83) (-1.00) (-0.58) 
ownership *crisisdum 0.014 0.023 0.000 -0.008 
 (0.46) (0.78) (0.02) (-0.91) 
Size 0.011* 0.015*** -0.001 -0.002 
 (1.94) (2.61) (-0.31) (-0.72) 
Age 0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.24) (2.36) (-0.54) (-0.11) 
Tangibility -0.050** -0.052** 0.027*** 0.019** 
 (-2.48) (-2.25) (2.66) (2.22) 
Leverage -0.052 -0.035 0.023 0.034** 
 (-1.47) (-1.05) (1.64) (2.52) 
Slack -0.000 -0.018 0.004 0.000 
 (-0.02) (-0.83) (0.28) (0.03) 
Loss 0.011 0.003 -0.006 0.001 
 (1.18) (0.37) (-1.42) (0.50) 
Constant -0.111** -0.158*** 0.029 0.040 
 (-1.98) (-2.80) (0.98) (1.53) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,755 2,155 2,734 3,507 
Number of ID 944 1,086 1,225 1,417 
R2 0.0611 0.0587 0.0659 0.0503 
Adjusted R2 0.0464 0.0468 0.0566 0.0429 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dechow is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Jones is discretionary accruals using 
Jones(1991); famdum is an indicator variable coded  1 when family members is the largest percentage ultimate shareholder 
and are either on the board of directors or in the top management and, 0 otherwise; ownership is the proportion ownership 
of the largest ultimate shareholder; crisisdum is indicator variable coded I for 2008 and 2009, 0 otherwise, 
Dechow*crisisdum is an interaction variable to capture the relationship between Dechow and crisisdum; Jones*crisisdum 
is interaction between Jones and crisisdum; famdum*crisisdum is interaction between famdum and crisisdum; 
ownership*crisisdum is interaction between ownership and crisisdum; Size is natural log of total assets; Age is number of 
years since incorporation; Tangibility is fixed assets over total assets; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Slack  
is cash over total assets; Loss is an indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise. 

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Furthermore, to control for endogeneity issues in the investment efficiency model 
(Equation 9), this thesis uses the predicted values of the probability of family 
control using first stage logit regressions and is in line with Pindado et al. (2011). 
The predicted value of being a family company is then included in the GMM 
specification of Equation 9 (Chapter 4). Table 6.14 reports the predicted values of 
being a family company (Column 3) shows that while financial reporting quality 
is effective in mitigating overinvestment, it is not effective in mitigating 
underinvestment. However, probfam is only effective in mitigating 
underinvestment but not overinvestment.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Underinvestment Overinvestment 
Dechow-Dichev -1.598*  -1.715**  
 (-1.71)  (-2.35)  
Jones  -0.472  -0.301 
  (-1.23)  (-1.43) 
probfam 7.385** 7.810 6.844** 8.897* 
 (2.00) (1.61) (2.21) (1.72) 
ownership -0.683* -0.783* -0.451 -0.720 
 (-1.93) (-1.86) (-0.96) (-0.94) 
Size 0.196** 0.263* 0.169* 0.220* 
 (2.04) (1.73) (1.94) (1.66) 
Age -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.10) (-1.23) (-0.85) (-1.13) 
Tangibility -0.098 -0.179 -0.085 -0.159 
 (-1.30) (-1.63) (-1.04) (-1.24) 
Leverage 0.192 0.200 0.393** 0.507 
 (1.41) (1.31) (1.99) (1.65) 
Slack 0.444 0.546 0.352* 0.481 
 (1.50) (1.34) (1.80) (1.50) 
Loss 0.153* 0.209 0.088** 0.154* 
 (1.94) (1.58) (1.99) (1.73) 
Constant -5.312** -5.976   
 (-2.03) (-1.63)   
     
Observations 1,755 2,155 2,734 3,507 
Number of ID 944 1,086 1,225 1,417 
AR(2) 0.467 0.701 0.273 0.558 
Hansen 0.246 0.259 0.742 0.961 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dechow is earnings quality proxy using modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) model; Jones is 
discretionary accruals using Jones(1991); probfam is the likelihood of being a family firm; 
ownership is the proportion ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder; Size is natural log of 
total assets; Age is number of years since incorporation; Tangibility is fixed assets over total 
assets; Leverage is total debt divided by total assets; Slack  is cash over total assets; Loss is an 
indicator variable, 1 if a firm is reporting net income <0 for the year, 0 otherwise. 
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6.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents results of tests on the second and third research questions, 
which is whether voluntary disclosure is different between family and non-family 
companies and whether family ownership affects the relationship between 
financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. Results of the logit 
regressions suggest that family companies are significantly and positively 
associated with the likelihood of lodging abbreviated financial reports. This result 
provides support to Hypothesis 2, which suggests that family and non-family 
companies have different preferences for voluntary disclosure. The result is 
consistent with the conjecture that family companies have less incentives to 
provide voluntary disclosure as they incur more costs in terms of loss of 
proprietary information. Also, due to the family’s substantial ownership and 
involvement in management, they derive less benefit from voluntary disclosure. 
Furthermore, the results show that regardless of the companies’ financial 
reporting quality, there is no significant difference as to whether family 
companies submit an abbreviated or full financial report. This suggests that 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported and is similar to the effect found by Ali et al. 
(2007).  
 
In relation to Hypothesis 4, results of the multiple regressions suggest that 
financial reporting quality enhances investment efficiency. The rationale behind 
this association is that higher quality financial reporting mitigates information 
asymmetries, resulting in increased investment efficiency through the reduction of 
both moral hazard and adverse selection (Biddle and Hilary, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the above result, however, the interaction between the family 
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dummy and the financial reporting dummy variables is not significant, providing 
no support to Hypothesis 4. This complements evidence from McNichols and 
Stubbens (2008) who provide evidence of the importance of accounting 
information in internal decision-making. Furthermore, it provides additional 
empirical support for Bushman and Smith (2001)’s argument that that even in the 
absence of agency conflicts between managers and investors, financial accounting 
data will increase capital allocation efficiency as it enables managers and 
investors to identify value creation opportunities with less error. An implication is 
that although prior literature documents that both family ownership and financial 
reporting quality are associated with investment efficiency, studies that examine 
the link between ownership and investment efficiency need to control for the 
relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency.   
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CHAPTER 7  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis is designed to further our understanding of financial reporting 
behaviour of private medium-sized companies in the UK. Specifically this thesis 
examines whether variation in the type of ownership, that is family versus non-
family, influences financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosure behaviour 
of private medium-sized companies. Furthermore, in light of the importance of 
accounting information in internal decision-making (McNichols and Stubbens, 
2008), this thesis also examines the impact that family ownership has on the 
association between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency.  
 
Medium-sized companies are often emphasized as vital for economic growth. 
SMEs account for 99.9 per cent of all private sector enterprises in the UK. 
Furthermore, according to the Institute of Family Business Report (2011), family 
firms are the backbone of the UK economy. Statistics from the report reveal that 
family businesses comprise 3 million businesses or two in three of all private 
sector enterprises in the UK. As highlighted in Chapter 1, in contrast to 
Continental Europe, the Family Business Report (2011) suggests that family 
businesses in the UK private sector are made up of predominantly Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SME). 
 
Prior accounting research on family firms has predominantly been in the public 
firm setting and has provided some evidence that family firms have specific firm 
characteristics. In particular, family ownership is characterized by a large, under-
diversified equity stake; long investment horizons and family members often 
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control senior management positions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Whilst prior 
literature has provided evidence that there are benefits to family ownership such 
as improved performance (Ali et al., 2007; Wang, 2006) and lower cost of 
financing (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003), family ownership has also been shown to 
have a negative effect on corporate transparency (Anderson et al., 2009). Given 
that increasingly prior research has documented that different types of family 
firms differ with respect to their strategic choices and relative performance, more 
research is warranted particularly as there is limited research on family firms in 
the private setting. 
 
Within the family firm literature, there is academic debate on whether private 
family firms incur higher or lower agency costs compared to non-family private 
firms. Prior literature in the public firm setting maintains that family firms are 
more susceptible to Agency Problem Type II between controlling family and 
other stakeholders. (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2011). Furthermore, Schulze et al. (2001) 
argue that among private family firms, as well as agency costs engendered by 
altruism, the family’s controlling interest could provide them with greater 
opportunities for private rent extraction for the benefit of family members, which 
could be at the expense of minority shareholders. Nonetheless due to their 
frequent substantial shareholdings and if not exclusive ownership, private family 
firms have high incentives to maximize profitability (Carney et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, similar to Stockmans et al. (2010), this thesis argues that due to the 
close connection between family and firm wealth in private firms, private firms 
have fewer incentives to manage earnings opportunistically as it also reduces 
family wealth. 
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In addition, this thesis takes advantage of a regulatory change in disclosure that 
occurred in 2008. Specifically, prior to 2008, the Companies Act 2006 allows 
medium-sized companies, which meet the criteria specified in the Companies Act 
2006, to file financial reports which do not disclose details of gross profit. Post 
2008, medium-sized companies are required to provide the figure for turnover. 
Given that turnover is commercially sensitive information (Dedman and Lennox, 
2009), it provides an ideal setting to test the proprietary cost hypothesis. As 
highlighted by Dedman and Lennox, this is unlikely to be an agency issue as 
companies are required by law to provide shareholders with full financial reports 
irrespective of what they publicly choose to disclose. Moreover, the authors’ 
further note that banks do not rely on financial statements filed at Companies 
House as firms usually provide banks with information needed on a timely basis. 
Unlike Dedman and Lennox (2009) who examined the impact of perceived or 
potential competition on voluntary disclosure, this thesis examined the effect that 
family ownership has on voluntary disclosure. In particular, it is hypothesized that 
family and non-family companies will have different preferences for voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
Quality of financial reporting in the private firm setting is an issue that has been 
receiving increasing attention by regulators (International Accounting Standard 
Board, 2010). Furthermore, an often-highlighted benefit of financial reporting 
quality is that it enhances investment efficiency. The intuition behind this 
association is that higher quality financial reporting mitigates information 
asymmetries through the reduction of both moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Biddle and Hilary, 2006). Notwithstanding, even in the absence of information 
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asymmetry, financial accounting data will increase capital allocation efficiency as 
it enables managers and investors to identify value creation opportunities with 
less error (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Moreover, prior empirical evidence 
suggests that ownership influences corporate investment policy (Fahlenbrach, 
2009). Accordingly, it is hypothesized that family ownership will affect the 
relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follow: Section 7.2 presents the 
summary of findings. Section 7.3 outlines the contributions of the thesis. Section 
7.4 explains the thesis limitations and provides suggestions for future research.  
 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
This thesis addresses the following research questions: 
Research Question 1: Does family ownership explain variation in earnings quality 
of private companies in the UK? 
Research Question 2: Is voluntary disclosure different between family and non-
family medium-sized private companies? 
Research Question 3: Does family ownership affect the relationship between 
financial reporting quality and investment efficiency? 
This thesis utilizes panel data of medium-sized UK private companies from 2004-
2011. The sample data comprises an unbalanced panel of 3,512 companies from 
2005-2011. Specifically, eight years of financial data and seven years of 
ownership data were collected from FAME in December 2012. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, Research Questions 1 and 3 utilize data from 2004-2011, while 
Research Question 2 utilizes data from 2004-2007. 

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7.2.1 Hypothesis 1 and empirical evidence associated with Research 
Question 1 
Hypothesis 1 relates to answering Research Question 1 and predicts that family 
ownership will be associated with higher financial reporting quality.  Earnings 
quality is measured by four proxies: the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals 
model; the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality model; conservatism, and 
incidences of small positive earnings.  
 
Results of the multiple regressions reveal that there is a positive association 
between family ownership and financial reporting quality. This is evident using 
both the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model and Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) accruals quality measure.  Furthermore, family companies are negatively 
associated with the likelihood of incidences of reporting small positive earnings, 
which suggests that family firms are less likely to be associated with earnings 
manipulations. The results are also robust to an alternative measure of family firm 
and issues associated with endogeneity. Although, theory suggests that family 
firms face severe Agency Problem II, the evidence suggests that overall private 
medium-sized family firms have fewer incentives to manage earnings and provide 
support for Hypothesis 1. A possible explanation could be that due to the close 
links between family and firm wealth in private family companies, private family 
companies will have fewer incentives to manage earnings opportunistically, as it 
reduces the family’s wealth (Stockmans et al., 2010). Furthermore, this is 
consistent with the conjecture that less severe agency problems result in less 
opportunistic earnings managements and higher financial reporting quality (Ali et 
al, 2007). Notwithstanding, the results also indicate that family companies are 
reporting less conservatively compared to non-family companies.  A possible 
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explanation for this is that due to lower agency costs and litigation concerns, 
private family companies have fewer incentives to implement conservative 
financial reporting which the literature highlights as two key drivers of 
conservatism (Chen et al., 2013).  
 
7.2.2 Hypotheses 2 and 3 and empirical evidence associated with Research 
Question 2 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 examine the associations between family ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. Using voluntary disclosure as a proxy for proprietary cost, 
Hypothesis 2 tests whether family and non-family companies have different 
preferences for voluntary disclosure. Results of the logit regressions suggest that 
family companies are significantly and positively associated with the likelihood 
of lodging abbreviated financial reports. This provides support to Hypothesis 2, 
which suggests that family and non-family companies have different preferences 
for voluntary disclosure.  
 
Furthermore, Hypothesis 3 is not supported as evidence suggests that there is no 
significant difference as to whether family companies submit an abbreviated or 
full financial report, regardless of the companies’ financial reporting quality. As 
outlined in Chapter 6, a possible explanation could be that financial reporting 
quality and voluntary disclosure have different economic roles in medium-sized 
private family companies. It is argued that quality of financial reporting is 
important for stewardship as private companies do not have market measures of 
firm value (Chaney et al. (2004). Notwithstanding, due to their undiversified and 
concentrated nature, private family companies will have less to gain from 
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voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, family companies will bear all the proprietary 
costs of disclosing proprietary information such as providing competitors with 
commercially sensitive information which may lead to loss of profits. 
Accordingly, voluntary disclosure of sales and cost of sales by family companies 
is a response to whether sales and cost of sales is viewed as commercially 
sensitive information, thus it is argued that family companies that stand to lose 
more will be unlikely to be associated with the likelihood of lodging full financial 
reports. 
 
7.2.3 Hypothesis 4 and empirical evidence associated with Research 
Question 3 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that family ownership will affect the relationship between 
financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. Prior studies have suggested 
that higher quality financial reporting should result in an increase in investment 
efficiency (Bushman and Smith, 2001). In addition, Biddle and Hilary (2006) 
argue that institutional features may also be related to firm-level capital 
investments. Furthermore, prior empirical research provides evidence to suggest 
that ownership has an effect on investment efficiency (Wei and Zhang, 2008; 
Pindado et al, 2011).  
 
A key construct in this analysis is investment efficiency. Similar to Biddle et al. 
(2009) and Chen et al. (2011), a firm is investing efficiently if it undertakes 
projects with positive net present value (NPV). Accordingly, underinvestment 
(negative values of the residuals from equation 8) includes not taking up 
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investment opportunities with positive NPV and overinvestment (positive values 
of the residuals from equation 8) is investing in projects with negative NPV. 
 
Results of the multiple regressions reveal that although financial reporting quality 
is associated with investment efficiency, family ownership does not seem to have 
an effect on the relationship between financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency. In particular, multiple regression results are consistent with financial 
reporting quality mitigating both under and overinvestment. However, there is no 
support for the conjecture that specificities of family ownership is effective in 
mitigating investment efficiency. Thus, the evidence suggests that Hypothesis 4 is 
not supported. This is in contrast to evidence from Pindado et al. (2009), who 
provide support that family ownership is significantly associated with investment 
efficiency.  
 
7.3 Contribution 
This thesis contributes to the literature and practice in several ways. First, it 
expands our understanding of the relation between ownership and financial 
reporting behavior of private medium-sized companies. That is, this study 
provides evidence on how variation in ownership, specifically family ownership 
across private medium-sized companies, affects the quality of both earnings and 
voluntary disclosure practices. This is an important issue given the increasing 
emphasis being placed by regulators on accounting practices of small businesses 
worldwide (IASB, 2010). Furthermore, financial statements are usually the only 
source of publicly available information on private companies. Information 
regarding the quality of this information would help to reduce information 
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opacity, which is a characteristic of private firms’ financial reporting environment 
(Minnis, 2011). 
 
Second, this thesis takes advantage of an ideal setting to test the proprietary cost 
hypothesis and contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosure. Specifically, 
this thesis examines the potential impact that family ownership has on the 
disclosure behaviour of medium-sized private companies. Evidence from this 
thesis suggests that financial reporting and voluntary disclosure may have 
different economic roles, as family firms are associated with both better financial 
reporting quality and a lower likelihood to disclose potentially commercially 
sensitive information such as sales and cost of sales. 
 
Third, a practical contribution is that this thesis adds to the limited research on 
private medium-sized family companies in the UK. In the EU, the European 
Commission has highlighted the importance of family companies and provides 
evidence that 60% of all European Companies are family companies (European 
Commission, 2009). The European Commission itself had undertaken a project to 
obtain a more comprehensive view of the characteristics and needs of family 
businesses in the EU. Thus, this thesis contributes to this knowledge base on 
family firms as well as to regulation on family firms reporting practices in the 
UK, which would inform policy on the needs of family businesses.  
 
Fourth, this thesis is that it increases our understanding of the role of accounting 
in the private company sector. While the cost of financial reporting for private 
companies is well known, there is limited albeit growing research quantifying the 
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benefits of financial reporting for private firms, particularly medium-sized private 
firms. Thus, evidence from this study suggests that private companies indeed 
derive an economic benefit in the form of increased investment efficiency by 
producing financial reports of a higher quality. In addition, this thesis adds to the 
growing research on the impact of financial reporting quality on investment 
efficiency.  
 
Fifth, another practical contribution is that as highlighted by Biddle et al., (2009, 
pg.114), who documents that a relation between financial reporting quality and 
investment efficiency has both macro-economic and micro-economic 
implications. As outlined by Biddle et al. (2009), the macro-economic implication 
is that investment is a determinant of economic growth. Furthermore, investment 
is important at the company level, as increasingly there have been policies to 
provide funding to SMEs. Anecdotal evidence can be seen in an article in The 
Telegraph, “Innovative SMEs to land £2.5 billion from EU fund” dated 15th 
October 2013. In particular, it highlights that a £60 billion product development 
fund, Horizon 2020 will be launched to enable innovative SMEs to be given up to 
£2.5 billion in funds to support research and innovation (Burn-Callander, 2013).  
 
7.4 Limitations and future research directions 
7.4.1 Limitations 
A limitation of this thesis is unable to provide evidence on heterogeneity of 
private family companies. In particular, this study was unable to test the founding 
family effect. Prior research has provided evidence of a founding family effect 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006), that is, differences between family firms and non-
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family firms are particularly strong in founder led firms. Unfortunately, due to 
data limitations, this thesis could not identify whether the family companies in the 
sample are founding family companies or otherwise. Notwithstanding, prior 
literature has found that superiority of family firm performance is associated with 
founding families, hence not separating out founding family companies should 
arguably make it more difficult to obtain an association between family 
companies and constructs utilized in this study such as financial reporting quality, 
voluntary disclosure and investment efficiency.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis was unable to separate out CEO and non-CEO family 
companies. This is because the information available in the both the annual return 
and the FAME databases only indicated directors but not CEO shareholdings. As 
outlined previously, all the family companies in the sample consisted of 
companies with the largest family ownership and are members of top 
management (i.e. are all directors). Accordingly, although this thesis used 
arguments from socio-emotional wealth, it was unable to test it directly. 
 
Moreover similar to other studies examining consequences of ownership 
structure, namely, there may be potential endogeneity problems in the models 
utilized in this study. In particular, as outlined by Hutton (2007) if family firms 
only retain control of better performing firms, then the relationship between 
family firms and better quality disclosures could be spurious, given that Miller 
(2002) provided evidence that better performance is associated with better 
disclosure quality. To alleviate endogeneity concerns that the measures of 
discretionary accruals are correlated with performance, performance has been 
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included in the regressions. Furthermore, this thesis has also controlled for 
endogeneity by using statistical techniques such as GMM, which has been shown 
to provide better statistical efficiency than other instrumental variables techniques 
(Ng, 2005). Although care has been taken to ensure that endogeneity issues have 
been considered, nonetheless endogeneity concerns cannot be totally ruled out. 
 
In addition, while four earnings quality measures were utilized to triangulate the 
results, nonetheless as highlighted by Hope et al. (2013), the literature has 
provided many variations of these models. Accordingly, similar to Hope et al. 
(2013), using alternative models may affect the outcomes of conclusions in this 
thesis. 
 
Furthermore, care must be taken not to generalize the findings beyond medium-
sized private UK companies. In particular, conclusions in this thesis may not 
apply to US private companies as in the US; private company’s information 
environment is more opaque as financial reports are not widely distributed to the 
public. 
 
 
7.4.2 Future research directions 
There are a few areas that deserve future attention. The first is the measure of 
family ownership. An obvious improvement would be to examine founding 
family ownership. The second is that this thesis could introduce more corporate 
governance variables. In addition, another improvement would be to separate out 
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the role of family CEO and non-family CEO management.27 Past research has 
provided evidence that there are different inferences that could be made by 
including this variable. Hence, future research could include this measure as one 
of the explanatory variables in their study. 
 
Another area of future research is to examine the impact of institutions 
specifically private equity ownership, in family companies. In addition, as 
highlighted by Hutton (2007), further research could examine whether institutions 
invest more or less in family companies specifically in the private company 
setting. This thesis has included institutional ownership, but only included the 
variable when ultimate ownership is by an institution. Thus, further research 
could consider how different types of institutional ownership affects financial 
reporting behavior of private companies. 
 
 
 
 
 

Due to data not being available from the database and time restrictions, this thesis was unable to 
separate out the role of family CEO and non-family CEO management.
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